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ABSTRACT 
 
JAMES R. HULL: Monetization: A Theory and Applications  
(Under the direction of Dr. Barbara Entwisle) 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the topic. In Chapter 2, I present a review of the theoretical 
work on monetization and money. This chapter identifies the classic schools of thought 
on what monetization is and combines these with recent interdisciplinary scholarship to 
produce a theory of monetization for the 21st Century. It is shown that this theory 
provides improved explanatory power and generates many more interesting avenues for 
further research than the current theories. The major contribution of this chapter is a new 
theory of monetization that builds on the work of classic sociology, economics, and 
anthropology. Chapter 3 extends the theoretical work of Chapter 2 to connect it with 
familiar sociological literatures describing exchange, social networks, and trust.  It 
highlights the importance these factors for understanding monetization as institutional 
change. It compares this enhanced theoretical understanding to simpler economic models 
typically employed and demonstrates that the social network interpretation of 
monetization out-performs the simpler economic labor supply and demand explanation. 
Basic correlation analysis is used to support the empirical propositions, and a discussion 
of the unique challenges to studying monetization empirically is provided. The major 
conclusion of this chapter is that social network position is closely related to the degree 
of labor monetization among rural households in a transitional economy.  Chapter 4 is 
unique in treating monetization as an outcome variable and exploring the basic 
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demographic, economic, and agricultural factors that predict this transition in a 
transaction common to many world economies: the exchange of agricultural labor. It uses 
data from Nang Rong District, Thailand to demonstrate that many of these factors are 
related to agricultural participation and labor monetization in opposite ways, suggesting 
an antagonism between labor monetization and traditional agriculture. Utilizing the 
longitudinal character of the data, the greater degree of monetization observed at a later 
time period is shown to be a response to changes in the structural parameters of the 
model, while declining agricultural participation is better explained by the shifting 
composition of the population through common demographic processes like population 
aging. Chapter 5 summarizes the findings, draws connections, and suggests directions for 
future study.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION TO THE DISSERTATION 
 
ORGANIZATION 
 
The three chapters that follow introduce and develop the formal concept of 
monetization, derive basic predictions about the nature of this phenomenon, and use 
variety of analytical strategies for evaluating these predictions. In Chapter 2, I present a 
review and synthesis of the theoretical work on monetization, and by necessity, a 
comprehensive review of the literature on money itself. I then provide two very different 
types of applications (Chapters 3 and 4) that each accomplish several goals. First, they 
illustrate empirically how researchers can begin to think more carefully about 
monetization and present strong cases for the value of this additional theoretical care. 
Second, they enumerate the methodological challenges that confront those who are 
interested in studying monetization itself, or in measuring and incorporating measures of 
monetization into models of other phenomena. Third, each of these applications makes a 
substantive contribution to a specific field of research: in the first case, the study of social 
exchange networks and their relation to the form of the exchange, and in the latter, the 
study of agricultural and economic change, both in the specific context of Nang Rong 
District, Northeast Thailand. In this introduction, I outline the significance of each work, 
the relationship of each chapter to the others, and the place of each chapter in the broader 
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organizational structure of academic research. But, first, a brief introduction to the 
general topic is in order. 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPIC 
Monetization, and money itself, share the dubious distinction of being concepts 
that engender a false sense of familiarity. Perhaps it is because of antiquity of the initial 
“transition from barter to money” in the highly developed social contexts inhabited by 
most professional researchers, or perhaps because of the ubiquity of money in such a 
context, but such speculation is quite limited in the present work.  Instead, in the papers 
that follow I confine myself to the immediate, and considerable, implications of taking 
excessive liberties with concepts that should be central to sociology, as well as 
economics, anthropology, and other disciplines. Therefore, one common thread among 
these three stand-alone articles is the attempt to avoid a similarly cavalier treatment of the 
concept. Rather than presuming a shared understanding of what money is, and what it 
means for something or someone to experience “monetization,” I devote as much 
attention as space allows to explicitly conceptualizing both terms. And while far from a 
complete treatment, it is my hope that the reader will be satisfied with the theoretical and 
empirical progress that result.  
It is fair to say that up until now, two general opinions have existed regarding the 
study of monetization. The first, prevalent in the economic literature, is that this subject 
was thoroughly dealt with a century ago and is now at best a curious little branch of 
historical economics. The second view, more common in sociology and anthropology, is 
that something called monetization continues to occur all over the globe up to the present 
day, and that it likely has implications for many of the most central subjects in these 
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disciplines: modernization, commercialization, Westernization, development, 
mechanization, and on and on. Connections to myriad other more specialized sociological 
subjects are frequently implied as well.  
The existence of two such widely divergent views, even in to disciplines that 
regularly disagree theoretically and methodologically, is a curiosity in its own right. But, 
given the enormous research potential suggested by this second view, one would expect 
to find considerable theoretical and empirical work directed at understanding 
monetization – what it is, what causes it, what it causes, and what its implications are 
from a variety of perspectives. And yet, in hundreds of published articles that relate 
monetization to one or another topic, not one devotes space to defining, discussing, or 
elaborating on the conceptual meaning of monetization. I do not fault the authors of these 
articles, for it is also clear that none were written with the explicit goal of improving 
understanding of monetization. Instead, the implication of this pattern of treatment is that 
all of the diverse subjects related to monetization might be relatable in intriguing new 
theoretical ways, and understandings of each improved, if understanding of monetization 
itself were a significant goal of at least a few sociological writers.   
SIGNIFICANCE AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF EACH CHAPTER  
Chapter 2 is entitled “The Sociological Significance of Monetization and Money.” 
It addresses the first problem of theory-building: conceptualization. Before statements 
can be made about what monetization does, how it works, and what it relates to, the 
question of what monetization is requires an answer. A major argument advanced in this 
paper is that the traditional approach to money used in economics (and, by implication in 
sociology) draws attention away from the social character of all economic exchange, 
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focusing on the technology of money rather than on the social institutions and network 
structures that exist and regulate its use. Among early sociological writers, Karl Marx and 
Georg Simmel devoted considerable theoretical attention to what Marx called the 
“riddle” of money. But for reasons that can be explored only briefly in the chapter, these 
theoretical treatments failed to inspire a field of empirical study of money from a 
sociological perspective. I argue that this is a major loss to the discipline, and attempt to 
provide a theory of money and monetization for the 21st Century that might better support 
such empirical investigations. This revised theory incorporates core elements of Simmel 
and Marx, but also synthesizes theoretical insights scattered in other disciplines to 
provide a comprehensive, interdisciplinary theory of monetization that outperforms 
conventional treatments on several measures.  
Chapter 3 is entitled “Social Networks and Monetized Labor.” It builds on the 
work of chapter 2 extending it further to connect up with more familiar sociological 
literatures describing exchange, social networks, and trust. The result is a set of testable, 
if simple, hypotheses about the most prominent characteristics of social exchange 
networks associated with monetized and non-monetized exchange. Chapters 3 highlights 
the importance of social networks, information, and trust for understanding monetization 
as institutional change and again compares this enhanced theoretical understanding to 
simpler economic models typically employed. Methodologically, this chapter emphasizes 
the usefulness of basic correlation analysis to support or refute these empirical 
propositions and provides a discussion of the unique challenges to studying monetization 
empirically. By moving to operationalize monetization in social network terms, this 
chapter represents an important step toward a fully grounded, empirical science of 
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monetization and money. But, it is acknowledged that much work remains to be done 
before monetization can be fully described as a shift in the structure of exchange 
networks and the information transmitted by these networks as it is suggested will be 
possible by Chapter 2.  
Chapter 4 is entitled “Agricultural Participation and Labor Monetization in a 
Transitional Economy.” It is truly unique in treating monetization as an outcome variable 
and exploring the basic demographic, economic, and agricultural factors that help to 
predict this transition in a specific type of transaction common to many world economies: 
the exchange of agricultural labor. I devote considerable space in the chapter to a 
discussion of methodological problems that will be common in modeling the 
monetization of many different types of exchange. Sample selection resulting from the 
observational method of study is a particular concern, and one that should be considered 
from the earliest stages of future data collections aimed at elucidating new aspects of the 
monetization process. The fundamental question addressed is, within a specific context, 
described extensively in both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, what factors serve to differentiate 
monetized-labor households from non-monetized labor households. The major result of 
this chapter is a pair of binary probit models estimating the influence of a wide range of 
household economic, demographic, and agricultural characteristics on the probability that 
the household will engage in agriculture and if so, whether it engages in monetized or 
non-monetized labor exchange. The nature of the relationship between these two 
outcomes is explained. The analysis uses data from Nang Rong District, Thailand to 
demonstrate that many of the same factors are related to agricultural participation and 
labor monetization in opposite ways, suggesting an antagonism of sorts between labor 
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monetization and traditional agriculture. Utilizing the longitudinal character of the data, 
the greater degree of monetization observed at a later time period is shown to be a 
response to changes in the structural parameters of the model, while declining 
agricultural participation is better explained by the shifting composition of the population 
through common demographic processes like population aging. 
Lastly, it is important that I also address the question of what new measurement 
procedures and data collection initiatives are suggested by the results of these chapters, 
and what types of data will be required to more satisfactorily evaluate the new theory 
presented here. This is the principal function of the Conclusion to this dissertation, in 
addition to reviewing the major connections between chapters. While smaller 
recommendations about future directions in research are made within each chapter, it is 
only when the insights of all three chapters are considered together that the most useful 
suggestions for follow-up research emerge. 
  
 
CHAPTER 2 
THE SOCIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF MONEY AND MONETIZATION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper, I present revised conceptual definitions of money and monetization which 
synthesize the strongest elements from Marxist and Simmelian analyses of money with 
contemporary scholarship. This new theoretical framework incorporates institutional and social 
network views of the role of money in society and the process of social change that is 
monetization. That such a theoretical development has utility for researchers is shown in two 
ways. First, I note that in current sociology, no one writes papers about the sociological 
significance of monetization itself; rather, authors write papers about many other topics in which 
monetization is recognized as somehow connected, but for reasons not fully clear, is not brought 
under direct scrutiny, or measured and incorporated into models. The absence of research 
directly addressing monetization has resulted in a disorganized state of affairs in which little 
agreement exists even about even the most basic conceptual issues. I suggest that one reason for 
this is that we lack a contemporary sociological theory of money, one that is easily relatable to 
other major subjects of sociological inquiry, as well as compatible with the research traditions of 
economics and anthropology, where money currently receives more attention. 
A second justification for this revised theory of monetization is that it provides a simpler, 
more complete, and more satisfying interpretation of well-documented accounts of the transition 
from barter to money. I demonstrate this using the example of a German P.O.W. camp during 
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World War II, selected for its comparatively contemporary setting, the prospective, first-hand 
documentation provided about the events by an economist of the time, and its considerable 
reputation as a pedagogical tool in illustrating the functions and utility of money. In analyzing 
the significance of the account as traditionally presented and then pointing out its weaknesses, I 
aim to do more than just provide a better theory. I also hope to persuade more sociologists (and 
not just economic sociologists) to take a renewed look at money and monetization as the fully 
sociological concepts that they are and to consider ways to incorporate elements of monetization 
theory directly into their own work.  
Third, I argue that this synthesis of classical sociological writing and scholarship from 
multiple disciplines yields a fundamentally different way of thinking about money and 
monetization, one that performs an important function of theory – the generation of novel 
research questions and new avenues for research – far better than the current, rather stagnant 
theoretical understanding of money. The revised theory of money and monetization presented 
here places social institutions and network relationships in the foreground, replacing the money 
instrument as the key feature that enables monetized exchange to be identified. Further, the new 
theory will make explicit statements about the nature of monetization that are currently absent 
from sociological writing on the subject, specifically, that it is best conceptualized not as discrete 
or continuous, but as both depending on the scale at which the phenomenon is studied. Together, 
these and other aspects of the theory allow monetization to be easily related to the already well-
established fields of research on social networks and social exchange and suggest a number of 
research questions that are as old as either Marx or Simmel and yet remain unanswered today.  
As noted, I begin In Section II by reviewing the ways in which these subjects are 
conceptualized and studied in contemporary sociology by non-specialists in order to provide a 
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better sense of just how important monetization is as a general subject, and at the same time to 
reveal how much is to be gained from a better theory of money. I turn in Section III to a formal 
review of economic, and classical sociological theories of money and monetization in order to 
ground the theory I develop later in classical sociological work and to remind contemporary 
sociologists of the central significance that money once occupied in the writings of the 
discipline. In Section IV, I introduce the various theoretical elements that contribute to a revised 
theory of money and monetization. Section V provides an evaluation of the new theory using one 
of the most well-known and best-documented cases of monetization in action, as well as an 
elaboration of the broader utility of the theory. Lastly, I return in Section VI to the objectives 
stated above and several more specific questions posed throughout the chapter to again make a 
broader call for the revitalization of sociological interest in monetization.  
 REEXAMINING MONEY AND MONETIZATION 
 The General Sociological Problem 
Exchange is one of the oldest and most pervasive of all human activities. It is so central 
to the human experience that Simmel once proclaimed it to be the most unique identifying 
characteristic of the human “exchanging animal” (2006: 291). That oldest form of direct 
commodity exchange, barter, has been with humanity from time immemorial, and money, too, 
has been a fixture of societies since at least the time of Aristotle, who provided perhaps the first 
serious analysis of money (Mielke 2000). And yet even in the most market-oriented economies 
on Earth, a surprising number of social exchanges that could in principle involve money remain 
fully or partially non-monetized, or undergo monetization before our eyes, or involve 
considerations of a personal nature in addition to price (Zelizer 1989; Zelizer 1996). That money 
has not dissolved as many barriers to exchange and trade as is often thought is an interesting 
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observation by itself, but more interesting still from a sociological perspective is the question of 
why some types of exchange continued to be monetized while others are not. More fundamental 
still, questions remain about what precisely occurs when some type of exchange becomes 
monetized, that is, when money, whatever it is, becomes an acceptable means of payment. Under 
what conditions does monetary exchange emerge and flourish? Under what conditions is it 
extinguished? What other social phenomena are affected by the way social exchange is carried 
out and how? And what implications might monetary exchange have for the cultural and moral 
fabric of a village, state, or nation? These questions should encourage the reexamination of 
classic works on money from the previous century as well as the role of money in contemporary 
society. 
Two major questions lurk continually behind the present analysis, and are better 
addressed sooner rather than later. First, is it really true that sociology has had so little to say 
about money in recent decades? And second, if so, what is the reason? The first question will 
take up much of the next two sections, but it should be said at the outset that what is in fact 
lacking are 20th Century sociological theories of what money is and what it does in society, not 
theories that incorporate money indirectly, of which there are many for money is ubiquitous and 
inherently social. On the second question, it has been suggested that the study of money was 
simply ceded to economics altogether during the Methodenstreit of the late 19th and early 20th 
Century (Ingham 1998; Ingham 2000). That is, as sociology and economics grew into distinct 
disciplines and carved out (and defended) subject domains, money became economists’ turf. But 
this interpretation ignores the glaring fact, to be detailed below, that economic theories of 
money, with a few notable exceptions are themselves mostly the products of a late 19th Century 
understanding of the matter. As Smithin (2000), himself an economist, writes: 
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The sociologists ceded the field [of money theory] to the economists (presumably on the 
grounds that money is pre-eminently an economic subject), but as has been shown, the 
prevailing tendency among the economists was to relegate the discussion of money to a 
very low order of priority. It would seem, however, that any unified social science worthy 
of the name must at some point seriously confront what has always been, and still is, one 
of the key social institutions in everyday life. (2000a: 7).  
 
 
Here Smithin points to the problem: a lack of serious consideration of money across two major 
social sciences that ought to both have more to say on the subject. But he leaves unanswered the 
question of why. I would suggest as a common explanation for the lack of critical attention in 
both economics and sociology that money is a fundamental and ever-present part of the habitus 
of nearly every practicing social researcher. It is something used every day by nearly every one 
of us to accomplish myriad tasks, ranging from the most mundane, such as feeding ourselves, to 
the more significant, such as purchasing an automobile or a better education. Such observations 
may well have been as true in the day of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim as they are today. But 
perhaps because using money seems as natural as breathing air, the nature of money and what 
distinguishes it from other forms of value largely escapes critical attention and scrutiny. It is 
simply too common and vulgar to attract notice.  
The great exception occurs during times of crisis, such as periods of hyperinflation or 
deflation, when our attention is momentarily and almost unflinchingly fixed on that thing called 
money, which suddenly appears strange and uncomfortably intangible. One of the most poignant 
and classic examples of the power that such crises have to engender fresh interest in the nature of 
exchange is provided by the economist R.A. Radford, who described his experience of watching 
monetized exchange develop right before his eyes in a German P.O.W. camp during WWII as 
though it were a new pastime that the men invented to pass their time in captivity (Radford 
1945). Much like the tale of Robinson Crusoe keeping meticulous records of his one-man island 
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economy, which has served for more than a century as an example for textbooks, Radford’s 
account has been repeated and reimagined many times by scholars attempting to gain new insight 
or to argue just the opposite – that the current understanding of money is more than sufficient to 
explain such cases. It is precisely because of the great popularity of Radford’s account with 
scholars of money that it will be used here as well to highlight the advantages of a fully 
sociological theory of money and monetization. But, more generally, a science of money that is 
built solely on the analysis of its perversities and anomalies is still insufficient to the task of 
understanding the general role of money in society, a task that has only grown in magnitude over 
time. Thus, along with other authors who have called for renewed sociological attention to 
money as a subject of interest in its own right (Deflem 2003; Ingham 1998; Ingham 2000; 
Keister 1992; Swedberg 1997), I suggest that there is much to be gained from a theory of money 
and monetization for the 21st Century.  
To see just what is to be gained, I will shortly present a broad review of the sociological 
literature discussing monetization, but to better ground this review, I first present a brief 
discussion of the popular understanding of the concepts of money and monetization.  
Popular Understandings of Money and Monetization 
Although this review focuses on the formal, scientific theories of money, it is extremely 
useful to begin where most people begin, researchers and non-researchers alike, with the popular 
understanding of what is special and unique about money and what it means for something to 
become monetized. At this most basic level, there exists a clever bit of semantic sleight-of-hand, 
one that is often imitated in more formal academic treatments, in which the definition of 
monetization is contingent on definitions of money itself. Consider the way the terms are defined 
in the 2002 online update to the 2nd edition of the Oxford English Dictionary (OED).  
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Monetization is defined by the OED as a noun corresponding to the verb monetize, so to 
discover its meaning, one must investigate the entry for monetize (2002a). To monetize, 
according to the OED, is to “convert to the use of money” (2002b). Slightly more information is 
provided for the adjective monetized, with the addition of the parenthetical phrase “(as opposed 
to barter)” (2002c). In this derivative way it becomes necessary to examine the manifold 
meanings of the word money in order to discover fully what either monetize or monetized mean. 
This approach, closely mimicked in the social science literature, focuses on money itself as the 
key feature distinguishing monetary transactions from non-monetary transactions. That is, to 
define monetization one must first define money. Having done so, identifying monetization 
ought to be a straightforward task, as one simply looks for the use of money and if it is found, 
then monetization and monetized exchange there is also.  
Further, the meaning of money exchange is often pegged to the meaning of barter 
transaction, and vice versa, in what verges on tautology. This is just the approach noted above in 
the OED, and it is also closely followed in the social science literature on money (2002d). Most 
discussions of the meaning of money employ a simple rhetorical device to side-step the critical 
task of distinguishing money from non-money. Take the definition of barter provided by 
Kemmerer (1935) “The exchange of one commodity for another when neither commodity is 
money is called barter” (3). In this statement, money is treated as the cipher of barter, the key to 
its understanding. Or more recently from Shapiro (1975): “To be designated as barter exchange, 
the exchange would have to be mediated without the use of whatever at the time is money” (7). 
And again, Dobeck and Elliot (2007): “Barter is the exchange of goods or services among parties 
without using currency as a medium of exchange” (5).  
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These popular and highly standardized definitions of barter are insufficient on their own 
merits because each treats a separate, antonymic concept as sufficient to define the most 
important features of a different concept. In short, they only tell us what barter is not, and vice 
versa. Without an adequate definition of money, barter remains logically undefined. Returning to 
the OED yields this problem in its starkest form yet, “any generally accepted medium of 
exchange which enables a society to trade goods without the need for barter…” (2002d). What, 
then, is money in the popular understanding? It is any form of exchange that is not barter. And 
what is barter? It is any form of exchange that does not use money. To see the confusion created 
by allowing money and monetization to remain as popular terms rather than properly defined 
scientific concepts, I now consider the general pattern of usage in the sociological literature. 
The Conceptual Problem 
Among the benefits of a better theory of money and monetization, the one with the 
greatest potential to impact research throughout the discipline would be improved conceptual 
clarity among sociologists discussing the relationship of this phenomenon to other sociological 
subjects. Assessing the manner in which the concept is employed by researchers whose principal 
focus is not monetization provides a measure of the extent of the problem of theory 
underdevelopment and the ability of scholarship on monetization to reach a wider audience, 
while giving one a tantalizing glimpse of what is to be gained through better integration of these 
many and varied lines of research if the problem be resolved.  
The term “monetization” has been used to describe an exceedingly wide range of 
phenomena operating at an equally wide range of scales in the sociology literature. To simplify 
the presentation I use a typology to sort current usage of the concept according to two 
dimensions: 1.) whether the phenomenon is conceptualized as discrete or continuous, and 2.) 
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whether it is conceptualized at a macro or micro level. The result is a two-by-two table in which 
each article is placed in the quadrant that most closely describes the way in which the term is 
conceptualized by its authors. 
The first dimension assesses whether monetization is identified or implied as an “all or 
nothing” sort of transformation. A discrete conceptualization suggests that something either is 
monetized or is not monetized, while a continuous conceptualization suggests that something can 
be partially monetized or in the process of monetizing. Determining which category a particular 
usage belongs to is sometimes difficult, owing to ambiguity in the discussion or the fleeting 
nature of the authors’ use of the term. In these instances, the author’s unstated conceptual model 
can often be divined by asking whether monetization is described as a single, one-time event, or 
as an ongoing or gradual, process. The former consistently suggest a discrete conceptualization, 
while the latter imply a continuous treatment in nearly every case. 
The second dimension assesses the scale at which the process identified as monetization 
is said to be operating. As with the first dimension, authors do not always provide much context 
to use in classifying their usage, and in these cases it is sometimes easier to ask whether the 
phenomenon undergoing monetization is an individual relation or thing or a corporate actor or 
social institution. Thus, this second dimension can also be thought of as indexing the degree to 
which the thing described as being monetized is a tangible, concrete thing like gold or 
agricultural products or a more intangible, abstract concept, like a society or economy.1  
                                                 
1
 Of special interest is the increasingly common practice of using “monetization” to describe a stand-alone process, 
similar to the way some authors might use the terms Bureaucratization, Modernization, or Westernization. Used in 
this “capital M” way, Monetization denotes a set of abstract conceptual ideas and relations without describing a 
specific instance or level of operation {{308 Kumar, Dharma 1985; 117 Thornton, Arland 1987; 310 Moraw, Peter 
1989; 311 Rose, Nikolas 1992; 312 Kratz, Corinne A. 1993; 313 Mackie, Gerry 1996; 314 Eyal, Gil 2000}}. 
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The result of this cross-classification is presented in Table 2.1. The purpose of this table 
is not to completely represent the exact pattern of usage across the entire field (or fields) of 
sociology as might be done in a formal subject review. Rather, it is to demonstrate that 
considerable heterogeneity exists in the pattern of usage. Thus, the most important observation 
about this table is quite simply that all four quadrants contain many articles. This suggests that 
while individual authors no doubt feel confident about the conceptual meaning of monetization 
when they employ the term, a very different picture emerges when these works are viewed as a 
collective whole. There is actually considerable disagreement about whether monetization occurs 
at the scale of individual transactions or entire economies and whether it occurs all at once or in a 
more ragged, piecemeal fashion.2 As these are two of the most basic conceptual questions 
imaginable, they speak to the low level of theoretical development surrounding monetization.  
The key challenge posed by these many diverse appearances of the term in the literature 
is determining if and how they might be unified by a single theoretical construct. It may be the 
case that some of these are eclectic formations, resulting from a researcher’s own creative 
grasping for words to describe a process observed in empirical research. But, the very uniqueness 
of the term “monetization,” suggests that these many diverse instances are an attempt to describe 
the same core process or quality. If so, then a better appreciation for what precisely occurs when 
something undergoes monetization may enable the unification of many of these discrepant uses 
of the term under a single consistent theoretical framework. It would seem at first glance that 
different models of the spread of monetization are implied by the discrete/continuous distinction, 
as are different approaches to observing and measuring the concept. Likewise, the range of scales 
at which the process is thought to operate and the types of phenomena said to be undergoing 
                                                 
2
 This review focused only on articles in mainstream sociology journals that were available in searchable electronic 
databases. A more comprehensive review would almost certainly return additional examples in all four quadrants. 
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monetization are also quite broad. But as I will show in Section V, the conceptual definition of 
monetization developed in this paper relates the seemingly disparate phenomena at either end of 
these continua in a simple, yet consistent and grounded fashion. Under this new conceptual 
understanding, these different models and depictions of monetization are allowed to coexist, 
side-by-side, without the necessity of declaring one or another empirical account invalid.  
Thus, the present state of affairs in sociology would appear to be one of considerable 
confusion, though largely unrecognized, over what exactly monetization is and therefore what it 
does. In order to address this state of under-theorization it is necessary to shed our familiarity 
with this thing that is money and examine it as a strange new object, for it is only in 
reestablishing the sociological meaning and significance of money itself that monetization can be 
fully understood. Therefore, in the next section, I take a much closer look at the range of existing 
theories of money, and by implication, of monetization.  
 EXISTING THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO MONEY: A CRITIQUE 
Of the multiple perspectives on money, its meaning, and function, three major schools are 
identified here that represent well the diversity of thought on these matters. The first, shared 
almost universally in economics, I label the materialist-functionalist school, following Dodd 
(1994). The second school is the classic Marxist analysis of money, a vital element in the larger 
critique of capital and political economy offered in Capital and earlier works. The third school is 
based on the work of Simmel on human interaction, and receives its principal expression in The 
Philosophy of Money. While other writers have been inclined to discuss money and its 
relationship to other social phenomena, few have produced a unique, unified theory of money in 
the way these three schools have done so. This review highlights the weaknesses of each of these 
existing formulations, including those of Marx and Simmel, from a sociological standpoint. 
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The Materialist-Functionalist Approach to Defining Money 
THE MATERIALIST APPROACH. What I label the materialist-functionalist perspective 
is in fact comprised of two independent theoretical approaches that are united in a shaky alliance 
by many scholars of money. The first, a materialist approach to the problem, emerged in the 
latter 19th Century as economists attempted a more systematic analysis of money. While the 
materialist approach to defining money does not fully supplant the popular notion of, “not 
barter,” it does lend an air of objectivity to the concept. One of the earliest and most enduring of 
these classifications has been attributed to Jevons (1875), who stated that in order to be 
considered money, a substance must have certain material properties, which he summarized as 
portability, indestructibility, homogeneity, divisibility, and cognizability (ease of recognition, 
difficulty of forgery)3. These material qualities of money gained widespread use as a theoretical 
construct, becoming as popular among anthropologists as they were among the economists who 
promulgated them, and have survived to the present day almost exactly as Jevons proposed 
them(Bradford 1928; Dobeck and Elliot 2007; Neale 1976; Plattner 1989).  
All such attempts to define, categorize, and evaluate substances as money fall under the 
designation of materialist approaches to conceptualizing money. As Dodd (1994) explains, the 
key conceptual task in this approach is descriptive in nature (xv). The argument is elegant at first 
glance: certain substances or commodities are better suited to serve as money than others, and 
therefore the characteristics determining fitness ought to be useful criteria for the identification 
of money. A materialist framework often underlies ideographic approaches to research, in which 
a great many substances that have in reality functioned as money throughout history and across 
                                                 
3
 While it is reasonable to credit Jevons with the organization of these various qualities into a single system, many, if 
not all were present in the writings of his contemporaries. As perhaps the best example, Marx, who was developing 
his critique of capital contemporaneously with Jevons, identifies at least four of these five qualities as the 
characteristics of the ideal commodity to take on the functions of the money form, a place he awards to gold {{328 
Marx, Karl 1887}}. 
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cultures are catalogued and evaluated. This is borne out by the encyclopedic compendiums in 
economic anthropology detailing the many substances, the more unusual the better, that have 
served as money (e.g. Neale 1976). Plattner (1989), for one, applauds these efforts:  
 
One of the major contributions of early economic anthropology was to describe the wide 
range of things used to accomplish money functions. The list is enormous, including salt, 
shells, stones, beads, feathers, fur, bones, and teeth, as well as agricultural crops, animals, 
and of course, metals, from iron to gold and silver (175).  
 
 
Without diminishing the importance of such catalogues, their contribution to a conceptual 
definition of money is questionable. First, while the materialist approach has the appearance of 
generality, in practice it is deeply rooted in analyses of “premodern”4 forms of money, and the 
influence of these studies on the manner in which the definition is applied can be very strong at 
times, especially when the attempt is made to apply them to more “modern” contexts.  The very 
descriptors portability or indestructibility must be reimagined considerably to achieve 
compatibility with a number of 21st century monetary forms. Just consider the myriad means of 
transferring funds electronically over the internet, as when an individual arranges to have 
“money” removed from a personal savings account and transferred to the account of an online 
merchant. Is this money, comprised solely of binary data indestructible in the same way as 
elemental metals such as gold or silver? Even granting that the elements of a materialist 
definition can be extended to new forms of money, the sheer volume and variety of substances 
that functioned historically as money, as well as the ever-growing list of monetary instruments 
that exist in fully “modern” economies suggest that virtually anything can be money, for better or 
for worse. Consequently, such an approach to defining money is only current until a new form of 
                                                 
4
 The terms modern and premodern, along with similar terms, are enclosed in quotes throughout in order to stress the 
implied non-neutral value statement that these terms possess. As will be seen, the conceptualization of monetization 
need not include any directional assumptions as previous formulations often have. That is, demonetization and 
monetization are assumed to be equally plausible, regardless of whether they are equally common empirically.  
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money comes along, at which point it must be added to the list (and the standards possibly 
adjusted to acknowledge some new technological breakthrough). From a theoretical standpoint, 
materialist definitions of money are therefore greatly conflated with the historical period in 
which that money is studied. Worse still, from the standpoint of theory-building, such deeply 
idiographic descriptions of the exact nature, function, and use of so many diverse monetary 
instruments work in opposition to the goal of generalizability. 
But there is a second, more fundamental flaw in the materialist approach to defining 
money. Many of the substances that can function as money do not always function as money 
(Dodd 1994). Even an ideal substance for monetary exchange, one that is highly portable, 
indestructible, homogeneous, divisible, and recognizable, can be traded directly for another 
substance or used in a “non-monetary” way. Gold and silver coins could historically be melted 
down to produce jewelry, for example. Plattner’s list of substances that have functioned as 
money recounted above (e.g. salt, fur, etc.) clearly speaks to this fact. The implication is that any 
definition of money that is solely dependent upon the physical characteristics of the substance 
will fail to consistently distinguish money exchange from other forms.  
THE FUNCTIONALIST APPROACH. As if acknowledging the shortcomings of a pure 
materialist approach, this list of material qualities is frequently supplemented with a qualitatively 
different type of definition, believed to address the weaknesses of the first. Dodd (1994) 
identifies this second component of definitions as the functionalist approach to defining money 
(xvi). The functionalist approach is diametrically opposed to the materialist approach. It begins 
by defining the functions of money and then identifies monetary forms with reference to this list 
of functions (Dodd 1994: xxi). When faced with a newly emerging monetary instrument, a 
frequent occurrence in “modern” economies, the nomothetic task is to compare the instrument to 
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an idealized set of functions, collectively embodied in the notion of “general purpose money” 
(Dodd 1994; Plattner 1989). In contrast, the idiographic, materialist task was providing an 
accurate assessment of the nature of the instrument and its fitness for use as money. 
 The functions that money is argued to perform in society comprise a highly standardized 
list of elements. Money is said to act as 1.) a medium of exchange, 2.) a common measure of 
value (or a unit of account) 3.) a store of wealth or value, and, sometimes, 4.)  a standard of 
deferred payment (Barker 1913; Bradford 1928; Dobeck and Elliot 2007; Kemmerer 1935; 
Plattner 1989; Shapiro 1975). The exact number of functions changes slightly as they are 
combined or replicated on the list, as do the labels given to these functions. In any case, the 
content of this ideal set of functions is of less significance than the way they define and identify 
money.  
To explain the need for a given function, and hence money, writers have long followed 
the now-familiar pattern of juxtaposing money exchange against the more “cumbersome” system 
of barter. For instance, one undesirable consequence of barter that has been regularly noted is the 
lack of “coincidence of wants”, famously illustrated by both Barker (1913) and Kemmerer 
(1935) with the quaint (and nearly verbatim) account by Jevons of “poor Mademoiselle Zélie,” a 
Parisian singer who agreed to give a concert in the Society Islands in exchange for a third of the 
show’s receipts. Her take was 3 pigs, 23 turkeys, 44 chickens, 5000 coconuts, and considerable 
quantities of bananas, lemons, and oranges (1913). As Barker dryly observes, “The Society 
Islanders, no doubt wanted to hear Mlle. Zélie sing, but Mlle. Zélie certainly did not want five 
thousand coconuts” (1913: 4).  
If one assumes that barter is a voluntary exchange, it is not likely to occur unless the 
parties involved are convinced at least for the moment of the opportunity to better satisfy some 
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want if the transaction is completed. When there are parties in one’s vicinity who have 
something of interest, and who are willing to accept what one has to offer in return, a 
“coincidence of wants” obtains. Because a substance which is recognized as a medium of 
exchange (money) may be accepted and held onto without fear of becoming stuck with it or its 
losing value over time, it is argued that money is able to overcome the coincidence of wants 
problem by decoupling the acts of buying and selling in both space and time. This observation 
also forms a central plank of the Marxist analysis, presented next.  
This approach to defining money again falls short of the promises of objectivity and 
conceptual rigor for two major reasons. First, in the same way that a particular substance may not 
always be used as money, no single monetary form (at present) is able to simultaneously fulfill 
all of these functions perfectly (Dodd 1994). In fact, there are natural antagonisms between the 
functions. For example, if money is to function maximally as a medium of exchange, then it 
might be presumed that the more portable and transient it is the better.  Meanwhile, if money is 
to function best as a store of value it must resist all decay, whether elemental or social. Shells, 
copper, silver, gold; each in its turn improved the overall functioning of money incrementally, 
thereby bringing the money in question into closer agreement with the ideal definition. This 
succession continued with the introduction of bank notes, paper money, personal checks, credit 
cards, debit cards, and on and on. All of these forms of money seek to fulfill the many functions 
of general purpose money completely and simultaneously, but in practice each remains at best 
only an approximation of this ideal type.  
As an example, consider the ill-fated U.S. two-dollar bill. As a specific manifestation of 
the United States Federal Reserve Note, the two-dollar bill is an exceedingly fine store of value 
(barring inflation), an adequate unit of account, and perfectly acceptable as standard of deferred 
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payment. But as a medium of exchange, the two-dollar bill often functions quite poorly in 
practice. Numerous popular reports recount store clerks who refuse to accept a $2 bill as 
payment for services or goods, having never seen one before and believing them to be counterfeit 
(Olesker 2005). In one documented incident in 1993, an employee of Taco Bell refused to accept 
a customer’s $2 bill as payment for his order. The vexed customer escalated the encounter until a 
manager was called to the scene only to have the manager express the same doubt, not just as to 
whether the bill was authentic but whether such a thing as a $2 bill existed at all. Not until a 
security guard arrived was the impasse resolved (Urban Legends Reference Pages 2005).  
This example provides a nice illustration of two points. First, despite having all the 
backing of the Federal Reserve, the United States Treasury, and many other parts of the federal 
government apparatus, the ability of the two-dollar bill (or any potential medium of exchange) to 
function as money can be completely negated by a single naïve exchange partner. One question 
for theorists who embrace the functionalist approach is this: in that moment and precise social 
context, was the two-dollar bill money? It still functioned as a store of value equal to two dollars 
perfectly well, whatever that value is, but it has clearly ceased to function for the moment as a 
medium of exchange. What was required in this case to reestablish the $2 bill as money was the 
involvement of a representative of law enforcement, or a trusted authority figure, essentially an 
agent of the “state” who legitimated and enforced the acceptance of the medium of exchange 
(with the implicit threat of involving still further agents, if necessary). The significance of this 
story should be clear: the physical form and the functions of money are neither necessary nor 
sufficient in all cases for the completion of a monetary transaction.   
The second point this example illustrates is that despite the clarity and appeal of the dual 
materialist-functionalist approach to defining money, the neat distinction between a function and 
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a material quality of money is nearly always muddled in practice. After all, it is just as valid to 
say that the two dollar bill failed the test of cognizability – and that it was this which prevented it 
from performing its function as a medium of exchange. As this illustration makes clear, these 
two systems are mutually reinforcing, each leaning on the other to an extent for support, both 
incomplete on their own. But even presented together in hybrid fashion, the materialist-
functionalist approach to defining money fails on at least one major point. Even with the most 
detailed possible accounting of what money does and why it does it so well, proponents of the 
approach cannot theoretically distinguish what constitutes money a priori, but are only able to 
identify empirical examples post hoc. This amounts to an “I know it when I see it” strategy, 
providing some utility for researchers, but failing entirely in the larger tasks of stating exactly 
what is unique about money (Dodd 1994). 
In contrast, the Marxist tradition which I describe next offers an exhaustive analysis of 
the forms of value, including money, from a very different perspective. Marx builds upon the 
work of his economist contemporaries, but among the improvements that the Marxist approach 
offers over the purely material-functionalist perspective is a theoretical bridge to the analysis of 
the wider human relations surrounding exchange.  
Marx and the “Riddle of Money” 
Befitting his status as a contributor to both economics and sociology, Marx’s analysis of 
money contains elements of both the traditional materialist-functionalist perspective just 
described and the sociological, institutional view of Simmel and others explored below. But 
while much of Marx’s multi-thousand page corpus deals in some way with the development and 
implications of a money economy, it is in his analysis of value that one finds the clearest 
expression of his thinking about the relationship of money to barter and exchange. The analysis 
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of value assumes its place in his writing only insofar as it is a necessary part of the groundwork 
for his larger project of critiquing capital, and as soon as it is adequately addressed, Marx moves 
on to this primary task.5 Thus it is possible, and a great simplification, to confine this discussion 
of the general Marxist perspective on money to the fullest expression of Marx’s theory of value, 
found in Capital Volume 1 (Marx 1887).6 I leave the connection between Marx’s larger analysis 
of capital and the theory of monetization for future exploration, delving instead more deeply into 
the contrast Marx paints between barter and money exchange as distinct phenomena.  
In his analysis of the forms of value, Marx posits a typology consisting of one form of 
use value plus four forms of exchange value, presented in a definite order that reflects an 
underlying model of the historical development of the money form (1887: Ch 1, Sect 3). Each of 
the forms of exchange value describes a particular expression of the relationship between 
commodities, and each is fundamentally distinct from the use value of the commodity. This 
careful distinction between the use value of a commodity, assessed in highly personal terms for 
the person who will use it, and the exchange value of that commodity in relation to some other 
commodity is an important contribution to the general analysis of money, one that Simmel, for 
one, is less clear about. Marx notes with frequency that these two distinct forms of value were 
often confused by his contemporaries, to the detriment of a proper understanding of value and 
money (1887: Ch 1, Sect 1). 
Laying aside use value for the moment, Marx’s four-part typology of exchange value 
begins with the Elementary or Accidental Form of Value. At the heart of this formulation lies the 
                                                 
5
 The truth of this is demonstrated by the fact that the term “barter” and discussions of this form of exchange appear 
almost exclusively in the first three chapters of Capital. 
 
6
 Multiple translations, versions, and printings of Capital exist, many with different page numbers. To reduce 
confusion for readers who wish to refer to specific citations and quotations, they are references according to the 
Chapter, Section, and Subsection, where applicable, as these divisions, with few exceptions, are stable across 
editions. All passages quoted from Capital come from the First English Edition of 1887, translated by Samuel Moore 
and Edward Aveling and edited by Frederick Engels.   
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concept of human labor. While the production of each useful commodity requires qualitatively 
different types of labor, all commodities relate themselves to each other through the basic quality 
that all embody: human labor (1887: Chapter 1, Section 2). In the case of this first form of 
exchange value, two commodities relate directly and uniquely to one another without an 
intermediary, a process that must therefore be carried out for each possible combination of 
commodities; tedious to say the least. Marx’s favored illustration makes this type of relationship 
between commodities clear: a certain amount of linen (say 20 yards) can be exchanged for one 
coat. The exchange value of each commodity can thus be expressed in a certain quantity of the 
other commodity, which functions in the role of the equivalent value.  
Slightly better than the elementary form of value, the total or expanded form of value 
allows multiple commodities to be related to each other in a chain. But, as Marx notes, this is 
“nothing but the sum of the elementary expressions or equations of the first kind” (1887: Ch 1, 
Section 3, Subsect B). Continuing with Marx’s simple illustration, the coat-value of 20 yards of 
linen is first determined, and then the tea-value of 1 coat, and then the coffee value of 10lbs of 
tea, and so on, with the chain of equivalences continuing indefinitely through as many different 
possible pairings as exist in the entire sphere of economic exchange. While cumbersome, the 
expanded form of value represents an important intermediate stage of development leading to the 
general form of value. 
The third form of value, the general, represents a qualitative leap in human ingenuity, as 
the exchange value of all commodities is now expressed in a single commodity (1887: Ch 1, Sect 
3, Subsect C). Marx notes that the functions of this commodity, known as the general equivalent, 
are best performed by gold for the reasons discussed in connection with the 
materialist/functionalist school: gold is durable, divisible, recognizable, and so forth (1887: Ch 1, 
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Sect 3, Subsect C). But lending support to the critique of the pure materialist position described 
above, Marx implies that these characteristics do not determine what constitutes money in a 
physical sense, but rather define those commodities that best perform the function of money in a 
social sense: 
 
In proportion as exchange bursts its local bonds, and the value of commodities more and 
more expands into an embodiment of human labour in the abstract, in the same 
proportion the character of money attaches itself to commodities that are by Nature fitted 
to perform the social function of a universal equivalent. (1887: Ch 2, emphasis added).   
 
 
It is but a small intuitive leap from this sort of general equivalent embodied in a 
commodity to the fourth form of value, the money form. The chief difference between money 
and the general equivalent is that general equivalents are commodities that, when not functioning 
in their role as measure of value, have some use values of their own, whereas the money form is 
exchange value in its purest expression, a commodity that exists only to measure value (1887: Ch 
1, Sect 3, Subsect D).  
While each of these forms of exchange value is qualitatively distinct from the others, all 
of them differ in the same fundamental way from direct barter. The latter Marx briefly, but 
succinctly describes as the exchange of one use value for another (1887: Ch 2). Thus, the Marxist 
analysis of money posits something considerably more complex and nuanced than the simple 
barter/money dichotomy found in the popular and materialist-functionalist formulations. For 
Marx, between barter and money lie three distinct forms of exchange value: the elementary, 
expanded, and general. It is unfortunate that Marx did not expend the same critical energies 
providing an analysis of barter as he did for exchange value, but this is understandable in light of 
his objectives. As it stands, Marx’s theory of barter is not generalized or abstracted to the general 
case, remaining closely intertwined in his writing with the forms of society in which it 
28 
 
principally occurs, a problem that was also observed to hold for the materialist-functionalist 
approach. Marx implies that barter can take place only in contexts where commodities are not 
produced with an eye toward exchange because when production for exchange occurs the 
elementary form of value replaces barter as the mechanism permitting exchange  (1887: Ch 2). 
Thus, it can be extrapolated that, for Marx, what distinguishes barter from the other forms of 
exchange is the purpose that drives the expenditure of labors in the first place, a potentially 
difficult concept to measure reliably.  
A second difference between money and barter that Marx more explicitly identifies 
concerns the sequence of events involved in an exchange of one commodity for another. This is 
best illustrated using the notation favored by both Aristotle and Marx, in which a commodity is 
represented by C and money by M. Using this notation, monetized exchange might be 
characterized as C—M M—C (sometimes just C—M—C), a circuit of exchange where a 
commodity first drops out of circulation and is replaced by money and the circuit is then 
completed from the perspective of the original seller when the money is again converted into a 
different commodity (1887: Ch 3, Sect 2, Subsect A). Barter exchange, in contrast, could be 
represented in this notation by C—C, where this is a literal depiction of the exchange and not 
shorthand for the longer C—M M—C circuit as Marx sometimes employed the expression. The 
implication is not only that money is not involved in barter, but that the barter exchange occurs 
principally between two actors who simultaneously act as both “buyers” and “sellers,” whereas 
the money form enables an actor’s act of selling to be separated in time and space from the act of 
buying, a quality previously ascribed to money. It also allows each portion of the 
“metamorphosis” from commodity to money and back to involve different parties (Marx 1887: 
Ch 3, Sect 2, Subsect A).  
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One significant consequence of the two previous observations is that much of what others 
describe as barter may not constitute barter at all according to Marx. Rather, these exchanges 
may actually involve one of the higher forms of value, but are carried out without an actual 
physical money form being present. This might be represented as C—(M M)—C, where the 
partitioning of money in the center is meant to signify this portion of the exchange process takes 
places entirely as mental activity on the part of actors who use money as a unit of account to 
measure the value of two commodities, and then exchange them directly. In such a case, Marx 
would be right to deny that this type of transaction is direct barter by his own standards. First, 
while hidden to the unobtrusive observer, it is the exchange values of the commodities that are 
being related, not their use values. Second, and more fundamentally, such a mode of exchange 
suggests that the commodities may have been produced with an eye toward exchange, a key 
characteristic of non-barter exchange for Marx.  
Beyond these points, what most sets Marx (and Simmel) apart from the materialist-
functionalist school is the context of the exchanges described in the foregoing presentation. Marx 
makes explicit many times and in many ways that money is a wholly social phenomenon with no 
reality or meaning apart from the social interaction of exchange. In the sampling of passages that 
follows, Marx fully reveals his sociological inclinations: 
 
It thus becomes evident that since the existence of commodities as values is purely social, 
this social existence can be expressed by the totality of their social relations alone, and 
consequently that the form of their value must be a socially recognised form (1887: Ch 1, 
Sect 3, Subsect C1). 
 
Value, therefore, does not stalk about with a label describing what it is. It is value, rather, 
that converts every product into a social hieroglyphic. Later on, we try to decipher the 
hieroglyphic, to get behind the secret of our own social products; for to stamp an object 
of utility as a value, is just as much a social product as language (1887: Ch 1, Sect 4). 
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…a particular commodity cannot become the universal equivalent except by a social act 
(1887: Ch 2). 
 
 
And perhaps Marx’s clearest statement about both the distinction between barter and the 
monetary exchange of commodities and the social character of the latter process,  
 
 
We see here, on the one hand, how the exchange of commodities breaks through all local 
and personal bounds inseparable from direct barter, and develops the circulation of the 
products of social labour; and on the other hand, how it develops a whole network of 
social relations spontaneous in their growth and entirely beyond the control of the actors 
(Marx 1887: Ch 3, Sect 2, Subsect A, emphasis added).  
 
There are a number of ideas contained in the above passage that will reemerge in the 
theory developed in the next section. In particular, while Marx explicitly states elsewhere that 
money is not a pure symbol, he seems to hedge this statement by suggesting that the money form 
contains a certain abstract quality that is a purely social construction (1887: Ch 2). That this 
quality has the potential to be divorced from the others rescues much of his subsequent analysis 
from the criticism that it does not allow for money to regularly take the sorts of wholly 
immaterial physical forms (i.e. not gold) that it regularly has done so in the past century. And in 
any case, Marx is not to be faulted for failing to be perfectly prophetic. The possibility of this 
purely symbolic money, of which the token is an example, is even more clearly acknowledged 
when Marx writes, 
 
…in this process which continually makes money pass from hand to hand, the mere 
symbolical existence of money suffices. Its functional existence absorbs, so to say, its 
material existence. Being a transient and objective reflex of the prices of commodities, it 
serves only as a symbol of itself, and is therefore capable of being replaced by a token. 
One thing is, however, requisite; this token must have an objective social validity of its 
own, and this the paper symbol acquires by its forced currency. This compulsory action 
of the State can take effect only within that inner sphere of circulation which is 
coterminous with the territories of the community, but it is also only within that sphere 
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that money completely responds to its function of being the circulating medium… (1887: 
Ch 3, Sect 2, Subsect C). 
 
By invoking the State as the only way symbolic money can function in the absence of a 
material form of value, Marx implicitly reinforces the institutional perspective on money 
developed here. Put simply for now, money, to function as a pure symbol, requires the 
compulsory action of the State (or a similar institutional structure) to enforce the acceptance of 
an object or symbol with no inherent use value in exchange for the alienated product of one’s 
own labor. Moreover, Marx makes clear that money in this form is inseparable from such an 
institutional structure because the functionality of money extends only as far as the influence of 
the State. 
To summarize, Marx provides a clear analysis of the development of the money form, far 
more subtle and detailed than the simple barter/money distinction portrayed by proponents of a 
materialist-functionalist understanding. And yet, despite the confidence that Marx expresses in 
the superiority of this analysis, he, like others, refers to money as a “riddle” and a “mystery” on 
numerous occasions, and not simply rhetorically. Simmel, on the other hand, lays his finger more 
directly on why money is such a puzzle to his contemporaries. Namely, that in focusing on 
money itself to the exclusion of the social structures that accompany it, money is stripped of its 
social character, and this inevitably leads to confusion on the part of observers who are thus led 
to ascribe to money, a mere thing, properties and powers that can only belong to networks of 
human actors themselves. To see what was and is so innovative about Simmel’s approach I now 
describe the essential elements of his analysis of money. 
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 Simmel and the “People behind the Objects” 
Simmel’s analysis of money, presented in The Philosophy of Money (Simmel 2006), is a 
unique work, employing few of the conventions found in other treatments. The level of attention 
he devotes to money in the more than 400 page Philosophy of Money surpasses that of even 
Marx. But it is the fundamentally sociological character of Simmel’s approach that makes it 
ideally suited to serve as the basis of a modern sociological theory of money and monetization. 
Specifically, Simmel’s observation that it is the “people behind the objects” that are of principal 
interest in studying exchange, monetized or not, should serve as the foundation of both the 
theoretical and methodological analysis of money. As I will show in Section IV, by situating 
human exchange in an explicit institutional context, and acknowledging the roles of information 
and social network structure in shaping this exchange, this fundamental contribution of Simmel 
can be extended to serve as the basis of a more complete understanding of money and 
monetization. 
As with Marx, Simmel’s careful study leads to some of the same general observations 
about money made by the materialist and functionalist approaches:  
• Money is a medium of exchange (2006: 126),  
• Money should exhibit divisibility (2006: 128),  
• Money is the pure value of a thing and not the thing itself (2006: 121), and 
• Money must be counted on to have a consistent value in the future (2006: 178). 
Yet Simmel’s orientation towards money and its “services” (2006: 188) is actually quite different 
from the functionalist perspective, best expressed in his declaration that “Money, whatever 
represents it, does not have a function, but is a function” (2006: 169, emphasis in original). This 
begs the question: a function of what? 
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Far more plainly than Marx, Simmel establishes himself as working from the emerging 
sociological perspective when he references the fundamental social nature of both money and 
exchange:  
 
…exchange is a sociological phenomenon sui generis, an original form and function of 
social life (2006: 100). 
 
 
It is, therefore, almost a tautology to say that exchange brings about socialization: for 
exchange is a form of socialization (2006: 175). 
 
 
…since money is entirely a sociological phenomenon, a form of human interaction, its 
character stands out all the more clearly the more concentrated, dependable and agreeable 
social relations are (2006: 172, emphasis added). 
 
As the last statement indicates, Simmel believes that the very development and existence of a 
monetary system of exchange is predicated on certain essential characteristics of human 
interaction. This is a familiar theme to students of Simmel, for whom nearly all human 
interaction is exchange of one sort or another, whether of information, goods, labor, or other 
thing of value: “Every interaction has to be regarded as an exchange: every conversation, every 
affection (even if it is rejected), every game, every glance at another person” (2006: 82).  
 Unlike Marx and the economists, Simmel conceptualizes barter exchange and monetary 
exchange as two distinct, but substitutable variations of the same sociological phenomenon. But 
if these two systems are substitutable, however poorly one may perform in comparison with the 
other, attempts to paint them as different social systems are misleading. In treating money as a 
separate sociological phenomenon from barter, one suggests that the transition from barter to 
money exchange is the extinction of one sociological form by another. This is exactly the 
imagery employed in traditional economic accounts of the “evolution of money” (Bonnie 1933: 
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53). But instances appear to abound of societies that function with both systems intact without 
any visible signs of antagonism. One economic sector may become monetized while another 
“lags” behind, remaining “mired” in barter transactions. This coexistence may be merely a 
transitional stage, but if so, the transition has been occurring since the introduction of money and 
continues to the present day, even in highly developed economies.7 Thus, in contrast to the 
common practice of defining barter as the cipher of money exchange and money exchange as 
anything that is not barter, Simmel’s view is that they are in fact two forms of the same 
sociological phenomenon. In conceptual terms, both are theoretically distinct, and yet are clearly 
subsumed under some larger conceptual umbrella.  
Against the three analyses of money presented in this previous section, I will posit a 
theory of monetization which, while rooted heavily in the work of Simmel with contributions 
from Marx’s critique, also brings in important interdisciplinary contributions from 
anthropological and economic writings and from institutional and social network theory. In order 
to make the presentation of these widely divergent streams of thought as efficient as possible, 
they are discussed only in terms of their utility for this synthetic theory, and not in their broader 
context as independent lines of research in their own right. To this end, I address four major 
issues: 1.) the theoretical meaning of exchange, as separate from transfers and transactions, 2.) 
the role of information in exchange, 3.) the institutional framework of exchange, and 4.) the 
social network significance of modifying the manner in which exchange is carried out. At the 
                                                 
7
 It may also be the case that the advent of new technologies has actually increased the practicality and use of barter 
in these highly developed economies, again suggesting the lack of an antagonistic relationship. The internet is an 
ideal instrument for reducing the “coincidence of wants” problem associated with barter transactions. Websites like 
Craigslist.org, Freecycle.org, and Kijiji.com allow users to greatly expand the extent of their search, increasing the 
odds of finding an acceptable trading partner, at little or no cost to the transactors in terms of time spent searching. 
Had the aforementioned singer Mlle. Zélie had access to a comparable service in the 19th Century, she might have 
had fewer reservations about accepting 5000 coconuts and sundry livestock in exchange for her performance, 
knowing that these items could be shipped overnight to suitable buyers in Alaska, Britain, or China in exchange for 
cash or something else that she could actually use.  
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conclusion of this discussion, I present this synthetic theory and then proceed to evaluate its 
utility in comparison to two of the three perspectives presented above. 
 
 INSTITUTIONS, INFORMATION, AND MONEY: A SYNTHETHIS 
 Exchange, Transactions, and Transfers 
I turn first to providing a stronger theoretical framework for understanding general 
human exchange, of which Simmel maintains barter and money are examples. This is necessary 
to fully appreciate the final observation of the previous section that barter and monetary 
exchanges are two forms of the same sociological phenomenon. Hunt (2002) reviews 
anthropological literature on exchange and suggests that the three traditional approaches to 
conceptualizing forms of exchange in anthropology result in suboptimal formations. To advance 
the analysis of economic exchange, Hunt proposes a distinction between economic transfers and 
economic exchange. They are nested concepts in his framework. All economic exchanges 
involve transfers, but not all transfers are exchanges. To constitute a transfer, a thing of value 
must change ownership, at least temporarily (2002: 108). There need not be reciprocity. Prior 
concepts including “the gift” and “negative reciprocity” (Sahlins 1972: 195-196) can be 
subsumed under the concept of the transfer. These are, essentially, “one-sided exchanges.” In a 
full-fledged exchange, another thing of value must be returned (Hunt 2002: 109).  
Two observations about this formulation hold special relevance. First, the exchange need 
not be simultaneous. Ongoing systems of economic exchange may exist in which assemblages of 
goods or services are doled out in ongoing fashion. Such a system often characterizes “personal” 
or “embedded” social networks (Granovetter 1985), owing to its dependence on long-term 
associations between transactors and emphasis on “security” before “profit” (Plattner 1989: 218).  
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Second, it seems likely that few actors in economic systems or societies acknowledge an 
exchange as two independent transfers. Rather, in practice, the exchange is viewed as a single 
act. Marx, for one, makes this point and goes further, to suggest that in cases of a C-M-C type 
circuit, the entire interaction will likely be viewed as a single economic act by all concerned, 
despite the highly significant fact (for Marx) that half of the circuit is typically carried out with a 
different party than the other (Marx 1887: Ch 3, Sect 2, Subsect A). Viewing multiple economic 
actions involving two or more parties as single acts serves to conflate acts of transfer and 
exchange and is partly responsible for the conceptual confusion which Hunt describes.  
Thus, in the present analysis, exchange denotes the most general concept, synonymous 
with the transaction. Both barter and monetary exchange constitute full forms of exchange, in 
which things of value trade hands, while a transfer is conceptualized as a 1-sided shift in 
resources from one to another. In practice, many transfers may be incomplete exchanges, but this 
distinction is of less importance to the present theory than the recognition that monetization, 
whatever it is, must involve an alteration in the way that exchange is carried out. So linking the 
study of money to the study of social exchange generally will have numerous theoretical 
advantages. 
The Role of Information in Exchange 
As the preceding section demonstrates, the current anthropological study of exchange 
addresses several fundamental questions surrounding exchange that garner little attention in 
other disciplines. The role of information in exchange is another important example. Plattner 
observes that all exchanges involve several distinct forms of information (1989). This 
information relates to the “goods” involved, the “transactions” involved, and the “actors” 
involved (Plattner 1989: 218). Under information about “goods”, Plattner includes immediately 
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perceived attributes of the thing to be exchanged. Examples include size, color, and composition 
in the case of goods, but this category of information could apply equally well to other things of 
value such as labor and services. Also grouped as information about “goods” is what Plattner 
terms “experience quality” – attributes of goods that are only exposed through use, such as 
durability, or in the case of labor, the intensity or skill with which a worker performs her or his 
tasks. Next, information about the “transaction” includes price, the conditions of payment (i.e. 
what will be accepted in exchange), and the probability that the given exchange will be 
successfully completed. Lastly, the type of information available about “actors” is concisely 
summarized by Plattner’s statement that “Knowing who a trader is may sometimes be the best 
way to know what he is buying or selling” (1989: 218).  
If barter and money are different means of accomplishing economic exchanges, which 
take place in all societies, then a better way to understand the difference between these two 
forms of exchange may lie in the multiple forms of information embedded in the exchange just 
enumerated. To better understand these differences, and place both forms of exchange in the 
proper institutional context, I turn now to the institutional nature of exchange. 
Barter and Monetary Exchange Institutions 
Simmel described money as “an original form and function of social life” and indeed it is 
appropriate to conceptualize economic exchange, monetary exchange, and barter as requiring a 
set of social institutions. I employ the term institution to denote a “…structure that human beings 
impose on their dealings with each other” (North 1992: 9). Many conceptualizations of 
“institution” exist, but North’s (1981, 1992) is especially appropriate because of his efforts at 
interjecting institutions into economic analyses, arguing that money and monetary systems 
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should be dealt with both as institutions themselves and as phenomena that are impacted by 
institutions.  
Elaborating on the concept of institutions, Hodgson (2004) states that they are: 
 
…durable systems of established and embedded social rules that structure social 
interactions…. By their nature, institutions must involve some shared conceptions, in 
order to make rules operative. According to this definition, systems of language, money, 
law, weights and measures, traffic conventions, table manners, firms (and all other 
organizations) are all institutions… (2004: 14, emphasis added). 
 
 
Hodgson, like North, declares that money systems are undoubtedly institutions. I have already 
shown that Marx shared this view, and one finds an equally plain assertion that money is a social 
institution in the writings of Simmel (2006: 184).  
While at times money, money systems, exchange systems, and barter are all 
interchangeably referred to as social institutions, the observations made earlier suggest a more 
precise interpretation. It is in fact not money itself that is the institution. Money is, for lack of a 
better term, a technology which has no function outside the context of the social institutions that 
exist for its use and support. Marx, to his credit, made this point explicitly as has been seen. 
Simmel draws attention to the same when he asks, 
 
If the embodiment of the action of exchange in a particular form is accomplished 
technically in such a way that each object is first exchanged for this form rather than 
directly for another object, the question arises: upon closer examination, what is the 
corresponding behavior of the people behind the objects?” (2006: 177, emphasis added). 
 
The acknowledgment and identification of a social institutional framework for the 
conduct of monetary exchange permits the following, fundamental observation to be made: even 
the simplest monetary transaction is an exchange involving not two, but a minimum of three 
parties: the two transactors and some “higher or intermediate” social organ (Simmel 2006: 175). 
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Put simply, barter is an essentially private exchange act, whereas regular money exchange 
depends upon the subsequent continued recognition by an economic community or a government 
of the symbolic value of the substance functioning as money. Simmel avows that monetization 
requires a social element to proceed; shared expectations, rules, and norms, among other things, 
must be put in place. Having been reminded of the institutional character of all forms of social 
exchange, one last piece of the puzzle remains to be laid into place: the description of the general 
social structure in which exchanges take place in explicit social network terms.  
Dodd’s Social Network Contribution 
Dodd (1994) argues that monetary exchange is more than just bartering with better 
information: “It is altogether distinctive,” he writes, “It requires the pre-existence of minimum 
forms of information, extended through time and across space, in order to proceed” (xxvi). What 
distinguishes barter from money exchange in this formulation is not the presence or absence of 
physical money, nor the question of whether the transacting parties recognize the things of value 
being exchanged only for their inherent use value or for their exchange value. Rather, it is the 
form of information required in order for each type of transaction to be successfully and 
voluntarily completed.  These “forms of information” are regulated extensively by social 
institutions. Affirming the inadequacy of the materialist and functionalist approaches to defining 
money, Dodd suggests that the solution is “…to focus on the social relationships that monetary 
transaction involves, not the objects which mediate those relationships” (1994: xv).  
Dodd thus appears to be the originator of the suggestion that it is possible to define 
money using the social networks that accompany and facilitate exchange in all societies, as these 
are immediate structural forms through which the more abstract monetary institution is observed. 
His approach is succinctly summarized in the statement that follows: 
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The information implicit in monetary transactions provides the most fundamental point of 
distinction between monetary exchange and barter….this distinction arises not from 
comparison of monetary and non-monetary forms but from examination of the network of 
social relationships integral to each as a type of exchange. (1994: xxiii).  
 
 
A comparison of network characteristics and in particular the types of information embodied in 
these networks over time and through space, will allow the analyst to clear the most basic 
conceptual hurdle: distinguishing money from non-money (1994: xxii-xxviii). And also, in 
keeping with the spirit of Marx, it should now be possible to identify the relevant exchange 
network of a given actor, and see that this network, through the regular conduct of exchange 
functions as the first, most readily observable face of the state or other social institutional 
structure behind money.  
Synthesis 
Combining the elements presented in this section, it is possible to make a number of new 
theoretical statements about monetization and money. Most generally, monetization is the 
introduction of new types, flows, and qualities of information into exchange networks. For 
example, the introduction of an abstract unit of account represented symbolically by some entity 
is a fundamentally new layer of information. Things of value that are transferred or exchanged, 
whatever their intrinsic properties, can be money only if the economic interaction takes place 
under the influence of a social  institution that recognizes and supports money as a function of 
economic life. Money is the object, humans are the actors. And rather than focusing intently on 
the form and function of money, one should be asking, as Simmel asks: what is the behavior of 
these actors? The sociological significance of such a different perspective on money should be 
easily apprehended. Moreover, this problem promises to be more theoretically interesting than 
simply distinguishing what constitutes money as an object (2006: 177).  This is not to say that 
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money objects are unimportant, but rather that from a sociological standpoint, the investigation 
of the people, networks, and institutions behind this peculiar class of objects ought to capture the 
full attention of researchers. For money to perform any social function at all, it must be 
accompanied by many of the aspects of a social institution.  
Returning to an earlier question, this may be what Simmel meant by his somewhat 
cryptic observation that money does not have a function, but is a function. In this framework, 
money does not have functions because it is just an instrument used in the service of a complex 
set of social rules and institutions. Nowhere at present is this more clearly evidenced than in the 
evolution of digital finance. It has grown increasingly common for salaries to be earned, bills 
paid, and exchanges of all manner carried out without ever involving any physical referent at all. 
In the 21st century, money may well be approaching a state of putative perfection, of becoming 
true “generalized money,” whereby it is fully divested of the last shred of physical substance and 
becomes a pure symbol as Marx partially portended (barring a power outage). From a research 
perspective, this has been a highly positive development, as it increasingly pressures scholars to 
reinstate the focus of monetary studies where I argue it belongs: on the structure of social 
exchange relationships that utilize money and other forms of exchange, and on the social 
institutions which make money possible, rather than on those bits of metal, paper, or shells that 
seem to arrest our attention as researchers and as human beings.  
 
MONEY AND MONETIZATION IN THE WORLD: RADFORD REVISITED 
An Empirical Application 
 I demonstrate the utility of the theory developed in Section IV in two ways. First by 
showing that refocusing attention on social institutions and networks and away from money itself 
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provides considerably better understanding of the process of monetization. This shift also 
generates many intriguing new research questions that deserve empirical attention. Second, I will 
return to the two-by-two typology of current usage in sociology and demonstrate the organizing 
effect that the revised theory has there and note the new possibilities for integrating these many 
divergent perspectives on monetization.  
What is required for the first task is an application that can be used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of this elaboration of monetization theory against conventional theoretical 
treatments.  I use the classic study carried out by Radford (1945), in which he describes the 
“spontaneous” development of a money economy in the German P.O.W. camps of WWII. This 
example serves as an ideal first test case for evaluating the new theory for at least three reasons. 
First, monetization is rarely observed in a scientific fashion as it happens, so Radford’s account 
is correspondingly rare. But, as will be detailed below, it does in fact have all of the requisites of 
monetization, starting from a state of fully non-monetized exchange and proceeding to fully 
monetized exchange, with each stage clearly described and annotated by Radford himself. 
Second, and more crucially, there is enough information in Radford’s account to enable the new 
elements of the theory to be falsified if they fail to match the empirical case. And third, 
Radford’s account is widely promulgated in introductory economics textbooks and classrooms 
(Abbott and Nantz 2001; Hansen 1983; Katzner 1991). As such, it continues to function as a 
prominent pedagogical tool that has been used to train generations of researchers in the 
theoretical aspects of money and monetary exchange. Thus, as a matter of course, any revision to 
the general theory of money ought to provide improved interpretations to the existing 
paradigmatic problems associated with the current theory. (Kuhn 1962) 
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In “The Economic Organization of a P.O.W. Camp” (1945), the economist R.A. Radford 
provides a first-hand account of his experience as a captive in a German Oflag, a particular type 
of camp for allied prisoners of war in which the prisoners were not required to perform labor for 
wages by the detaining power (190). When allied forces were captured on the European 
continent in the course of the war, Radford reports that they entered an elaborate network of 
German-controlled P.O.W. camps in which most prisoners started out in less stable, temporarily 
erected facilities and in time were transferred to larger and more permanent installations, 
frequently spending time at so-called “transit camps” en route. Radford describes the Oflags 
thus, 
 
They consisted normally of between 1200 and 2500 people, housed in a number of 
separate but intercommunicating bungalows, one company of 200 or so at a building. 
Each company formed a group within the main organisation and inside the company the 
room and the messing syndicate, a voluntary and spontaneous group who fed together, 
formed the constituent units (190). 
 
As Berliner (1999) notes,8 there were two principal sources of food and goods in the camps, both 
of which served to keep the initial distribution of goods (or “incomes”) throughout the camps 
equal: German rations of food and clothing; and packages sent by the International Red Cross 
that contained tinned beef (“bully beef”), biscuits, chocolate, and cigarettes, among other things 
(1999: 57; Radford 1945: 190). Against this backdrop, Radford describes the development of a 
system of monetary exchange, beginning with simple trade or barter and evolving rapidly to a 
full-fledged money economy.  
Berliner divides Radford’s description of this developmental process into five distinct 
stages. In Stage 1, prisoners casually trade unwanted items from their own Red Cross packages 
                                                 
8
 In presenting the particulars of the account, I rely heavily on Berliner’s {{316 Berliner, Joseph S. 1999/a}} concise 
presentation.  
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for items from others’ packages that they preferred (1999: 57). Radford describes the direct 
bartering at this stage as “a more equitable means of maximizing individual satisfaction” than 
simply relying on one’s own assortment of goods, but also characterizes the hours following the 
arrival of a Red Cross shipment as “bedlam” (191).  
The growing frequency and complexity of trades led to Stage 2 which saw the 
establishment of a bulletin board on which interested parties could place notices for items wanted 
and offered, along with acceptable terms of exchange (1945: 191). An important corollary of this 
development was a much greater uniformity in the valuation of various commodities and a fixing 
of their relationships to each other due to the public nature of the notice board. 
Stage 3 of development according to Berliner was the establishment of cigarettes as a 
“medium of exchange” (1999: 58). Thus it became commonplace for the P.O.Ws to speak of the 
“cigarette-price” of a tin of beef or a bar of chocolate. As a direct consequence of the 
establishment of cigarettes as the “standard of value” (Radford’s term), even non-smokers were 
now willing to accept cigarettes in exchange for other things of value, safe in the knowledge that 
they could be traded for something else of value (191). In the language of the materialist-
functionalist school, cigarettes had become the accepted medium of exchange, as well as the 
“unit of stored value,” enabling actors to begin amassing small fortunes in Tobacco. In Radford’s 
account of the development of money in the P.O.W. camp, there were two perennial problems 
surrounding the use of cigarettes as money for many of the prisoners: the temptation to smoke 
one’s savings, and the possibility of “sweating” the money. This term originated to describe the 
practice of removing tiny amounts of metal from coins of gold and other precious metals, 
resulting in the debasement of the currency over time. This was accomplished in the P.O.W. 
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camps with cigarettes by removing small amounts of tobacco from each cigarette and then re-
rolling this tobacco into additional cigarettes (Radford 1945: 194). 
In Stage 4, an official store sprang into existence, sanctioned by the German prison camp 
administrators and staffed by prisoner volunteers. The store offered “Bully Marks,” simple 
tokens with no practical value of their own, in exchange for any of the goods received in a Red 
Cross shipment that a prisoner did not want or need (Berliner 1999: 58). Cigarettes were now 
wholly supplanted, not only as the medium of exchange, but also as the “unit of account,” a 
phrase that refers to the commodity in which money is denominated. In this case, rather than 
being worth so many cigarettes, a Bully Mark was equivalent to a certain amount of bully beef, 
in the same way that, during the days of the gold standard, United States dollars were backed by 
a fixed amount of gold. Bully marks had an added advantage over cigarettes of being resistant to 
“sweating” and of not tempting the men to literally watch their fortunes go up in smoke. 
Stage 5, the final stage in Berliner’s typology, was never achieved by the P.O.Ws in 
Radford’s camp, but would have been reached when the shipments of Red Cross provisions 
ceased to go directly to the P.O.Ws altogether. Instead, the shipments would have gone directly 
to the store, which would have then issued each prisoner a fixed amount of Bully Marks 
equivalent to the value of the goods in one Red Cross package (Berliner 1999: 58). Berliner 
argues that this arrangement would have removed the need for P.O.Ws to sell unwanted items 
back to the store and would have been reached had the war not drawn to a close. Radford points 
out that the final days and weeks of the conflict were marked by ever-increasing instability as the 
mostly orderly system of P.O.W. camps in Germany fell into complete chaos (1945: 197-198), 
ensuring that this higher level of economic organization was never reached.  
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While there are many more subtle and intriguing elements of Radford’s account, this 
broad outline of events will suffice for the present analysis, with additional details brought into 
the discussion where appropriate. The brief interpretive notes added to the above account are 
derived directly from Radford and are in keeping with conventional accounts of events as they 
appear in contemporary treatments. As such, they will serve as a baseline for comparison against 
the alternative interpretation developed here. In order to make this comparison possible, I turn 
now to a formal analysis of various theories of money.  
Three Interpretations of Radford’s Account 
I compare the new theory developed in this paper to two of the three alternative 
formulations presented in this chapter: the materialist-functionalist perspective and a purely 
Marxist perspective. I have chosen not to provide a purely Simmelian interpretation of Radford’s 
account simply as a matter of efficiency. Since a substantial portion of Simmel’s analysis has 
been incorporated into the synthetic theory presented here, the chief advantage of my neo-
Simmelian perspective over the approach of Simmel himself is its more explicit formulation in 
terms of social networks, institutions, and information, each of which remain underdeveloped 
notions in Simmel’s original work. In judging the effectiveness of each approach, I wish to draw 
attention to the types of useful empirical questions and new directions for research that are 
generated by each interpretation of the classic account by Radford described in Section II. It 
should be stated that these interpretations need not be mutually exclusive. Rather, like concentric 
circles, each may incorporate much of the preceding formulations, but adding additional levels of 
understanding and pointing to those issues about which existing perspectives are silent.  
For the essential elements of the materialist-functionalist interpretation of events in the 
P.O.W. camp, one need look no further than Radford’s own account, written from the 
47 
 
perspective of a classically trained economist. To recapitulate these points, consider the 
following explication: 
The Materialist-Functionalist Interpretation: As Radford describes it, prisoners were 
initially faced with identical assortments of goods and a varied assortment of preferences 
for these goods. As a result, there was something to be gained if one could exchange 
some part of his parcel with another. As the regular distribution of Red Cross rations is 
established, the men become more habituated to one another and the routines of the camp 
life. The men are placed into still larger camps where the frequency of exchange 
increases further until the inefficiency of barter drives the prisoners to establish the notice 
board. This helps them to overcome the “coincidence of wants” problem and aids in the 
establishment of regular relations between different goods. The time from the arrival of 
the first packages of rations to the creation of such a commodity exchange: 1-2 weeks. 
Within a month, the basic qualities of cigarettes – small, portable, easily divisible, 
recognizable, durable relative to the length of confinement, etc. – render them superior to 
other goods as a means of expressing the value of things. Thus cigarettes become 
established as a kind of commodity money and begin to assume all of the typical 
functions of money identified in Section III – medium of exchange, unit of account, store 
of value, etc. – making them desirable to all, not just smokers. When the prisoners in 
Radford’s group arrive at the large, permanent camps in Germany, a small store and 
restaurant are established, enabling P.O.Ws to sell unwanted items to an intermediary and 
to accept “Bully Marks” in exchange, which can be used to purchase items from the store 
or restaurant and for exchange with other prisoners. These Bully Marks represent the full 
realization of a money economy, just weeks after the soldiers began with crude, simple 
barter, and the impetus for the creation of such a system is identified as the ever-growing 
frequency of trade, which at each stage of development served to multiply the 
inefficiencies of each simpler system. Thus, this is a narrative which purports to describe 
and explain the “spontaneous” development of a money economy from a very simple 
state in something on the order of a few months.  
 
The Marxist Interpretation: In the first weeks of the prisoner’s experience, each acquires 
a collection of commodities, not through his labor (for none is required of the prisoners), 
but through what Berliner calls a system of distribution by assignment. The use value of 
each type of good varies from man to man, and so the direct barter of commodities 
between men leads to a better distribution of use values among them. This system of 
exchanging use-value for use-value suffers from all of the inefficiencies described in the 
previous account, and in addition, quickly erodes due to the fact that the men begin to 
look forward to the next shipment, when they can obtain new goods for exchange. From 
this, the elementary form of value, in which commodities confront each other directly, the 
process rapidly becomes more elaborate, and the total or expanded form of value, a chain 
of relationships, evolves. This chain of equivalences can be traced by each man through 
the string of postings on the bulletin board. Soon, that commodity best suited to fulfill the 
functions of the general equivalent rises to the occasion. In light of the available 
commodities, cigarettes are the best choice, for the same reasons given in the previous 
account. Thus cigarettes are destined to take on the role of general equivalent, the 
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commodity in which the exchange value of all other commodities is expressed. Lacking 
access to a better general equivalent such as gold, a form of token money emerges to 
enable the transition from general form to money form to proceed. Bully Marks are the 
highest form of value achieved – the money form. While most commodities circulate in a 
C—M—C circuit in the camps, some nascent capitalists do attempt to turn money into a 
larger sum of money through a variety of means. The store itself, however, is run as a 
not-for-profit service for the men. Thus, in this narrative, like the last, the emergence of 
money is explained by a definite, evolutionary, pattern of development. Presumably, once 
achieved, the money form will remain in place indefinitely.  
 
The Neo-Simmelian Institutional/Network Interpretation: Throughout Radford’s 
account, mention is made of the social conditions existing in the camps, but does not 
directly tie these conditions to the conduct of exchange. The initial weeks of incarceration 
in the P.O.W. camps were chaotic. Military chains of command were often broken, units 
divided up, and the general predictability of day-to-day life entirely disrupted. As a result, 
many of the social institutions and rules designed to impose order on the lives of the 
soldiers were also suspended, with life being governed by a few basic principles of 
survival. The exchange networks connecting these soldiers were sparse and tenuous at 
best. But routine was quickly established again to the extent possible. One element of the 
reestablishment of routine was the regular delivery of Red Cross rations. Something 
never mentioned in Radford’s account, but patently obvious, is that nearly every Allied 
prisoner, to a man, has considerable familiarity with the both the institution of monetary 
exchange and that of barter, gained throughout his life via exposure to the economies of 
all of the nations involved in the war. As soon as order is restored a bit, an attempt is 
made to reestablish such institutions of exchange. The money institution has different 
requirements than the barter institution, one of which is the universal recognition of a 
given good as money. For barter to take place, the two parties must each be convinced of 
the potential use value of the thing they are to receive, the honesty of the exchange 
partner, assessed through past transactions or by word-of-mouth, and the acceptability of 
the terms of exchange, to name a few. But, for a money-based exchange to take place, a 
principal requirement is that the money received, whatever its form, will indeed be 
honored by the next exchange partner and accepted in the next transaction. The continual 
movement of men in and out of the camps and through the German P.O.W. system makes 
such a condition nearly impossible to meet at first; the networks of exchange are 
constantly being divided into smaller pieces and then recombined. Under these 
conditions, the men have to content themselves with barter, though they see no problem 
in at least adopting a uniform unit of account as they are already well-accustomed to such 
a thing. If someone wishes not to accept such a mutually agreed-upon unit of account, no 
exchange need occur. But by the same token, if a man wishes to go against the will of the 
larger network of traders, he is effectively excluded from most exchange opportunities. 
After several weeks, the men enter a larger, more permanent camp where the men before 
them, seeking to reestablish many a missing institution, have taken great strides toward 
the establishment of a full-fledged exchange institution which recognizes cigarettes as the 
medium of exchange. And here one also sees that the newest actors are again effectively 
barred from practicing barter if they wish to engage with this larger community which 
now even includes some of the German captors and townspeople from near the camps.  
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As soon as permission can be obtained to start a store (another familiar institution), the 
men begin to recognize Bully Marks as currency. Now those men who choose not to 
acknowledge Bully Marks as money face isolation yet again from the principal network 
of traders – they will be unable to interact with the majority, who will insist that Bully 
Marks be accepted in exchange, and thus most exchanges will rapidly be drawn under the 
auspices of the “newly” established institution. Men who commit acts deemed deleterious 
to trade, such as currency debasement, face exclusion as well, and thus attempts are made 
to conceal such acts from detection. Central to this narrative is the establishment of a 
mini-“State” in the form of a network of several hundred or thousand regularly 
interacting trade partners who all agree that a money symbol – first cigarettes, then Bully 
Marks – will be accepted as valid. Those who do not embrace the money risk exclusion 
from the activities of the community. Thus, this is a narrative in which the desire to carry 
out monetized exchange is already latent in the population (though it is scarcely different 
should this desire be fully emergent, just slower). As soon as the general conditions of 
life permit, this population makes creative use of the materials at hand to approximate 
such a system as best as possible. The passage of time, the strengthening of the individual 
network ties between actors, and the increasing average density and connectivity of the 
network(s) as a whole enable the ever-more efficient functioning of the money system.  
 
Evaluation 
Consider again the questions of why monetization occurs, and what this transition 
signifies. For the materialist-functionalists, monetization occurs because monetary exchange is 
simply better than barter: it performs all of those various functions that are ascribed to it and 
does so better than anything else because of its material properties. But there is no 
acknowledgment of the social nature of exchange, nor or the sociological processes by which it 
is determined that monetization should proceed according to one course over all others. For, if 
money has an objective existence tied to its material properties, then in 100 separate hypothetical 
P.O.W. camps, one should observe a consistent pattern in which the same exact monetary forms 
emerge in time, regardless of such factors as what goods are contained in the packages initially, 
or what particular preferences the men have. Although no such data exist, even the few accounts 
that exist of a similar nature to that experienced by Radford suggest that uniformity is not the 
norm. Shapiro, for one, recounts that following WWII, shortages of money throughout Germany 
led the citizens there to rely on not only cigarettes, but on Cognac as general equivalents (1975: 
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5-6). Cognac is a strange choice indeed, and a supreme illustration of the difficulty in predicting 
the precise form that money will take due to the flexibility of the human monetary institution.  
For the Marxist, monetization occurs because barter imposes harsh limitations on the type 
and quantity of exchanges that can occur, a limitation which is overcome as soon as traders have 
realized first the elementary, then the expanded, the general, and lastly the money form, which 
they will inexorably accomplish in time. Thus, barter should be rapidly extinguished by higher 
and more efficient forms of exchange in the Marxist interpretation, just as the word barter 
disappears from Capital after its opening chapters. But, to the contrary, Radford notes that 
despite the increasing efficiency of the monetary system that developed, “barter was never 
extinguished” (1945: 191). This is a point, drawn from careful empirical observations, that is 
almost universally overlooked in discussions of monetization, in both this and other accounts. 
For the newest of the perspectives, there is much to be found in Radford’s original 
account that supports the validity of the new formulation. The following passage contains within 
it nearly every element of the institutional/network view, though these implications go 
unrecognized: 
The unity of the market and the prevalence of a single price varied directly with the 
general level of organization and comfort in the camp. A transit camp was always chaotic 
and uncomfortable: people were overcrowded, no one knew where anyone else was 
living, and few took the trouble to find out. Organisation was too slender to include an 
Exchange and Mart board, and private advertisements were the most that appeared. 
Consequently, a transit camp was not one market but many (1945: 198).  
 
 
In those camps with the highest degree of general organization, the P.O.Ws were 
permitted to develop the most unified markets, the most uniform price systems, and the most 
refined monetary institutions. What Radford identifies as a market is nothing more than an 
invisible social network comprised of the ties that exist between individual prisoner-traders. It 
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would be tempting, therefore to say that the market itself, as the analogue to Marx’s “State” is 
the thing that determines what commodity will serve as the money commodity, but this is a 
dangerous way to state the situation. In fact, it is the network of traders, flesh and blood human 
beings, that makes such determinations through a highly complex and poorly understood process 
of collective decision-making. Radford’s account provides little insight into the exact network 
structure of the camps, and so it is entirely possible that the designation of a particular 
commodity as money took place in many smaller networks with many different results, but that 
the amalgamation of these networks required some networks, whether the smaller or the less 
well-organized, to abandon their preferred forms of money.  
Perhaps the greatest evidence of the utility of the institutional/network perspective is to 
be found in the rapidity with which both commodity markets and a full-fledged system of money 
emerged. Radford is quite explicit: the “lively trade” in cigarettes emerged in less than 1 month, 
under the most extreme conditions imaginable, in a prison camp, among the soldiers of many 
nations (1945: 191). Where even language was not shared, money nevertheless enabled the 
smooth conduct of exchange. What does this suggest with regards to the “spontaneous” 
generation argument in comparison with an institutional/network interpretation? I would suggest 
that the swift development of such complex forms of social exchange is more easily explained if 
one presumes that most if not all of these men, regardless of nationality, were already 
accustomed to living with a monetary institution. For such a system to emerge de novo as it 
likely has only a few times in history is undoubtedly a much slower and halting process. And yet, 
this is exactly the interpretation that the materialist-functionalist reading implies.  
The materialist-functionalist perspective ignores the behavioral norms, social 
conventions, and rules (institutions, collectively) that exert control over the use of money, taking 
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them to be properties of money itself, not of human beings, and therefore leave no role for 
institutions in the monetization process. The Marxist approach acknowledges that the whole 
process of monetization is as much a social construct “as language” but provides little critical 
analysis of the actual role that such institutions play. Only the institutional/network 
interpretation, grounded in Simmel’s work, directs the researcher to examine these institutions 
themselves as the principal agents of monetization, and specifically identify the nature of the 
information transmitted through exchange networks as the most important characteristic defining 
monetized exchange. Moreover, as Zelizer argues (Zelizer 1996), the social institutions 
surrounding money both shape the way money is used, and are shaped by newly emergent forms 
in an interactive process (1989: 342).  
The materialist-functionalist perspective similarly fails to acknowledge that all human 
exchange, including that which occurred in the P.O.W. camps, takes place in the context of 
human exchange networks. These networks are only implied by the Marxist perspective, and 
indeed the Simmelian perspective only hints at them. The institutional/network approach 
suggests, in contrast, that these networks of traders are the social context that enables exchange 
of any type to occur. If even a single transaction is carried out using some form of money, 
symbolic or commodity, information about that transaction is not limited to the parties involved. 
It travels throughout the network, altering the information available to everyone else connected 
in potentially powerful ways. This brings to mind Watkins’ (1991) analogy of fertility 
preferences acting like dye injected into the bloodstream of nations, allowing the researcher to 
observe the otherwise invisible structure of affiliation, shaped by language, culture, and so forth. 
For Watkins, such behavior is largely unobservable to the researcher, being passed “over the 
back fence, or at cafés,” but it has the power to reshape nations no less than local exchange 
53 
 
networks (1991: 7). In like fashion, even when these networks are not directly observed, their 
presence is always felt by virtue of the fact that monetized exchange cannot take place without 
them. 
Beyond these advantages, the new theory also exhibits a unifying effect on the study of 
monetary instruments: whether an economic community denominates in seashells or Euros is of 
little importance from a sociological point of view. What matters is that that economic 
community accepts the symbolic value of the monetary instrument and agrees to honor it at a 
specific value. In fact, the specific “physical” form that money takes can now be demonstrated to 
be largely irrelevant to the transactors involved. This is not the case with barter. While the 
properties of the many forms that money may take do differ, and these have consequences for the 
efficient flow of all things through the monetary system, they have no relevance whatsoever to 
the determination of whether a social system is monetized or not. This determination must be 
made entirely with reference to the social arrangements governing whether a particular entity has 
been designated as fulfilling the symbolic role that all money, and nothing else, fulfills.  
Implications for Level of Analysis, Conceptualization, and Agency 
I now return to the general state of sociology literature described at the outset. As I noted 
in Section II, the lack of a consistent sociological theory of money and monetization has left 
most researchers to their own devices in attempting to explain the relationship between 
monetization and their own research topics. In particular, I identified two basic elements that 
most conceptual definitions should provide: whether the phenomenon is discrete or continuous 
and the scale at which it operates. I also noted that the former dimension could also be thought of 
as the temporal scale, while the latter can be conceived of as the spatial scale of the phenomenon. 
Thus, does the theory promulgated here require us to focus on any one particular level of 
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temporal or spatial analysis in order to observe this dynamic institutional change? Clearly, the 
answer to both questions is no. To understand how monetization can be both discrete and 
continuous and how it can operate at both the micro and macro scales, it is necessary only to 
apply already well-understood aspects of social network analysis.  
As is common in social network analysis, the researcher must simultaneously consider 
both micro-level interactions between actors (dyads) and the nature of the macro-level system 
(the entire network, or sub-network). Different implications may arise at different levels of 
analysis. A given exchange is either monetized or it is not, but a given network of exchange 
partners may display finer gradations of monetization, according to the spread and degree of 
monetized exchange. In the latter case, the most appropriate way to conceptualize monetization 
is as an emergent property of the network under consideration. Thus, when discussing a higher-
level social group, whether a population, a society, an organization, an economy, or any other, it 
is generally inappropriate to speak of monetization as a dichotomous type of change, except in 
the rarest of instances.  
Such an approach also re-injects agency into all discussions of monetization. When a 
nation or economy is monetized, the implication is frequently that the people experiencing this 
change had little choice or direct involvement in the matter – they are portrayed as passive 
subjects or even as victims. But in treating each individual economic exchange as the building 
blocks in an analysis of monetization, and the resulting networks as the focal point, the people 
experiencing the change are reintroduced as sociologically significant. If monetization is a 
quality of the economic exchange that reflects the choices of the transactors, then it follows, as 
before, that not all members of a social group need monetize at the same time. Rather than 
presupposing geographical, sectoral, and social group unity in monetization, this 
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institutional/network approach allows these characteristics to vary over time and within networks 
(or societies). The challenge for researchers becomes the determination in a given social context 
of whether monetization proceeds in a unitary or piecemeal fashion (the ubiquity of 
monetization), the degree of substitutability of money and barter, their complementarity, and 
their potential antagonism or competition. Such a comparative and historical approach to 
studying monetization, paired with this newly-developed conceptualization, should prove to be a 
highly productive field of research.  
 Discussion: Reclaiming Money and Monetization 
Throughout this paper, I have juggled two major ideas. First that a better theoretical 
understanding of money and monetization is possible and necessary, both for its improved utility 
to theorists and because of the potential such a theory has to support new collaborations between 
researchers who are studying different aspects of the same core process. And second, that 
sociology has at least as much of a claim to the study of money and monetization as economics. 
On this latter point, I have cited sociologists, both classical (Marx 1887; Simmel 2006) and 
contemporary (Deflem 2003; Dodd 1994; Ingham 1998; Ingham 2000; Keister 1992; Swedberg 
1997). It would be nice to see such a point echoed by the author and chief observer for one of the 
most cherished accounts in economics of the development of money, and in fact, one need look 
no further than the opening paragraphs of Radford’s original paper to find just that: 
 
Although a P.O.W. camp provides a living example of a simple economy which might be 
used as an alternative to the Robinson Crusoe economy beloved by the text-books, and its 
simplicity renders the demonstration of certain economic hypotheses both amusing and 
instructive, it is suggested that the principal significance is sociological (1945: 190, 
emphasis added).  
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Here is confirmation of the best possible sort for a central thesis of this paper: the principal 
significance of monetization is sociological, owing to “…the universality and the spontaneity of 
this economic life.” (1945: 190). Thus there is an even more basic justification for testing this 
new theory using Radford’s account: the universality of the behaviors being described, behaviors 
that represent responses to equally universal problems of human association. Money, then, is no 
more or less than a tool brought to bear on very human problems arising out of an unequal 
distribution of desires. Money was not “created” or “invented” in the case described by Radford, 
but was rather a well-established aspect of the culture of most if not all of the soldiers confined 
in the P.O.W. camps. The account is therefore not an account of the “spontaneous” development 
of money at all, but rather an account of the essential elements that are required for the 
successful functioning of a monetary institution in a vastly simplified economic and social 
context. As such it holds much value for sociologists working in a variety of fields.  
 Of the broader questions posed at the outset, several have now been addressed, while a 
number represent the new frontiers for research that have been opened up by this theoretical 
revision. The question of what occurs when exchange becomes monetized has been addressed; it 
requires nothing less than the creation of an institutional structure, embodied in social networks, 
that is capable of enforcing the acceptance of some commodity or symbol in exchange for a thing 
of value. A tentative answer has also been provided to the joint questions about the conditions 
under which monetized exchange emerges and is extinguished. As Radford’s account clearly 
shows, monetized exchange does not act to regularize and stabilize exchange as is often 
suggested. Rather, it requires such stability and predictability.  
Still other questions now take on a much deeper meaning and will hopefully encourage 
renewed sociological attention to the role that monetization plays in myriad social processes. 
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Two of the questions posed at the outset are representative of the broader potential for intra- and 
interdisciplinary connections to be made. First, what other social phenomena are affected by the 
way social exchange is carried out and how? Arizpe (1981) memorably described monetization 
as a process having a “ripple effect” in the transitional economies where he observed it taking 
place (637). Others have echoed this sentiment over time. But monetization has the potential to 
bring about a corresponding “ripple effect” in the research that is conducted, traveling outward in 
ever-greater circles and touching upon ever-larger domains. It is my hope that this paper helps to 
replace the stagnant, critically disengaged approach that currently prevails with a vibrant, healthy 
scholarly debate about the conceptual and theoretical significance of monetization.  
Second, and perhaps most important, what implications might monetary exchange have 
for the cultural and moral fabric of a village, state, or nation? Such evaluative questions seem far 
less significant if the focus of monetary theory is on money itself: what significant consequences 
can the material form that money takes have for questions of value and morality? But, when 
monetization is re-conceptualized as a shift in the very institutional and network structure of a 
community, this has far-ranging implications for the way that actors and groups interact with one 
another. It was these broader implications that drove Marx, Simmel, and their contemporaries to 
devote considerable attention to the subject, not the “novelty” or “emergence” of money. In an 
era that witnessed the development of the highest forms of industrial capitalism, these 
implications were perhaps closer to the surface of human experience. Some 100 years later, they 
have become no less important, but are perhaps less readily apprehended due to their 
commonness or their complexity. But a renewed interest in the fundamental theoretical issues 
surrounding money and monetary exchange, including new empirical attempts to operationalize 
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and measure the network aspects of this theory, will enable us to once again bring these issues 
into sharp focus. 
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TABLE 2.1: Cross-Classification of Articles in Sociology Journals Using Term 
“Monetization” According to Two Major Conceptual Criteria 
 
 Discrete Continuous 
Micro/ 
Tangible 
 
• gold and silver (Carruthers and Babb 1996: 1578; 
Gideonse 1934: 750) 
• goods (Yarros 1915: 331) 
• perks and benefits (Bell 1995: 260; Dye 1967: 46; 
Eaton 1972: 675; Garcelon 1997: 45; 
McCormick 1960: 366; Oluwu 1999: 5) 
• income (Axinn and Levin 1972: 164; Walder 
2002: 231) 
• deficits (Campbell 1996: 68) 
• taxes and rents (Allen 1983: 160; Lachmann 
1989: 143; Richards 1981: 297) 
• environmental services (Presser 1994: 447) 
• birth and death ceremonies (Roitman 1990: 681) 
• agricultural products and surplus (Blockmans 
1989: 738; Clark 1966: 49) 
• non-market work (Benavot 1989: 21; Bernard 
1973: 782) 
• legal claims and damages (Kritzer 1987: 344-
346; Miller and Sarat 1980: 535) 
• human behavioral motives (Belcher 1962: 112) 
 
 
• child care arrangements (Angrist and 
Lave 1973: 459) 
• agriculture (Clairmonte 1964: 422) 
• taxes (Goldstone 1988: 114) 
• earnings (Vijverberg 1993: 945) 
• household production (Oberschall 1996: 
1034) 
• “productive activities” (Korzeniewicz and 
Moran 1997: 1011) 
Macro/ 
Intangible 
 
• economies (Axinn and Yabiku 2001: 1222, 1229; 
Brown 1958: 419; Delany 1963: 463; Ramu 
1974: 627) 
• economic sectors (Crenshaw 1991: 1175; 
Friedman 1961: 100; Waldinger 1986: 255) 
• markets (Goldthorpe 1998: 176; Tilly 1996: 593) 
• societies (Lindenberg 1985: 100) 
• nation-states (Elder 1976: 220; Munro 1996: 124) 
• empires (Spengler 1964: 420-423) 
• capitalism (Hass 1999: 387, 391, 400-405, 417, 
421) 
• exchange (Bornschier, Chase-Dunn, and 
Rubinson 1978: 677; Chirot 1985: 186; 
Coleman 1987: 435; Sewell 1992: 26; Thomas 
and Lauderdale 1988: 388; Weingrod and 
Morin 1971: 312) 
• value (Levine, Carter, and Gorman 1976: 1113)  
• economic activity (Campbell 1993: 175) 
• transactions and interactions (Borocz and 
Southworth 1996: 818; Chase-Dunn, Kawano, 
and Brewer 2000: 82) 
• “labor power” (Sitton 1998: 68, 76) 
• “everyday life” (de Sardan 1999: 39, 45-46, 50; 
Tetlock 2000: 317) 
 
 
• economies (Cole 1989: 131; Elvin 1984: 
382, 385; Engberg 1965: 181; Fahey 
1982: 64; Goldstone 1984: 1134; Lenski 
1976: 554; Miller 1961: 433) 
• nations (Abdel-Salam 1970: 359-361) 
• markets (Form 1973: 3) 
• societies (Moody 1976: 144, 151; 
Runiciman 1983: 163, 177; Sacchi 1998: 
152, 157-158) 
• marketplaces (Fernandez Kelly 1989: 623) 
• rural households (Morawska 1989: 266) 
• regions (Subrahmanyam 1995: 761) 
• “social relations” (Dunning and Mennell 
1998: 343-344) 
• exchange (Rosenberg 1994: 358) 
• systems for housing provision (Bodnar and 
Borocz 1998: 1281-1282, 1287-1288, 
1301) 
• the “commercial base” (Collins 1997: 
861-862) 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 3 
SOCIAL NETWORKS AND MONETIZED LABOR 
 
 INTRODUCTION     
 
It is the primary task of this paper to continue to fill an empirical gap in the literature 
about the sociological process that goes by the name of monetization. Using data on labor use in 
Northeast Thailand, I show that a relationship exists between the use of monetized exchange and 
the social network characteristics of villages and households. This relationship was predicted by 
an improved theory of monetization and serves to supplement and extend existing theories of 
agricultural labor and the economics of exchange. This analysis also improves understanding of a 
common and vital form of economic exchange in the Southeast Asian context: rice harvest labor. 
As exploratory research, it highlights the need for more attention, both empirical and theoretical, 
to be given to understanding what monetization is and how, specifically it can impact the nature 
of transactions in the many settings where exchange takes place. 
The theory developed here is an attempt to better distinguish between traditional in-kind 
forms of exchange and monetized exchange, using the insights of sociological exchange theory 
and social network analysis and theory. Five specific hypotheses are derived from the application 
of this general theory to the context of the rice harvest in Northeastern Thailand. The empirical 
analysis presented here is wholly consistent with these five theoretical predictions at two very 
different points in time, supporting the assertion that the theory describes a stable, underlying 
condition in labor exchange networks, and exchange networks more generally. The specific 
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conclusions of this analysis should generalize to a much wider range of social and economic 
contexts, provided that researchers can obtain measures of the relevant aspects of monetization 
and networks described here, which at present are seldom collected simultaneously.  
I take a simple approach to the measurement of “monetization” in this paper, relying on 
respondent’s implicit understanding of the possible forms of exchange available to them, 
monetized or not. But, at a minimum, three theoretical questions should be addressed. First, what 
is monetization in this general sense? Second, on what grounds do I anticipate finding a 
relationship between monetization and such characteristics as network structure and individual 
network position? This question forms the major part of Section II. Third, does it matter in a 
practical or theoretical sense whether an exchange is monetized? Is the difference really 
significant? Opinions on this last question are particularly divided, and often break sharply along 
disciplinary, even sub-disciplinary lines. Rather than taking a theoretical approach to addressing 
this third question as I have done elsewhere (Hull 2009a), I use the empirical analysis described 
in Sections III through V to suggest that different types of exchanges are not equivalent in the 
context examined here. The implications that such differences may have for the actors involved 
are described in Section VI, where I also discuss to the broader significance of the findings.  
 THEORY 
What is monetization?  
The aim of this section is to generate specific hypotheses about the relationship between 
monetization and social structure, as explicitly measured using social network analysis. I begin 
by providing a brief answer to the first question posed above (for more detail, see Dodd 1994; 
Hull 2009a; Smithin 2000b). I then provide a thorough discussion of the second question. Lastly, 
62 
 
I state the hypotheses that derive from this discussion formally before proceeding to the analysis 
and an answer to the third question. 
Monetization is traditionally defined as a shift from barter to money as the means of 
carrying out exchange (Dobeck and Elliot 2007; Kemmerer 1935; Shapiro 1975). In this 
conventional conceptualization, money is viewed as a technology with numerous properties and 
functions, each of which describe the thing that is money itself, rather than the social 
arrangements that make monetary exchange possible (Hull 2009a). In contrast, I conceptualize 
monetization here as a shift in the institutional and network structures that pertain to social 
exchange, and not as the simple introduction of money as a technology into an economy. The 
introduction of money requires very specific institutions to be in place in order to support its use. 
These institutional structures differ in fundamental ways from the more limited institutional 
arrangements that are required for the smooth functioning of a barter and in-kind exchange 
system. Barter can take place between two parties in comparative isolation from the broader 
influence of a social system, but money transactions have an inherent and permanent social 
character. When the social significance of money is ignored or given only passing mention, the 
resulting discussions of monetization and its relation to other phenomena often fail to capture the 
many complex interactions and shifts that are likely occurring as both precursors and responses 
to the introduction of money precisely because these are social things.  
Secondly, I conceptualize monetization as a multi-scale phenomenon, discrete at the 
smallest scale of individual exchanges, and continuous at larger scales such as villages, sectors, 
economies, or societies. Individual actors can carry on cash-based exchanges in some cases and 
not in others, especially when these exchanges are of a qualitatively different nature, and 
evidence suggests that this occurs in various economic sectors of even the most developed 
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nations (Zelizer 1996). Even restricting attention to a single type of transaction such as labor 
exchange during a harvest, it remains possible for a single actor to mix strategies, paying some 
associates and bartering or exchanging in-kind with others. At the level of a collection of actors, 
the network, it becomes more plausible still that a multiplicity of modes of exchange might be 
observed, and one may begin to observe specific communities or sub-networks of interaction 
develop around particular types of transactions, one set of actors engaged in monetized 
transactions, another bartering. This is an important element to the proper conceptualization of 
monetization, one that has often been neglected by researchers who prefer to conceptualize 
monetization as an all-or-nothing proposition (Hull 2009a).  
Monetization, Information, and Trust 
INFORMATION. In order to fully understand why a relationship is hypothesized to exist 
between monetization and social networks, one must consider the significance of trust in matters 
of exchange, a connection that has heretofore gone largely unexplored in the literatures on trust, 
exchange, and money considered in isolation from each other. In brief, monetization involves a 
reduction in the uncertainty that is borne by at least one of the parties to an exchange, and 
therefore has the potential to reshape networks of exchange affiliation as actors respond to the 
changing informational requirements of a new form of exchange. Where both forms of exchange, 
monetized and non-monetized, exist side-by-side, one should also expect to observe different 
characteristics in the network structure associated with each type of exchange.  
To understand why these expectations are reasonable, begin by considering that exchange 
without money is fundamentally dyadic in principle, and often in reality. Such exchanges may 
involve more than two parties, of course, and may be spread across time in what constitutes a 
series of “embedded” exchanges that are only commensurate on average (Granovetter 1985; 
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Sahlins 1968; Sahlins 1972). But in the absence of money, these exchanges involve only the 
actors themselves, who bear total responsibility for determining essential information about the 
goods involved (both immediately perceivable and knowable only through experience with the 
good over time), characteristics of the transaction itself (price, conditions of payment, and so 
forth), and familiarity with the actors (such as reputation for fairness, and degree of trust) (Dodd 
1994; Plattner 1989). Dowling has labeled the totality of these informational requirements the 
caveat mutator burden – the “barterer beware” burden, a variation of the well-known Latin idiom 
caveat emptor, meaning “buyer beware” (1979). 1  
The major source that actors may avail themselves of in order to obtain the information 
upon which a successful transaction depends is to be found in the existing networks of social 
affiliation and exchange. Actors to whom an individual is connected through previous dealings 
may be able to provide important information about past dealings with a potential new exchange 
partner, while an individual’s own past dealings with a certain actor may also be conceptualized 
in formal network terms as the strength or frequency of past interaction, and even the outcome of 
such interaction. Individuals may also utilize networks to share or even manipulate information 
about their own reputations as traders. But, regardless of where information about possible 
exchange partners is obtained, the locus of responsibility in non-monetized transactions such as 
barter always lies almost entirely with the actors involved in the exchange. In a monetized 
exchange, by contrast, the two parties remain embedded in some larger social context, but this 
context now contains within it additional social institutional machinery for enforcing or 
guaranteeing the payment of some set value in exchange for money, whether bone, metal, paper, 
or electronic bit. The presence of this monetary institution, when it is properly functioning, 
engenders trust in the social symbol that is money, enabling the smooth conduct of transactions, 
                                                 
1
 A more general and accurate translation of Dowling’s phrase might be the “exchanger beware” burden. 
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large and small.  In order to better understand the significance of these observations, it is useful 
to consider more closely what is meant by the concept of trust and how this concept relates to 
information and social networks.  
THE ROLE OF TRUST. Trust originates as a response to uncertainty. Bhattacharya, 
Devinney, and Pillutla provide a useful definition of trust as, 
 
…an expectancy of positive (or nonnegative) outcomes that one can receive based on the 
expected action of another party in an interaction characterized by uncertainty. (1998: 
462). 
 
Where the interaction involves the exchange of things of value, a certain amount of uncertainty is 
almost always present. The “expected action of another party” derives directly from the 
information amassed on a potential exchange partner, whether voluminous or slim. To place 
one’s trust in an exchange partner is to put one’s imprimatur on the exchange, a symbolic gesture 
that declares the caveat mutator burden has been fulfilled and the trade partner deemed worthy 
and reliable enough, and the goods or services of sufficient perceived quality, to carry out a 
transaction.  
Granovetter (1985) argues that it is trust that imbues economic exchanges with a social 
character and yet keeps them from becoming over-socialized to the point of determinism (487-
493). Humans do cheat their exchange partners, but such behavior is not normative and is 
typically punished when discovered. Those who break this trust frequently will be deemed 
untrustworthy by those who have been cheated and often word goes out to other potential 
exchange partners to avoid dealing with this actor. Whether this actor is an individual or an 
entire corporate entity makes little difference. Stronger bonds of trust may therefore develop 
between actors when exchange is carried out informally, not because of any inherent difference 
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in the economic relationship itself but because of the greater tendency for information about such 
transactions to be shared widely among other close associates (Molm, Takahashi, and Peterson 
2000). Such casual and ongoing associations provide frequent occasions for the actors to 
demonstrate to each other that they can be trusted. 
All exchanges, whether large or small, in anonymous markets or intimate village settings, 
take place within a context of uncertainty, and therefore require some form of trust. But what 
specific type of trust is required in a monetized context? To accept a bit of metal, scrap of paper, 
or collection of binary bits in exchange for one’s labor, the product of one’s hands or mind, or 
some other thing of value requires a considerable leap of faith. The difference is that, unlike non-
monetized transactions, in which only the trustworthiness of the potential exchange partner and 
the quality of the thing received must be evaluated, in monetized transactions it is the State, or 
equivalent social institution, that must also be trusted. Trust must be invested, quite literally, in 
money itself, in the monetary system. While it is true that hyperinflation and other problems of 
monetary systems introduce interesting additional wrinkles into the formulation, the essential 
observation is that monetization shifts responsibility for obtaining some (but not all) of the 
required information in an exchange from the transactors to social organizations (be they chiefs, 
guilds, central banks, nation-states, etc.). Thus, when a shift occurs from non-monetized to 
monetized systems of exchange, the nature and distribution of the trust required by the 
transaction is also shifts. 
One implication of this transfer of trust from person to institution is straightforward: an 
institution must only gain one’s trust once, and barring the widespread failure of that institution 
(rapid currency devaluation being an excellent example) quickly ceases to evoke suspicion and 
remains trusted indefinitely. In contrast, each new party to barter requires that the process be 
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undertaken anew, and even trusted long-term partners occasionally perform unscrupulous acts. It 
is this tendency for the machinery of trust to rapidly fade from perception in the course of 
monetized exchange, and to remain ever present in barter, that leads to the erroneous conclusion 
that barter requires greater levels of trust than monetized exchange. To use money requires not 
less trust, but more, though it is trust directed towards a very different entity (Dodd 1994: xxv). 
In an exchange transaction in which one of the actors pays money for a good, the caveat 
mutator burden is substantially altered, but only for one party. To illustrate, first imagine a 
simple exchange: the direct bartering of agricultural produce for other produce, say oranges for 
flour. In such an exchange both parties bear the caveat mutator burden to similar degrees – Actor 
“A” presumably does not wish to procure a bag of sour oranges, nor “B” a bag of moldy flour. 
Thus, all of the elements of the social relationship in which the exchange is embedded, as well as 
the powers of observation each actor possesses will be called upon by both parties to protect their 
interests as best they can. If A and B have already established trust based on previous exchanges 
or information from their network, and they can meet the other elements of the caveat mutator 
burden, there is a good chance that an exchange will take place. Even if actor B should intend to 
cheat A by attempting to hide rotten oranges in the bottom of the bag, this actor still would not 
wish a similar thing to happen in return as regards the flour. In other words, even a potential 
cheater is subject to the caveat mutator burden to an equal degree under barter, and cannot afford 
to be any less vigilant. In contrast, if one is offered an equivalent amount of money as payment 
in exchange for goods, services, or other valued things there is a higher probability that the 
caveat mutator burden will be met for that person because the money is trusted, ipso facto. Even 
taking into account such factors as the risk of counterfeit, the introduction of money typically 
reduces the caveat mutator burden for the “sellers” of things of value below what it would be 
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under a direct barter system. For the “buyers” of things of value, the burden remains largely 
unchanged.2  
It is thus no accident that caveat emptor is a widespread idiom in market economies 
while caveat venditor (seller beware) is seldom heard. As one example supporting this theory, 
DiMaggio and Louch have found that U.S. consumers prefer to buy an automobile from someone 
whom they know well, and sell to someone whom they do not. In their words,  
 
The greater the risk in a transaction—the greater the advantages that information 
asymmetry and asset specificity bestow on sellers and the greater the seller’s inclination 
to exploit those advantages—the greater the likelihood that buyers will prefer dealing 
with people to whom they have social ties outside the transaction itself” (DiMaggio and 
Louch 1998: 634).  
 
 
Such behavior can be interpreted as a reflection of the trust requirements of exchange. The buyer 
bears responsibility for assessing conditions of the exchange such as the seller’s “inclination to 
exploit,” which are seldom precisely known in practice. Thus, when assuming the role of the 
buyer, the caveat mutator burden leads actors to express a preference for dealing with those 
about whom they can obtain the most information through other social network ties. The 
possibility of a buyer cheating, on the other hand, is substantially reduced (although not 
eliminated) through the introduction of money into the exchange. Thus consumers, when 
assuming the role of the seller, might be thought to show no preference at all for whom they sell 
to. But of course information can flow both ways through a network, and perhaps to reduce the 
likelihood of friction within one’s own social group, or simply to make it more difficult for the 
                                                 
2
 Although considerably beyond the scope of the present analysis, it is worth noting that the last remaining 
possibility – the exchange of one monetary instrument for another, reestablishes a degree of parity between the 
parties involved. But, simultaneously, the consideration of this large class of economic transactions readily points to 
the simplified nature of the model presented here, as clearly not all monetary instruments are created equal.  
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buyer to later complain about the purchased car, sellers in practice display a preference for 
dealing with strangers.  
Moving from the general to the specific, it should now be apparent that in a fully non-
monetized exchange environment, buying, selling, and exchanging households all share similar 
caveat mutator burdens. Each time objects or services of value are exchanged both parties must 
satisfy these informational requirements. They must trust one another. In the specific case of 
labor exchange, a common feature in many agricultural and subsistence economies, one would 
therefore predict that households will exhibit a preference for exchanging labor-for-labor with 
associates who are trusted. Such trust may be based upon assessments of the work habits, 
reliability, and familiarity obtained through personal experience or through word-of-mouth from 
other members of a social network. An actor might actually prefer associates with whom they 
share no close connections, but if non-monetized exchange is being used, such a preference is 
trumped by the difficulty of satisfying the caveat mutator burden where strangers are concerned. 
Only when local labor sources are exhausted might one expect to see households turning to 
associates that are distant and unknown to them as a labor source of last resort in the absence of 
monetary exchange. 
One special aspect of labor-for-labor transactions that further supports this prediction is 
that one party must always “ante up” first, with repayment in kind being delayed for some time. 
Labor obtained through exchange is extra labor, in addition to what is provided by one’s own 
household, which must also work to harvest one’s own land and therefore cannot simultaneously 
be providing labor elsewhere. Thus, whichever party assumes the role of first provider is in a 
particularly vulnerable position, as there is a risk that the exchange partner will renege on the 
deal, or will attempt to cheat by repaying the debt with less labor than was received. For the 
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party that goes first in such exchanges, money transactions should have an immediate, readily 
apparent advantage over other types of exchange. If these actors are compensated monetarily for 
their labor, they need have fewer worries that they will be cheated or swindled by an exchange 
partner who fails to follow through with the promise of future labor. Trust in the money itself, 
established long before, and remaining inviolable except in periods of monetary crisis, will be 
sufficient to guarantee that concerns about cheating are allayed and an exchange will take place, 
other factors being equal.  
Thus, money makes it possible for those who wish to obtain money to sell their labor to 
comparative strangers without the need to satisfy an otherwise sizeable caveat mutator burden. 
To be sure, theirs is still far from a worry-free existence. For one, they could be exploited or 
underpaid by their employers.  As noted earlier, there is no escaping the requirement of trust 
altogether, it is simply shifted to qualitatively different concerns. This is the place where the 
present theory connects with fields that study labor contracts, for example. But, at the heart of 
the discussion is the observation that different expectations characterize monetized transactions 
where buyers and sellers of labor are concerned. In contrast to the sellers, actors who are in need 
of labor still have the same caveat mutator burden that they have always borne. These 
“employers” must continue to assess the characteristics of the worker and the service being 
rendered as best they can and retain the incentive to deal with better-known exchange partners, 
expressed as preference for hiring only laborers whom they trust to a high degree, just as they did 
in a non-monetized institutional environment. From these general observations, a number of 
specific predictions, formulated in explicit social network language, can now be deduced. 
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Social Network Hypotheses 
The advent of social network analysis has provided a methodology and a language 
permitting the specification and measurement of the types of social relationships and information 
flows discussed above in explicit terms (Burt 1976). Therefore, a number of specific social 
network hypotheses can be expressed that formalize and extend the preceding discussion.  
First, greater concentrations or frequency of ties between actors in local social networks 
ought to make the exchange of labor through non-monetary means less risky than it would be in 
sparse networks, ceteris paribus. Conversely, in networks in which the frequency or 
concentration of local network ties is lower, one might expect to see a heightened reliance on 
monetized labor because such an arrangement reduces the informational burden for at least some 
parties. The story is likely complicated considerably by such factors as access to money and the 
availability of labor of different types (well-known vs. not, for example), but these factors should 
not fundamentally alter the basic existence of a relationship between these two characteristics of 
networks. Because there is currently no empirical basis to suggest which formal measures of 
network structure might be the appropriate means of operationalizing the “concentration and 
frequency” of ties, a broad sample of common network measures is used.  
Secondly, a relationship between monetization and network characteristics should only 
be expected for those specific network ties that are reasonably capable of providing information 
relevant to the type of transaction under consideration. Put simply, different types of networks 
should provide information that is useful to meeting the caveat mutator burden for different 
types of transactions. As noted in the introduction, I will be using the specific example of rice 
labor exchanges to formally examine these predictions. This proposition is examined by 
comparing the correlation between monetization and essential aspects of two different types of 
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social networks: rice labor networks and sibling networks. These two networks show very little 
overlap, or multiplexity, in the context of the study (Entwisle et al. 2007). Examining these two 
networks side-by-side enables me to provide some support for the contention that it is specific 
information pertaining to trust and the expected value of the transaction (collectively, the caveat 
mutator burden), and not simply the general degree of connectedness, that accounts for the 
observed association.  
Third, I expect to detect the informational asymmetry discussed above. If it is in fact the 
case that labor providers and labor users have similar informational requirements in non-
monetized exchanges and different requirements when the transactions are monetized, this might 
be expected to manifest itself in the strength and type of the relationship observed based on 
which end of the transaction an actor occupies. Specifically, one would expect to find that labor 
users are more attentive to information about the potential trade partner than labor providers 
when monetized transactions are taking place, while these two ought to appear similar for non-
monetized exchanges.  
Fourth, as noted earlier, I conceptualize monetization as a multi-scale phenomenon, one 
in which actors may potentially mix exchange strategies at all but the lowest level of the single 
transaction, at least in principle. Empirically, two questions should be addressed. How common 
is such mixing of strategies in practice, and if it does occur do the actors or collectivities mixing 
those strategies more resemble those who are fully monetized or fully non-monetized. I predict 
that in their network positions and properties, actors using both types of exchange will more 
resemble their fellows who use only non-monetized labor.  Following the logic of the foregoing 
discussion, this is because even one such non-monetized transaction requires considerable social 
network resources to be utilized in meeting the caveat mutator burden. 
73 
 
Fifth, and of particular importance to the theory presented above, I expect there to be a 
readily apparent relation between the general degree of familiarity existing between two parties 
and the form of exchange used. To the extent that a defensible measure of this familiarity can be 
constructed to adequately capture the essential element of trust, I expect to observe the tendency 
toward monetized transactions to decrease with familiarity. More will be said about this 
hypothesis when the specific concepts laid out in this section are operationalized in Section IV. 
Likewise, all of these hypotheses will receive additional refinement as the specific data and 
measures used in the empirical analysis are now described.  
 CONTEXT AND DATA 
Nang Rong District, Thailand  
The data used to explore the relationship between social network characteristics and 
monetization of labor come from the Nang Rong Projects, a large collection of studies examining 
social, demographic, and environmental conditions in Nang Rong, Thailand over a span of more 
than 20 years.3 This analysis makes use of the two most comprehensive data collection efforts, 
fielded in 1994 and 2000, as well as some information collected in 1984. During each wave, an 
attempt was made to collect a complete census in 51 villages resulting in a large total numbers of 
individuals (ranging from 34,035 in 1984 to 33,193 in 2000) and households (ranging from 5,860 
households in 1984 to 8,638 in 2000). This, combined with the broad range of thematic areas 
about which information was collected, and the multilevel structure of the data, make these data 
ideal for secondary data analysis.  The present research examines two previously well-studied 
aspects of the datasets simultaneously: the structure of particular social networks (e.g. Entwisle 
et al. 1993; Entwisle et al. 2007; Faust et al. 1999; Godley 2001; Rindfuss et al. 2004), and the 
pattern of household labor compensation (e.g. Hull 2007). These subject areas and the data 
                                                 
3
 For a complete description and access to the Nang Rong data, visit http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/nangrong. 
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collected for their investigation are combined in a novel way to yield new insights about the 
relationship between social networks and labor exchange.  
Nang Rong District, Thailand is an undulating expanse of  land in Northeast Thailand 
that is noted for both its high levels of traditional smallholder agriculture (Phongphit and 
Hewison 2001) and for its traditionally high levels of poverty (Dohrs 1988: 12-13; Parnwell 
1988). This poverty is attributable in part to the unpredictable monsoon rainfall in the region, 
upon which the livelihoods of many resident farmers vitally depend, and to the poor soils and 
drainage (Fukui 1993). Agriculturally speaking, at least two such livelihoods are available: 
wetland (or “paddy”) rice agriculture, which is mostly rain fed; and upland cash cropping, which 
has included the growing of cassava, kenaf, sugarcane, and other “field crops” at different 
historical periods. Many households in the region also practice strategies of economic 
diversification, managing “diverse portfolios” that help to buffer the effects of potentially 
disastrous events like drought, flooding, and the destruction of a specific crop by pests 
(Grandstaff 1992). Beyond agriculture, few economic options other than out-migration have 
presented themselves to residents of the District in the past. Development projects such as the 
Community-Based Integrated Rural Development projects, CBIRD-I and CBIRD-II, helped 
during the 1980s and 1990s to increase the number of locally available non-agricultural jobs and 
made other substantial contributions to the economic opportunities available to Nang Rong 
residents (Canadian International Development Agency 2006; David and Viravaidya 1986; 
Entwisle et al. 1998; Stoeckel et al. 1986).  
For the large share of households that do grow rice, obtaining enough labor to complete 
the harvest in a reasonable length of time is a perennial challenge. Many developing regions are 
characterized by surplus labor for agricultural tasks (or assumed to be so in economic theories of 
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development), and this situation is typically exacerbated by mechanization of tasks and 
agricultural intensification, which have the effect of further reducing labor demand relative to 
supply. Nang Rong, in contrast, continues to experience high demand for agricultural labor, at 
least seasonally. This demand is at its greatest during the rice harvest, when a perfect storm of 
factors including the unpredictability of late-season rains, the persistent threat of animal and 
insect pests, and the requirement of processing mature rice in a timely fashion all pressure 
households to harvest their rice as quickly as possible (Hull 2007). The result is more work at 
harvest time than can typically be accomplished by the average household in a timely fashion. 
This imbalance has only worsened as average household sizes have declined over the past two 
decades (Entwisle et al. 2008; Piotrowski 2008b).  
To meet labor demands that frequently exceed the resources of the immediate family, 
most rice-growing households in Northeast Thailand have a variety of sources from which to 
obtain the needed additional labor. Households may call upon former members now living in the 
same or a nearby village along with their spouses, children, and other family members. Former 
members are usually the children or siblings of household heads who have moved out as a result 
of marriage or an improvement in the economic standing of the household that allows large 
extended families to fission into smaller nuclear households (Piotrowski 2008b). The practice of 
“lucrilocality”, in which newlywed couples choose to live with whichever partner’s family 
provides the greatest potential opportunities in terms of land and other assets, means that couples 
in the Thai context may move into either maternal and paternal homes or found their own 
households (Chamratrithirong, Morgan, and Rindfuss 1988). Households also receive labor from 
returning migrants from the household who have been living away from the household for some 
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time (defined as at least 2 months in this study) but who return to assist the family during the 
harvest (Piotrowski 2008a). 
Together these individuals provide a substantial amount of labor for households. In 1994, 
the only year for which data on the number of days of labor provided was collected, these 
individuals provided about 23 percent of the total person-days of additional labor used by 
households.4  These workers are connected to the household through ties of kinship, and are 
quite often also connected through long-established patterns of interaction with the household. 
As a consequence, the vast majority (around 90-97 percent) of this labor is provided for free or 
on an exchange basis (often simply a day for a day). For the remaining 77 percent of the person-
days of labor utilized in that year, households had to seek out additional labor for the harvest 
from neighbors and fellow villagers, individuals and associates from nearby villages, and even 
near-total strangers, possibly provided by roaming labor gangs that sometimes show up at 
harvest time. In contrast to the current, former, and returning household members, these more 
socially distant laborers are most frequently remunerated in cash for their labor.  
This was not always the case in Nang Rong, however. While no empirical evidence on 
the method of compensating rice harvest laborers exists for the region prior to 1994, historical 
reports from the area note a very different strategy was once popular throughout the Northeast of 
Thailand. The long khaek strategy, as it is called in Thai, is essentially a barter-based labor-
exchange system. Households in a village pool their labor, collectively harvesting each 
household’s rice paddies in succession as they reach maturity. Cultural, agricultural, and 
biophysical factors, many of them unique to the region, combined to make this a highly efficient 
                                                 
4
 124,003 person-days of labor in total were reported in 1994. This number only includes labor from former, 
returning, and non-household members. The number of person-days of labor provided by current household 
members was not measured. It should be added that the validity of these estimates may somewhat questionable due 
to recall and other forms of error. Hence, they are only provided to give a sense of the rough distribution of 
household vs. non-household labor and not incorporated into the formal analysis. 
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strategy for ensuring that the maximum amount of rice is harvested while minimizing losses in 
years past (2007). At the core of this strategy’s effectiveness is the staggered maturation of rice 
paddies which occurs both between households and even among a household’s multiple paddies. 
This variation results from exogenous factors, such as small-scale variation in growing 
conditions, but is also intentionally promoted by households through the planting of diverse 
varieties of rice with different growth characteristics, varying planting dates, and the spatial 
separation of growing plots to maximize the variation for each household (2007). The 
consequence of all of this variation is that it is possible for households to send members 
elsewhere to assist with another household’s harvest without endangering their own crop.  
The long khaek system was long the standard means of acquiring additional labor beyond 
what could be provided by the current, former, and returning household members. But recent 
decades have seen the system supplanted by one of labor for monetary pay. Phongphit and 
Hewison summarize the demise of this system succinctly, stating, 
 
Traditional co-operation, called long khaek, where villagers helped one another on 
special occasions, has disappeared in most villages.  Villagers used to assist each other 
during various stages of rice growing, especially in transplanting, harvesting, and 
threshing.  These days most have to rely on their family and hired labor….In cases where 
villagers continue to exchange labor, more careful calculations are involved than was 
previously the norm.  If a person has gone to work for two days in someone else’s fields, 
then that person will “re-pay” with an equal period of work. (2001: 103) 
 
Despite the existence of “cash for labor” arrangements for well over 30 years, households in 
Nang Rong continue to report that between 10 and 30 percent of the laborers not directly 
affiliated with the household continue to work for “free” or exchange. It is this simultaneous 
coexistence of an in-kind exchange-based system of labor with a cash-based monetized system 
of labor that forms the contextual basis for the present study. 
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Units of Analysis and Sample 
The variables created for this analysis are measured at two levels: the household and the 
village. Doing so enables me to examine the multilevel nature of monetization. Elsewhere I have 
provided a thorough discussion of the multilevel nature of monetization as a social phenomenon, 
which can be summarized in the statement that theory predicts different properties and 
relationships at different scales (Hull 2009a). The definition of a household used here identifies 
groups of individuals who share a common dwelling unit and engage in a variety of activities in 
a common location, most notably sleeping under the same roof. This operationalization of 
households presents few problems for this analysis due to the reliance chiefly on “true” 
household measures: those that are characteristics of the household unit itself, and not simply 
aggregate measures or averages of the characteristics of the household members which could be 
particularly sensitive to the inclusion and exclusion of members. The implication is less potential 
for variation to be introduced into the measurement of these phenomena by the 
operationalization of the household.  
The sample of households to be used in this analysis, and thus the households used to 
construct village-level measures, is not the full 7331 households in 1994 or 8638 households in 
2000.  There are several factors that diminish the total set of households included in this analysis 
of labor use. First, the household must have harvested rice in order to be able to use any labor 
during the harvest. Removing those households from the sample who did not grow any rice 
reduces the number of households included to 5835 in 1994 and 6389 in 2000. Further, of those 
who harvested rice, a portion relied on only current or former household members to meet their 
labor needs, and chose not to or did not have the ability to hire or exchange for extra labor. Both 
paid labor transactions and labor exchanges occur almost exclusively in the act of obtaining extra 
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labor, above and beyond what is provided by the household itself. For this reason, households 
that did not utilize any extra labor offer no direct insight into the hypotheses examined here 
because they neither hired nor exchanged for any additional labor. Moreover, as will be explored 
further in the discussion in Section VI, attempting to include households that neither grew rice 
nor used any extra labor in the analysis only results in a fundamentally different set of questions 
about exchange than those addressed here. For now, I define the sample for this analysis to be all 
households that used at least one laborer that was not a current or former household member 
under the definitions provided above. Using this standard further reduces the sample to 2007 in 
1994 and 4081 in 2000.  The selection implications of this decision are explored in Section VI as 
well.  
In contrast, the village level poses few challenges in selecting the proper sample – all 51 
villages about which information was obtained are included, with one exception described later. 
The extent of each village is defined with respect to the original 51 villages chosen to participate 
in the 1984 Nang Rong study. While many of these villages have subsequently undergone 
administrative splitting, all data for the “daughter” villages are kept as a single unit, or “mother 
village.”5 Doing so reduces concerns about the arbitrariness of the administrative village 
definition because two households that were part of the same social and economic community 
before and after an administrative split placed them into different villages will continue to be 
recognized as part of the same community(Entwisle et al. 2008). As a practical matter, I go back 
as far as is possible, using the social boundaries of villages as constituted in 1984 to represent a 
“village” in this study. One important benefit of doing so is a consistent frame of reference when 
                                                 
5
 From the original 51 villages selected to field the Nang Rong study in 1984, 92 administrative villages had 
emerged by 2000 through a process of administrative splitting. When a village grows to a certain extent (there is no 
precise upper threshold), it is “split” into two villages, each designating a separate village headman and other 
administrative apparatus, and functioning as a unique entity in the eyes of government agencies. Spatially and in 
network terms, the daughter villages are often much more difficult to distinguish.  
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comparing 1994 data to 2000 data. While the exact composition of the villages with regard to 
households, territorial control, and many other factors is constantly shifting, the 
operationalization used here ensures that the social entity labeled “Village X” in 1994 is as close 
as practically possible to that labeled “Village X” in the year 2000.  
 MEASUREMENT AND METHODS 
Variable Descriptions 
HOUSEHOLD LEVEL MEASURES. The household-level network measures serve as the 
basis for both household and village variables, and so are described first. There are three groups 
of measures. The first two groups are derived from a series of questions asked of each household 
regarding the source of any labor that it utilized in the course of harvesting its rice. This source 
information details which other households from within the same village assisted with the 
harvest, how many laborers helped from each household, and the precise location of each 
household.  In addition, the economic nature of the exchange – whether for pay, free, or 
exchange, was also recorded. From these extremely detailed raw data the first group of measures 
is created by instituting two dichotomies. 
First, labor was either paid or not, which treats households that reported exchanging labor 
as theoretically similar to those reporting receiving labor for free. There are reasons to doubt that 
households consistently distinguished between free labor and exchange labor, most notably the 
observation that most “free” labor in fact takes part in the context of a long-term relationship 
between households that is similar to labor exchange (Hull 2007). Households seldom if ever 
provide free labor to those they do not regularly interact with.6  
                                                 
6
 One notable exception to this comes from evidence that some village headman and religious leaders may receive a 
non-trivial amount of “free” labor from households in their village, but this “tribute labor” also resembles a barter-
like transaction much more than it resembles a market-based cash transaction, and thus can be grouped in the latter 
category as well {{3 Phongphit, S. 2001/f: 103/s103}}.  
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Second, labor is classified as either from within the village or from beyond. Using the 
1984 village definitions, all labor provided to the household was categorized according to its 
source. Initially, categories included from the same village, another village in Nang Rong, 
another district in Buriram Province, another Province, and another country.  Much of the small 
share of labor that is provided to a household from far away (such as that from another district or 
province) is provided by persons with whom the household shares strong bonds of kinship or 
other affiliation, and is not contract labor. Descriptive analyses not shown here corroborate this 
assertion, showing that as one moves farther beyond the village in spatial terms, the proportion 
of workers that was paid actually declines to a level nearly identical to the level observed for 
former household members. The conclusion to be drawn is that outside the District, spatial 
distance is not a particularly useful proxy for social distance or familiarity.  This is the principal 
reason for dichotomizing this measure.  
Based upon these two dichotomies, all labor used by a household is categorized, and 
indicator variables are created that denote whether a household had used any labor of each type: 
paid, free/exchange, within village, and beyond village. For each indicator variables, a household 
can have a 0 (no) or a 1 (yes) for each of the two categories in a dichotomy. For example, a 
household that mixed compensation strategies, paying some workers and not others, would have 
a 1 for both “any paid” and “any free/exchange.” A household that paid all of its workers would 
have a 1 for “any paid” and a 0 for “any free/exchange.” Thus, two sets of four indicator 
variables exist: one set dealing with compensation and the other with the origin of the labor. 
These sets of dichotomous indicator variables are the first group of household variables.7  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
7
 Due to the way the analysis sample is defined, only three of the four categories in each set will appear in the tables 
shown. The fourth possible category – used no paid labor (0) and no exchange labor (0) and its "within the 
village/outside the village" analog – has no cases because these households are excluded from the analysis. 
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The second group of household variables is generated using data on the within-village 
rice harvest network.  Complete and accurate data on social networks are typically quite costly 
and time-consuming to collect, and in this case, it was simply prohibitive to collect complete rice 
harvest network data beyond the villages. Instead, full network information was collected for all 
households in the village, and partial information from beyond, in the form of limited out-ties 
(instances in which a household named another household as having provided assistance with the 
rice harvest).8 In formal network terms, I begin with the non-symmetrical adjacency matrix of 
within-village household rice harvest affiliations, an n x n matrix in which the entries on the 
horizontal represent a household’s out-ties (other households named as providing labor) and 
those entries on the horizontal represent a household’s in-ties (households that named the ego 
household as a labor provider). Using these matrices, a number of household-level measures are 
generated for each rice-growing household.9 These include the degree (the total number of 
connections), out-degree, in-degree, total number of households reachable by a path of any 
length, and the average pathlength between the ego household and all other households. In 
calculating the path length measures for the rice harvest networks, the directionality of the tie is 
ignored. It is also possible for households to have “self-reflexive” rice harvest labor ties, which 
are comprised of former members of the household who came back to assist the household with 
its labor. These members provide a substantial amount of labor to the household, nearly all of 
which is free, but the presence or absence of these self-reflexive ties has no impact on the 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
8
 In fact, out-ties were only collected within the village as well, but because this information was obtained from 
every household in the village, the result is a complete network, in principle. 
 
9
 All social network measures were created using UCINET {{1 Borgatti, S.P. 2002}} and subsequently exported for 
analysis in standard statistical software packages (SAS and STATA). 
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position of the household in the village network that was measured. Therefore, they are excluded 
from social network calculations throughout this paper as a potential confounding factor.  
The third group of household-level measures is also a set of social network measures, and 
is identical in construction to the second set, but is calculated for the network of sibling 
affiliations of household members. For all household members aged 18-41, a complete list of 
siblings was collected, along with information on the present location of each sibling. Using the 
data on siblings living in the same village, a complete network of within-village sibling 
affiliations is constructed.10 For comparative consistency, the same sample of households is used 
to calculate these sibling network measures that were used to calculate the rice harvest measures.  
VILLAGE LEVEL MEASURES. The first set of variables of interest at the village level is 
the proportion of households in each village that utilized any of each of four possible types of 
extra labor: paid, free/exchange, intra-village, and extra-village. These are aggregate variables. 
Each measure is the number of households in a village using labor of a given type divided by the 
number of households that used any extra labor during the season in question.  In addition to the 
proportion variables, two other sets of village-level measures are employed. The first is a set of 
                                                 
10
 Unlike the rice harvest network, which is directional, this is an undirected network, meaning that if A is sibling to 
B, then B is also a sibling to A. The structure of the data would therefore permit an analysis of the degree to which 
siblings in separate households name each other (reciprocal ties). While this is beyond the scope of the present 
analysis, informal review of the data suggests a non-trivial degree of non-reciprocity exists in the sibling networks 
(perhaps as high as 60 percent of all sibling ties are not reciprocated). That respondents are seemingly not recalling 
all of their siblings could be interpreted as evidence of error in respondent recall and other types of error, but is more 
likely attributable to the key informant format of the data collection. A widespread practice in large-scale household 
surveys, the use of a key informant allows for information to be collected on individuals who are members of the 
household but are not present at the time of the interview. Such individuals constitute a large share of the overall 
population the results are thought to represent. One interpretation of the low rate of reciprocity among sibling ties is 
that key informants are likely not reporting fully on the siblings of other adult members of the household who are 
not present during the actual interview. Fortunately, a considerable portion of these missed ties will be reported by 
the other household, enough that the sibling networks generated are fairly complete despite this potential non-
reporting, but the possibility remains that the sibling networks produced via this data collection method may exhibit 
a degree of missing data whose exact magnitude cannot be determined. If one presumes that the key informant was 
one who was most familiar with key household decisions such as the acquisition of extra help during the rice 
harvest, the same should not hold true for the rice-harvest network data.  
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social network indices that summarize the global characteristics of the labor-sharing network 
within the village. The second is an identical set of social network indices that summarize the 
global characteristics of the sibling network in the same village. As these two sets of measures 
were created in identical ways, I describe only the creation of the rice harvest social network 
measures.  
Whenever possible, an attempt was made to create an aggregate or global network 
measure to parallel those created at the household level. This enables a direct comparison of 
effects across levels, and the exploration of the effect of aggregating household-level attributes. 
Therefore, the mean degree, mean number reachable, and mean path length were calculated for 
each village network. At the village level there is no need to additionally calculate the mean 
number of in-ties and out-ties, as these two means will be equal to one another and to the mean 
number of symmetrical ties, a result of the data structure. Additional measures of the density of 
the village network (a measure of the total number of ties divided by the total number of ties 
possible in the network) and Freeman degree centralization (a measure of the concentration of 
structurally advantaged positions in the overall network) are calculated (Wasserman and Faust 
1994). Together, these common social network measures provide a simple characterization of 
each village network that captures many of its most salient features.  
Methodology 
I rely on basic descriptive methods to establish the existence of correlations between 
monetization at the household and village level and several characteristics of two key social 
networks in Nang Rong, Thailand. A description of the specific methodological issues that arise 
in an analysis of this type follows.  
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CORRELATION ANALYSIS. Pearson’s r is computed and reported throughout this 
analysis as a means of establishing association between variables, both continuous and 
dichotomous. Technically, a special form of correlation, the point-biserial, is more appropriate in 
instances in which the association sought is between a continuous and a dichotomous variable 
(Chen and Popovich 2002). A special case of Pearson correlation, this measure has fallen out of 
favor in the computer era, however, because it can be easily shown that the point biserial 
correlation is functionally indistinguishable from the more common Pearson’s r except in the 
rarest of cases, typically when sample sizes are below 30 (e.g. Anderson 1994). Thus the 
equivalent point-biserial correlation can be computed using any program that computes 
Pearson’s r (Klugh 1986). 
But, as a result of including dichotomies in the analysis, the r statistic derived cannot 
assume the full range of values (-1, 1) as would be the case for a Pearson correlation between 
two continuous variables. Rather, the maximum range that the statistic can take in this case is (-
0.798, 0.798), achievable only when the dichotomous variable divides the sample into equal-
sized groups. This value decreases further as the dichotomy becomes more imbalanced to as little 
as (-0.26, 0.26) under certain conditions (Gradstein 1986; Shih and Huang 1992). Thus, the 
maximum possible value for r in each correlation involving a dichotomy, obtained from 
Gradstein (1986), are provided for the reader at the bottom of Table 2 as an aid to interpretation 
(Gradstein 1986: 260).11 
OUTLIERS. An important issue in descriptive analyses is that of outliers, or extreme 
values. In the present analysis, there was one village in 1994 that was an extreme outlier on 
                                                 
11
 For those interested, the maximal value of the point biserial correlation, as shown by Gradstein {{14 Gradstein, 
Mark 1986/a}} depends on the empirical probability of success, p, which can be found for the three dichotomous 
variables used here in Table 3 as the mean. The values reported at the bottom of Table 4 are taken from the table on 
page 260 of the article by Gradstein. 
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measures of rice network structure at both the household and village level. Numerically, on the 
measure of rice harvest network degree, this value for this village was 10 times the inter-quartile 
range above the third quartile. Other rice network variables showed similar results for this 
village. All other villages were within distributional expectation. There is nothing which would 
bar a village from having a network structure such as this in principle. But neither would it be 
difficult to obtain such data in error through one of many mistakes in data collection, be it 
mistranslation, incorrect instructions provided to the respondents in that village, improper 
recording, or other errors in the data management process. The fact that measures for the same 
village were not extreme in 2000 further suggests that something was indeed out of the ordinary 
in this village in 1994. Verifying the reason for the unusual rice network measures is difficult. 
Population mobility and mortality have acted on the population for over 15 years, while the 
passage of time has continually eroded respondents’ ability to recall. Thus, in light of the degree 
to which the measured behavior of the village is so far outside the expected range of behavior 
established by 50 other villages at two points in time, I have removed it from the 1994 village-
level analyses.  
RESULTS 
Reviewing the hypotheses laid out in Section II, I expect to find evidence of the 
following five relationships in the household and village-level analyses: 
HYPOTHESIS 1: A positive relationship between measures of the density, connectivity, 
and centralization of networks (measures of the level of association and potential 
information transfer) and reliance on non-monetized forms of exchange at both the 
household and village levels, 
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HYPOTHESIS 2: a relationship should only be observable between monetization and 
characteristics of those specific types of network that are reasonably capable of providing 
information relevant to the type of transaction under consideration: the predicted 
relationships should be apparent for the rice network but not for the sibling network. 
HYPOTHESIS 3:  In monetized exchange, information asymmetry will be detectable as a 
difference in the strength of relationships for out-ties (labor using) and in-ties (labor 
providing), while in non-monetized exchange, no such difference will be detectable, 
HYPOTHESIS 4: households using both monetized and non-monetized labor will more 
resemble households who use only non-monetized labor in their network positions, and, 
HYPOTHESIS 5: The less well-known a potential source of labor is to a household, the 
more likely it is that a transaction between the two parties will be monetized. 
Village Level Descriptive Results 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the village-level measures of network properties 
and rice-harvest labor strategies. Recall that measures for 1994 and 2000 are identically 
constructed, here and throughout. Looking first at the village-level measure of monetization, an 
increase from 83 to 89 percent of households using any paid labor is observed from 1994 to 
2000. This increase is not great when compared with the standard deviation, nor is the observed 
decline in the proportion of households using any free or exchange labor from 20 percent to 15 
percent. Most other village-level characteristics also differ between the two periods. All of the 
variables describing the rice harvest network, except the measure of network centralization 
experience a near-doubling from 1994 to 2000, reflecting an expansion in the size and the extent 
of connectivity in the networks. Households were more interconnected via their rice harvest 
labor ties in 2000 than in 1994, which could be meaningful or reflect nothing more than a 
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response to the greater quantities of rice harvested in 2000 resulting from plentiful and well-
timed rains. Increases were also observed in the same measures for the sibling network, which 
are not explainable by rainfall. The average degree, number reachable, path length and density of 
the village sibling network all increased, though more moderately, while the centralization of the 
village sibling networks remained static. Taken together, these statistics confirm that 1994 and 
2000 represent different social contexts, providing a stronger test of the robustness of observed 
relationships.  
Village Level Correlation Results 
At the village level, I find the proportion of laborers that was paid and the proportion that 
was compensated non-monetarily are not randomly distributed across villages with respect to 
network characteristics. Rather, those villages with a higher average number of ties between 
households in the rice harvest network, better interconnected networks, and denser networks are 
also the villages with a higher tendency toward using non-monetized labor. A negative 
association exists between the proportion of households paying any laborers and the average 
degree of the rice harvest network (the average number of households helping an ego household) 
in both 1994 and 2000. In 1994, a statistically significant correlation of -0.44 is found between 
these variables. A significant correlation of equal magnitude but opposite direction (0.43) is 
found between the proportion of households using any free labor and the average degree. The 
corresponding correlation coefficients for 2000 are -0.41 for paid labor and 0.50 for free labor. 
Each of these indicates a strong, consistent association between the degree of monetization at the 
village level and the structure of the village rice network. An equivalent and only slightly weaker 
relationship exists between the average number reachable via any length of path in the village, a 
measure of connectivity, and both monetization measures. The correlation coefficients for 
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average number reachable and paid labor are -0.39 in 1994 and -0.24 in 2000 (the latter was 
marginally significant, at p=0.09, but in a consistent direction); the same coefficients for free 
labor are 0.37 and 0.32. Lastly, yet again the same exact pattern is apparent in the correlation 
coefficients measuring the relationship between the density of the village network and both types 
of exchange in both years (with all but the 2000 paid labor coefficient significant at p<=0.05, and 
this marginal at p=0.08).   
In substantive terms, this finding supports hypothesis 1, that non-monetized labor would 
be more likely in networks that provided more opportunity for the transmission of various forms 
of information about potential exchange partners, and correspondingly that paid labor would be 
more likely in networks that permit lower levels of information flow. Further, the relationship is 
consistent in both years despite differences in the overall amount of rice grown, the timing of the 
harvest, the size of the total labor force, the demand for labor, and other factors.  
None of the village-level sibling network measures were correlated with either variable in 
either year. In substantive terms, villages with dense, interconnected webs of sibling affiliation 
were no more or less likely to be monetized than sparser networks. This finding can be 
interpreted as support for the second hypothesis, that the type of information that is most useful 
to decisions about labor exchange is network-specific. While the overall level of 
interconnectedness in a village cannot be ruled out as a factor that is related to such issues as 
trust and form of exchange, these results support the theory that general webs of affiliation at the 
village level do not provide the transaction-specific types of information required to meet the 
caveat mutator burden. This information does appear to be available through networks specific 
to rice harvesting.  
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Household Level Descriptive Results 
Basic descriptive statistics for household level measures are reported in Table 3. Most of 
the means of these variables are consistent from 1994 to 2000. Among those that changed 
between the two periods are the dichotomous measures of whether a household used all paid 
labor or all non-monetized labor, which showed results very similar to those for the village-level 
monetization measures. Also, the changes in the nature of the sibling network that were 
observable at the village level are also apparent and of considerable magnitude at the household 
level. In contrast, the rice harvest network measures are essentially stable, surprising given the 
change at the village level and the observation that the number of households who relied on any 
extra labor to harvest their rice doubled in 2000 over the 1994 number. Despite this sizable 
difference, the basic characteristics of the average household’s rice network position remained 
comparatively stable over time.  
Household Level Correlation Results 
Correlation coefficients and significance levels for the household-level analysis are 
presented in Table 4. Overall, these coefficients are highly consistent across a six year span 
during which time many aspects of the social, agricultural, and economic context shifted 
dramatically. They are also quite consistent with the associations found at the village level. 
Support is found for all five hypotheses at the household level.  
Substantiating Hypothesis 1, all of the measures of household network position examined 
here showed moderately high positive associations with non-monetized labor, and negative 
associations with monetized labor. Households with a greater number of connections to others, 
whether through providing labor, using labor, or a combination of both, show a greater tendency 
toward non-monetized labor. Those that can reach more households in the village and those that 
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have longer chains of affiliation (paths) reaching farther from the ego household also show a 
positive association with using non-monetized labor, and a negative association with monetized 
labor.  
The household-level evidence for Hypothesis 2 seems at first to contradict the findings of 
the village-level analysis. Here the degree and average pathlength of a household’s sibling 
network ties are weakly, but significantly, related to monetized labor exchange in a negative 
way. But rather than an outright refutation of Hypothesis 2, this finding suggests a more nuanced 
understanding than was afforded by the village-level analysis. Chiefly, that the both sibling 
networks and rice networks may be providing some opportunity for the transmission of 
transaction-relevant information, but that the relationships represented by the rice harvest labor 
network are considerably more efficient at doing so. Thus, the type of network does matter in a 
way consistent with the assertion that transaction-specific information is provided by specific 
types of networks, even while both types of networks provide some information.  
Support for Hypothesis 3 is the most mixed of the five hypotheses, and suggests at least 
one refinement of the theory put forth that warrants further examination. The prediction of this 
hypothesis is that the discrepancy between out-ties and in-ties should be greater for monetized 
transactions than for non-monetized transactions. This follows from the prediction that labor 
users in non-monetized exchange (represented in these data by the in-ties) would have 
informational requirements similar to those of labor providers, while these requirements should 
be observably different in monetized exchange. In both 1994 and 2000, a stronger relationship is 
observed between both forms of exchange and the number of out-ties than is the case for in-ties, 
which seems to go against the strict prediction of “equal information requirements” for labor 
users and providers in non-monetized exchange. But this was not the most important prediction 
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of hypothesis 3. The prediction that the difference would be greater for monetized exchange is 
supported, especially for the year 2000, in which the gap between these two coefficients is nearly 
twice as large for monetized transactions. The interpretation is that being better connected 
through providing labor to others makes one less likely to use paid labor, but being better 
connected through obtaining labor from others makes one especially less likely to use paid labor. 
And, importantly, this difference is more pronounced for monetized labor than for non-
monetized labor. The implication is that while Hypothesis 3 is supported, the conclusion should 
be re-stated to reflect the fact that information asymmetry appears to exist in non-monetized 
exchange as well. Missing, for one, is information about the question of who “antes up” first that 
was discussed earlier. Such additional information might enable more light to be shed on this 
particular aspect of the relationship between social networks and exchange.  
Regarding Hypothesis 4, I find that at the household level the mixing of strategies (using 
both in-kind labor exchange and money) is a fairly rare practice (see Table 3). A simple 
interpretation is that a household paying some workers in cash and exchanging labor with others 
might engender resentment or jealousy on the part of the non-monetized exchange partners. As I 
have argued, these non-monetized exchange partners stand to benefit from monetizing the 
exchange by reducing the risk involved in providing labor on an exchange basis. I also find that 
these mixing households are generally intermediate between the two other groups with respect to 
the strength and direction of association with rice network variables, which is exactly what one 
would anticipate. And, as expected, these mixing households are somewhat more similar to their 
non-monetized counterparts than to the fully monetized households, providing support for the 
theory that using even a little non-monetized labor obligates a household to invest a substantial 
amount of effort into meeting the caveat mutator burden.  
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Lastly, I return to the top of Tables 4A and 4B which have been overlooked up to this 
point. Here I present the correlation matrices between the measures of labor monetization and 
three identically constructed measures of the source of the labor used: whether all labor was from 
within the same village, from both within and beyond the village, or entirely from beyond. 
Examining these correlations provides very consistent results that suggest a relationship between 
social distance and monetization, supporting Hypothesis 5. When labor is from beyond the 
village, it is more likely to be monetized and when labor is from within the village it is more 
likely to be non-monetized. Further, households that mixed exchange strategies were also more 
likely to mix labor from within and beyond the village.  
 DISCUSSION 
Potential Threats to Internal and External Validity 
SAMPLE SELECTION. As noted in Section III, the sample comprises only those 
households that both grew rice and used extra labor. On a practical level, households that did not 
acquire any additional labor are isolates in the rice harvest network, giving them values of zero 
for all household-level network measures; simultaneously, they will all have a value of zero for 
any measure of monetization (that is, they did not pay any workers nor did they use any 
exchange labor). Thus, including them in simple correlation analyses has the effect of adding a 
large number of observations with values of (0,0) for each pair of variables. This unduly and 
inaccurately biases the resulting measures of association, easily turning negative correlations 
positive and giving all correlations an artificially high level of significance. As well, it conflates 
“real” zeros – those households that used extra labor but did not pay any laborers, for example – 
with “structural” zeros – those households that could not pay any laborers because they did not 
grow rice and hence had not need for rice harvest labor at all.  
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More formally, it could be argued that all rice-growing households are at risk of 
acquiring this additional labor and thus the larger sample that includes these households should 
be used. Excluding those households for which the outcome of interest was not observed has the 
potential to influence more than just the external validity of the results. Internal validity can also 
be affected when sample selection is present (Berk 1983). Likewise, those households that grew 
rice may be a select (non-random) sample of all households in Nang Rong. Therefore, there is a 
risk that the observed relationships might differ if those households that did not grow rice and 
pay extra labor had engaged in these behaviors. Put differently, the actual sample used might 
differ in ways that impact the relationships between variables observed. On the other hand, if the 
selection process does not influence the specific relationships observed here, then it can be 
effectively ignored within the context of the present analysis.  
I address these concerns in three specific ways. First, I have dealt extensively with the 
nature of sample selection in the Nang Rong labor exchange data in previous work, which 
specifically describes the factors influencing the household decision to grow rice and pay 
laborers (Hull 2009c). Based upon that analysis, the households that did not grow rice at all 
were, on average, smaller, older, and considerably less likely to own or use any agricultural land, 
livestock, or agricultural equipment. The stability observed in these observations over time, 
paired with the comparatively small fraction of households that did not grow rice in either year 
suggest that while theoretically possible, the counterfactual has little meaning in this specific 
instance. That is, many of the households that did not grow rice would not have done so under 
any plausible set of circumstances. Moreover, as I also argued in that paper, the decision to grow 
rice appears to be less related to subsequent decisions about labor than previously thought, which 
supports the assertion that any correlation between unobserved selection factors and the observed 
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relationships between social network factors and labor monetization may be minimal. For these 
reasons, I choose to focus for the remainder of this discussion on the potential effect of selection 
into using extra labor, and not selection into growing rice.  
The second observation helps to address concerns about this latter selection process. 
Specifically, it is relevant that the relationships are nearly identical in both significance and 
magnitude in both 1994 and 2000. This is despite the considerable shifts in the proportion of the 
total population and the proportion of rice-growing households that used extra labor, as shown in 
Table 5. Both the raw number and the proportion of rice-growing households that used any extra 
labor nearly doubled, in the case of proportions from 34 percent in 1994 to 64 percent in 2000. 
And yet, despite the considerable shifts in these proportions, the observed relationships were 
extremely stable over the same period. This is additional evidence that any forces at work in 
shaping the selection into using extra labor may not impact the observed relationships. 
Third, there is the consideration that current methodological approaches for dealing with 
the potential effects of selection are almost exclusively designed for advanced causal modeling. 
It has been an explicit element of the present analysis that no statements be made about the 
direction of possible causality. As stated in a previous section, there are valid theoretical 
arguments suggesting that monetization may reshape social networks, and that networks may 
influence monetization. Thus, any attempt to deal formally with the selection effect, such as the 
use of a two-part model, Heckman model, or related instrumental variable approach must also 
deal effectively with a highly probable endogenous relationship. To the best of the author’s 
knowledge, the Nang Rong Project data are already extremely rare by virtue of the fact that they 
collect information on both social networks and labor exchange compensation. As noted in my 
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previous work cited above, no viable candidate variables exist to be used as an instrument to deal 
with either of these two fundamental problems of multivariate modeling.  
In sum, there are a number of reasons, both theoretical and methodological, for limiting 
the analysis to only those households that acquired additional labor beyond their current, 
returning, and former members. Any impact of selection on the observed results, while difficult 
to estimate in practice, is thought to be modest. Subsequent data collection efforts may enable 
this question to be still better addressed.  
TYPE II ERRORS DUE TO MULTIPLE COMPARISONS. A second potential critique of 
the exploratory and descriptive analysis presented here is that a large number of hypothesis tests 
are carried out without consideration for the possible effects of multiple testing. Concerns about 
multiple testing in the present instance seem unwarranted for reasons to be discussed below, but 
as a check against this threat to inference, a Bonferroni-style multiple comparison procedure can 
be employed to assess the robustness of the results to such a criticism.  While many variations on 
the basic Bonferroni correction exist, these are universally motivated by a concern for to 
improving statistical power, not providing a better check against the risk of Type I error. The 
simple Bonferroni correction is already maximally conservative in this latter regard (Holm 1979; 
Olejnik et al. 1997).  
Thus, in the context of sensitivity analysis the Bonferroni is ideal, as it is both simple and 
conservative.12 Applying the correction is straightforward, with one exception being the 
determination of the relevant family of comparisons. Again, wishing to err on the side of 
conservatism, I define the family of hypotheses for this multiple comparison procedure as all 
tests performed at a given level of analysis on data from a given year. There are thus four 
                                                 
12
 The specific correction used is the substitution of α/m in place of α, where α is the level of significance and m is 
the total number of relevant tests contained in the family of comparison.  
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families: household and village level tests in 1994 and household and village tests in 2000. The 
Bonferroni-adjusted significance levels for the household-level analysis would be p<=0.0013 
(for 39 hypothesis tests). The Bonferroni-adjusted significance levels for the village-level 
analysis would be p<=0.005 (for 10 hypothesis tests). Each of these adjusted levels controls for 
the family-wise type I error rate at the conventional level of p<=0.05. The summary conclusion 
is that the application of the Bonferroni adjustment does not alter the general conclusion that all 
five hypotheses receive support. However, some minor differences do emerge. 
When this standard is applied to the village level analysis, 4 of the 10 coefficients that 
were initially judged to be significant retain that significance, but the change is quite systematic. 
The relationship between the average degree of the rice network and the proportion of both 
monetized and non-monetized transactions remains significant in both years, while the 
relationships with the density and connectedness measures are no longer significant. Recall, 
however that the hypotheses were not framed at the level of specific variables but were more 
general, stating that a difference should exist on at least some of the measures. Thus, at the 
village level, evidence of a relationship is weakened, but is still sufficient to support the major 
conclusions at this level even with this highly conservative correction.  
When the Bonferroni adjustment is performed on the household-level significance tests, 
45 of the 62 coefficients that were significant initially retain significance under this more 
conservative application. And as before, the pattern of change is systematic. It is almost 
exclusively the sibling network variables that cease to demonstrate a statistically significant 
relationship with the measures of monetization. Owing to the substantially weaker relationships 
detected with these sibling network measures, they do not meet the higher standard of the 
Bonferroni-adjusted significance level, but the rice network measures continue to do so. Only 
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Hypothesis 2 depended directly on the distinction between sibling and rice harvest networks, and 
when these coefficients drop out of the pool of interpretable findings, the essential conclusion 
that rice networks best conduct information relevant to decisions about rice harvest labor 
exchange is not affected. The other hypotheses were evaluable based solely on the associations 
between the rice network measures and the monetization measures. Likewise, Hypothesis 5, 
which is based upon the correlation matrices at the top of Tables 4A and 4B remains unaffected 
by this adjustment.13  
The approach used here to control the rate of Type I errors, the single-step Bonferroni 
correction, also has the potential to increase the risk of Type II errors. In the context of an 
attempt to identify previously unnoticed correlations between variables typically studied in 
isolation from one another, the question of which type of error poses the greater threat to 
scientific progress is largely a matter of opinion. As Westfall and Young remind us, the 
meaningfulness of any set of findings must be judged according to costs and benefits, 
introducing a dimension of art to the science of interpretation (1993). So judged, the chief aim of 
the present research is the generation of empirically substantiated hypotheses about a newly 
derived set of theoretical associations. All of these will require further confirmation regardless, 
and other elements of a causal interpretation such as directionality and a lack of spuriousness 
remain to be fully established. Therefore, judged by either standard of significance, the principal 
                                                 
13
 I present these additional results in answer to the possible criticism that the significance of the findings that 
support the conclusions of this analysis might result from chance alone, which it appears they do not. However, it is 
also worth noting that the application of multiple comparison tests to the correlation context is not a firmly 
established practice. The best evidence of this is that in a comprehensive review of more than two dozen 
methodology articles published in the past 30 years that introduce a procedure for controlling either the expected 
number of Type-I errors, the familywise error rate, or the false discovery rate, a single article by Collis and 
Rosenblood (Collis and Rosenblood 1985) was the only article found to suggest a correction method especially for 
correlation matrices. As further evidence of the confusion that seems to persist, standard software packages do not 
readily offer any form of correction for the large number of hypothesis tests conducted during a correlation analysis. 
Conversely, general procedures that carry out multiple comparison tests such as SAS’s PROC MULTTEST do not 
permit the researcher to conduct these adjusted test of significance on correlation coefficients. It is possible to 
implement such procedures using original code, but a cursory review of correlation tables presented in the literature 
suggests that this is rarely done in practice. 
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findings remain, but it is the author’s opinion that in this instance the multiple comparison 
procedure represents a strong dose of medicine for a very mild problem that only serves to 
dampen the pace of exploration of this new area of study. Type I errors, if they exist at all, will 
not long stand up to the heavy replication that research at this stage of development merits.   
Competing Explanation of Findings 
A third general critique that might be directed at the empirical results presented here is 
that they can be explained by reference to a simpler theory. Thus, in the absence of any 
additional support for the more sophisticated theory, parsimony would argue that this simpler 
explanation be accepted. The simple theory can be stated as a rule: if sufficient labor is available 
from within the village, then non-monetized exchange will be used, but if this labor source is 
exhausted, then strangers must be called in from outside the village, and these exchanges will be 
monetized as a matter of course.  
Several things should be said about this alternative explanation. First, of the five specific 
hypotheses derived and empirically demonstrated in this paper, only hypothesis 5 deals directly 
with the inside/outside distinction. And as was noted earlier, the dichotomy of labor from within 
the village and labor from beyond is not without its problems. As a proxy for the underlying 
concepts of familiarity or trust, this dichotomy is crude at best. And yet, despite the lack of 
sophistication in the way the variable was measured, it is possible to adjudicate between these 
two competing theories.  
Before doing so, a second observation is warranted. Namely, that properly considered, 
this “alternative” explanation is not an alternative to the theory presented in Section II. Rather, it 
arises due to the inefficiency of the current analytical strategy for demonstrating this theory. If 
the alternative were found to indeed explain all of the results presented here, it would not, ipso 
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facto, mean the falsification of the theory presented here. Rather, it would signal a need for 
further data collection and analysis because the theory presented here provides additional 
interpretive power that the alternative does not. That is, the new theory makes a number of 
additional statements about the nature of monetized exchange that could not be directly verified 
using existing data but that were nonetheless described in Section II. The alternative model 
explains the findings in terms of labor supply and a simple rule: use non-monetized village labor 
first, and then use monetized extra-village labor. But this alternative does not explain the 
underlying motivations for such preferences, which is precisely the additional matter that the 
new theory speaks to. Beyond the five hypotheses presented here, it suggests both who should 
prefer monetized labor, and why, making its explanatory power greater, but also making it more 
difficult to support empirically.  
A third observation raises still more doubts about the adequacy of this alternative. While 
it is true that the alternative satisfactorily explains the observed correlation between the source of 
labor and the type of exchange, it simultaneously implies 1.) that paid outside labor ought to be 
used most in those villages with the greatest unmet labor demand and 2.) that most fellow 
villagers should not be paid for their labor. A quick descriptive analysis suggests that neither of 
these corollaries is consistently true. Measuring unmet labor demand is complicated, but as a 
rough measure, the ratio of the total area of land planted to rice to working age adults in a village 
suffices to show that the predicted relationship is not consistent either across or within years. 
Table 6 reports the correlations between this ratio and for different measures of monetization at 
the village level. The first three are the number of households using any paid labor divided by 
each of the three possible denominators listed in Table 5 – all households, rice-growing 
households, and extra-labor using households. The fourth is the proportion of all rice labor that 
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was monetized. From this analysis it appears that, in general, unmet labor demand within the 
villages was potentially greater in 2000 than in 1994, consistent with what is known about 
growing conditions in both years. And there is indeed, a statistically significant relationship 
between three of the measures of monetization and the ratio of land to labor. But, equally clear 
from the table is the fact that such a relationship was not significant for these same variables in 
1994. The implication, that unmet labor demand had little relationship to monetized labor in 
1994 suggests that an alternative explanation is required in this year to explain the main findings 
of the paper, which were observed in both 1994 and 2000.14 
The same process of deduction is used to show that the second corollary is not supported 
by the data. In 1994, around 70 percent of the within-village labor provided to households was 
monetized, while by 2000 this figure had grown to over 90 percent. When the use of monetized 
labor within the village is assessed on a household-by-household basis, the proportions fall, but 
not nearly enough to support the alternative in its simplest formulation. Simply put, so many 
villagers are paid (and indeed a large enough share of laborers from outside the village works for 
free or exchange) that the simple rule posited above cannot be valid. If the rule is refined to 
suggest that all well known villagers provide non-monetized labor first, and subsequently 
strangers provide paid labor, the alternative becomes scarcely different from the theory presented 
here, except that it continues to lack a satisfying explanation for why such a preference should 
exist. To summarize, an explanation that relies solely on preferences and unmet labor demand in 
the village superficially fits the pattern of the data, but fails to win support both because its 
necessary corollaries are not borne out by the data and because it still fails to provide any deeper 
                                                 
14
 No reliable relationship at all was found to exist between identical measures of the proportions using help from 
beyond the village correlated with the same rough measure of unmet labor demand at the village level.  
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explanation for the preferences themselves. 15 While more complex, the theory advanced here 
explains the consistent pattern observed in these two very different observational periods in a 
way that the competing theory cannot, and displays more finesse when making valid predictions 
(five were presented here) than the next best alternative.  
 Conclusions 
 In this paper I present a theory of monetization that introduces the concept of the caveat 
mutator burden, the minimum amount of information an actor must obtain about a potential 
exchange partner before feeling confident enough to carry out a transaction. This burden is 
thought to vary with the actors involved, the context of the exchange, and the types of valued 
objects or services exchanged. Moreover, and central to the thesis presented here, the caveat 
mutator burden is radically altered in subtle but important ways by the introduction of monetary 
instruments into the context of exchange. In monetary exchange, a portion of the trust that is 
required for the actor to feel confident in carrying out the exchange is invested in a social 
institution that guarantees the value of the money received or given rather than the exchange 
partner, and thus, is more likely to encourage such transactions in many conditions. And yet, it is 
shown here that contrary to the informal statements and implicit models of monetization in the 
literature, monetization is not the juggernaut it is made out to be. Some households in Nang 
Rong pay their laborers, some do not. Presuming that few non-household members ever truly 
work for free, the conclusion is that some households continue to have valid reasons for 
                                                 
15
 As yet another test of the alternative hypothesis, I divided the sample in half according to household labor supply 
and total rice yield. I then recalculated the correlations from the main analysis for each of the four subgroups 
produced – low labor, low yield, low labor, high yield, high labor, low yield, and high labor, high yield. This same 
process was repeated excluding former household members, using total extra labor used by the household and total 
rice yield, total labor used in the village by total village rice land cultivated, and an alternative specification of the 
village measures. In none of these specification tests were the findings of the principle analysis contradicted. Even in 
the cells with the greatest imbalances in the amount of available labor relative to labor demand a relationship was 
consistently observed between the proportion of households using monetized labor and the proportion of extra-
village help. This further elaboration is further proof that, at the household level, hypothesized unmet labor demand 
does not condition any of the observed relationships among variables.  
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engaging in non-monetized transactions. There is every reason to assert that despite its being a 
traditionally subsistence region, every household in Nang Rong is familiar with money and uses 
it in at least some cases, if only for the payment of taxes to the central government (Rigg 1994). 
Whether those households that use non-monetized exchange do so because it provides benefits of 
some sort or because they have no alternative (due to a lack of available cash, for instance) is an 
important question and one that should be investigated further. But even the basic conclusion 
that in the year 2000 a full 15 percent of Nang Rong households still used at least some unpaid 
labor calls for a theoretical treatment of monetization in the future that better acknowledges the 
complexity and subtlety inherent in the phenomenon, rather than a continuation of the practice of 
painting monetization in broad strokes. 
Establishing correlation or association is a vital element in causal analysis, and therefore 
the significant correlations demonstrated here represent an important contribution to the study of 
the relationship between social networks and monetization. Moreover, the theory presented in 
this paper provides reasonable grounds to anticipate that the relationships observed are due to 
more than pure chance or spuriousness. The empirical associations found are entirely consistent 
with the theory developed and described in this paper. I find that households in Nang Rong, 
Thailand, a district in Northeast Thailand that is known for both its poverty and its unique social 
adaptations to an unyielding landscape, tend to utilize monetized and non-monetized labor in 
ways that are entirely consistent with expectations deduced from theory. These households 
display a tendency to continue using non-monetized labor in situations where the exchange 
partner is better known. The assertion that trust, or familiarity, factors into the evaluation of a 
potential trade partner is among the most important theoretical statements made here, and 
deserves more rigorous evaluation, as does the argument that an informational asymmetry exists 
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in monetized transactions that is not present to nearly the same degree in non-monetized 
transactions. Lastly, it would seem that these households may use information acquired through 
rice harvest networks, but not through sibling networks, despite the fact that sibling networks 
have been shown to be viable conduits for other forms of information.  
Monetization matters in all kinds of ways, so the literature asserts. But if sociologists are 
to move beyond the practice of attributing to monetization a causal role without any real 
empirical evidence to support that claim, a dedicated program of research that bridges sociology, 
economics, anthropology, and related fields will be necessary. In this paper, I have attempted to 
bring together a broad scattering of relevant theoretical and methodological concerns and use 
them to generate some initial hypotheses about monetization using the example of rice labor in 
Northeast Thailand. The list of possible economic transactions, social contexts, and even 
historical eras that could generate data capable of shedding additional light on this subject may 
be long, but it awaits researchers who will collect these data, or recognize the opportunity to 
conduct a secondary analysis of data collected for a different initial purpose. The analysis 
presented here is simple enough that, should such additional secondary resources be found, 
suitable comparative research and even replication will be possible. 
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TABLE 3.1 Descriptive Statistics for All Village-Level Measures, 1994 & 2000  
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TABLE 3.2 Pearson Correlations among Village Characteristics and Rice Harvest Labor 
Measures, 1994 (r and p-values) (a) 
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TABLE 3.3 Pearson Correlations among Village Characteristics and Rice Harvest Labor 
Measures, 2000 (r and p-values) (a) 
 
 
108 
 
TABLE 3.4: Descriptive Statistics for Household-Level Measures, 1994 & 2000 
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TABLE 3.5: Pearson Correlations Between Household-Level Network and Rice Harvest 
Labor Measures, 1994 (r and p-values) (a) 
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TABLE 3.6: Pearson Correlations Between Household-Level Network and Rice Harvest 
Labor Measures, 2000 (r and p-values) (a) 
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TABLE 3.7: Proportions of Households at Each Stage of Sample Selection 
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TABLE 3.8: Correlation between Village Labor Demand and Select Measures of 
Monetization 
 
 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 4 
AGRICULTURAL PARTICIPATION AND LABOR MONETIZATION IN A 
TRANSITIONAL ECONOMY 
 INTRODUCTION  
  “Monetization” and “monetized” are popular words among social scientists trying to 
describe massive social, cultural, and economic forces transforming the populations they study, 
particularly in developing contexts. The terms have appeared in nearly one hundred demography 
articles in the past three decades in discussions about many core subjects of the discipline (Hull 
2009a). Demographic subjects that have been implicitly linked to monetization in the literature 
include fertility, mortality, migration, and many aspects of economic development. In short, it is 
a literature too voluminous to be reviewed here (but see Appendix A for a brief annotated 
bibliography). In these articles, it is in characterizing context – the social, economic, and cultural 
backdrop against which some other phenomenon of interest occurs – that mention of 
monetization is made. But where found, the term is consistently employed without definition or 
explanation, and rarely if ever is it developed into a meaningful part of the principal discussion. 
Monetization is perpetually relegated to discussions of the broader implications and connections 
of research found in introductory and concluding paragraphs.  
In contrast, the present work shifts monetization to the foreground, operationalizing and 
measuring the concept and specifying its relationship to a wide range of significant social and 
demographic factors. Without this sort of attention to the specific way in which economic 
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exchange takes place in a given context, not just the scope and extent of such exchange which 
more commonly captures the attention of researchers, explanations of economic phenomena are 
incomplete at best. So too are discussions of phenomena that are the cause or consequence of 
things economic. At the same time, there is an important lesson to be abstracted from the way 
monetization has been dealt with in the past: namely, that monetization should be explored and 
understood within a specific context which defines the types and nature of transactions, 
networks, and institutional structures that impact and are impacted by it. Thus, in this paper, I do 
just this by exploring correlates of the monetization of a specific type of transaction in a specific 
context: the acquisition of agricultural labor during the annual rice harvest in Northeastern 
Thailand.  
The question I seek to answer is, in this specific context, which households engage in 
monetized labor transactions, and which households rely on labor exchange or free labor? In 
addition to answering the question, this example will be used to illustrate several more general 
observations about monetization and the methods use to study it. First, a major obstacle to a 
better theory of monetization in the past has been the tendency to treat the phenomenon as an 
abstract process of social change with no specific referent. When one asserts that “monetization” 
impacts, for example, inequality and status roles in a community, some logical questions should 
be: monetization of what? Of which exchanges? All exchanges? And so on. These subsidiary 
questions are rarely asked, and as a result, the possibility of understanding monetization as a 
more general process of social change is hampered. At present, no one is in a position to state 
(and to support with empirical evidence) whether different economic sectors actually monetize 
concurrently, that the monetization of X leads to Y, or which actors, if any, embrace monetized 
exchange and which, if any, avoid it. To address this shortcoming, in this paper I seek to explain 
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the monetization of a specific type of economic exchange, just one of many. The choice of rice 
harvest labor as the example is significant, however. The ideal form of exchange to measure and 
analyze as a starting point in building a better theory of monetization should be one that is 
widespread in a given context, reasonably bounded in time and space, and only partially or fully 
monetized.  Seasonal agricultural labor fits these requirements quite well.  
Second, properly conceptualized, monetization is a specific characteristic of individual 
economic transactions taking place within a network of exchange. Each individual transaction 
may be monetized or not, but the larger network of exchanges also takes on a specific character 
as a result of the aggregate impact of these individual transactions. Elsewhere, I have examined 
this relationship between social network structure and monetization, demonstrating a number of 
stable associations between the network context and the nature of the economic exchange (Hull 
2009b). Here, I develop a different implication of the same theoretical framework: namely, that 
to understand the pattern and nature of monetization more generally, it is also necessary to 
investigate the pattern and nature of the economic activities being monetized. In the example 
used here, of the monetization of rice harvest labor, this means that it is of considerable utility to 
understand the factors influencing a household’s participation in rice agriculture. For this reason, 
and for additional methodological reasons explored later, I will examine monetization and 
agricultural participation simultaneously in order to better understand the phenomenon of 
monetization itself.  
Third, according to the theory laid out below, it is appropriate to examine monetization in 
a single economic sector or type of transaction, but this is not to say that such behavior exists in a 
vacuum. Clearly, the monetization of different aspects of life can be thought of as elements of a 
broader process of social change in which many such aspects become monetized. This seems to 
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be the predominant, if not the only, view in both popular and theoretical understandings of 
monetization (Hull 2009a). This view is not criticized here. Instead, the present example presents 
an important illustration of this point by virtue of the fact that, for a formerly subsistence 
agricultural household to cease to engage in rice agriculture altogether, that household must meet 
its basic needs in some other way, which almost certainly involves the use of money. Thus, there 
is a strong additional reason to examine these two phenomena, agricultural participation and 
labor monetization, together: labor monetization is theorized to be an outgrowth of a broader 
process of societal monetization that may be somewhat antagonistic to traditional agriculture.  
It is with these broader observations in mind that I aim to answer two questions which 
have both theoretical and practical significance for regions that use a mixture of monetized and 
non-monetized exchange. The first question in this analysis is posed with respect to a specific 
type of economic transaction which is common in the Isan region of Northeast Thailand: during 
the highly labor-intensive wetland rice harvest, which households pay their workers in cash, and 
which rely on barter-like schemes such as labor exchange? The act of paying workers in cash 
rather than exchanged labor or barter may seem at first a trivial matter, but from a sociological 
point of view, it represents a fundamental transition in the economic relationships that exist 
between the transacting parties. To preview one reason, the cash transaction no longer represents 
a transaction between just two parties, the laborer and the farmer, but between three: the laborer, 
the farmer, and the abstract third-party agent or government that determines what units will be 
used in economic accounting and which insures, formally or informally, the value of any money 
exchanged (Dodd 1994).  
Monetization also signals an underlying process of attaching a monetary value to all 
things. When accepted as a medium of exchange, money may render barter and other forms of 
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exchange less desirable, but in order for a household to monetize its transactions, it must first 
obtain money, which can lead it down additional paths of new behavior – out-migration for wage 
labor, planting cash crops, or local wage labor where available. Possibilities for obtaining cash 
are often restricted in these regions, but the creativity of households often far surpasses the 
imagination of researchers attempting to measure and understand such behavior. In this paper, I 
propose to explore which of several key behaviors and statuses is related to the act of paying 
laborers in order to ground discussion of monetization in the empirical experience of those for 
whom monetization is less taken for granted. 
The second question is what characteristics are associated with a household’s decision to 
engage in the primary type of agriculture in a predominantly subsistence economy, in this case 
rice cultivation? Logically, this second question is inseparable from the first because one cannot 
pay for labor if none in needed. But as described above, the decline of subsistence agriculture 
also signals, albeit less directly, the emergence of alternative strategies for earning a livelihood. 
Northeast Thailand, where the data for this study were collected, is a region in which greater than 
80 or 90 percent of all households have historically been engaged in subsistence rice agriculture. 
In recent decades, evidence suggests that the share of households practicing rice agriculture is on 
the decline, at least in the study area for this research. As households face an expanding list of 
economic choices and opportunities, these are continuously weighed against the longstanding 
challenges of making a living through subsistence agriculture. Therefore, one might expect that 
some households are abandoning rice agriculture or experimenting with other economic 
strategies. But which households, and why? Any fundamental shift in the basis of economic 
livelihoods may be attributable to a wide range of factors operating additively, interactively, or in 
a mutually reinforcing ways.  Life course effects may also play an important role in this process. 
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Basic population aging and household fragmentation or nucleation may all play a role. A 
household’s decision to participate in agriculture each year has far ranging potential 
consequences for the household and for others, from the basic health and well-being of the 
household members to such important issues as land use and land cover change at the larger 
scale of villages and regions (Parker et al. 2003).  
To support each of these claims, I present a pair of binary probit models. The first 
predicts agricultural participation and the second predicts use of monetized labor in rice 
agriculture. The results of this descriptive modeling suggest that differentiation is occurring 
among households with respect to both monetization and rice agriculture and that this 
differentiation is attributable to shifting social, agricultural, and economic conditions in the 
region. Specifically, demographic, agricultural, and economic characteristics of households all 
influence the decision to grow rice, while selective household and agricultural factors alone 
impact the use of monetized labor. Further, these results are stable across very different periods 
of time in which a wide array of measured and unmeasured factors likely differ markedly. Lastly, 
a decomposition comparing the impact of data composition with that of the structural parameters 
suggests that shifts in the proportion of households growing rice between years are attributable 
chiefly to shifts in the characteristics of households and villages in the study area, while shifts in 
the proportion using paid labor are better explained by changes in the values of parameters.  
In sum, both of the social phenomena examined in this research are central to the 
economic viability and cultural identity of the population of Northeast Thailand. But this analysis 
focuses on the broader theoretical questions of what sorts of factors are associated with 
monetized exchange and what is distinctive about the process of monetization viz. the many 
other “-izations” that are simultaneously transforming the social landscape. I begin this paper in 
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Section II with a presentation of a general theory of monetization and then apply it to the specific 
context of Northeast Thailand. In Section III, I present additional detail about the case and data 
used, including an extensive discussion of rice agriculture in Nang Rong and the process by 
which households in this region acquire the labor needed to harvest their rice in a timely fashion. 
This section also argues that rice agriculture in Nang Rong represents an ideal test case of the 
more general theory of monetization presented here and elsewhere (Hull 2009a; Hull 2009b). 
Section IV presents the analysis methodology and a detailed description of the measures used 
and the theoretical reasons for including each. Section V contains descriptive results and presents 
and interprets the two probit models. An additional decomposition analysis is also introduced in 
this section which takes advantage of the repeated waves of data to distinguish unique roles for 
population shifts and structural changes in producing changes in each outcome. A discussion of 
the broader significance of the results is found in Section VI, along with responses to the most 
likely criticisms of the methodology employed in the analysis.  
 CONCEPTUALIZATION AND THEORY 
I define monetization as a process of institutional change in the means and method of 
exchange that operates at multiple scales.1 At the level of the individual transaction, 
monetization is discrete, meaning that a transaction is either monetized or it is not, while at 
broader levels of aggregation (the neighborhood, the village, the economic sector, the economy, 
and so on) it is a continuous process of cumulating one or more distinct monetized transactions. 
This accumulation may not be a simple additive process. Further, monetization, in its most basic 
formulation, is associated with measureable differences not only in the behavior of individuals, 
but in the social networks that connect them (Hull 2009b). Successfully transitioning between 
                                                 
1
 The definition and theory of monetization presented here draws heavily upon work presented elsewhere (Hull 
2009a; 2009b). 
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barter-based exchange and money-based exchange (or back again) requires a fundamental 
change in the information that flows through exchange networks (Dodd 1994). This formulation 
allows for partial or incomplete monetization of a given economic sector to exist and even to 
persist.  
A fundamental component of all economic transaction is information: information about 
the other party or parties involved, the goods or other things of value being exchanged, and many 
other key facts that all inform an actor’s decision to engage or not(Plattner 1989). The 
information that matters in a monetized transaction concerns such important questions as 
whether the value of a monetary instrument will be constant over time, how it may be redeemed, 
and who will enforce the redemption and guarantee its value, if necessary. Whether money is 
introduced to a population from outside, or spreads from one area of life to another in a 
population that already possesses many of the institutional aspects of money, or even emerges 
spontaneously, it cannot be adopted without a corresponding change in the informational 
structure with regard to the specific domain of life being monetized. While this information is 
generally equated with the functions of money – as a store of value, means of exchange, unit of 
account – it does not in fact characterize money as a substance at all but rather the social 
institutional structures which regulate the use and flow of money. In this sense, money is the 
least interesting aspect of monetization. Far more interesting from a sociological viewpoint are 
the potential changes to the social structures and institutions that control economic exchange. 
These changes are the central issue of monetization. 
The major differences between monetized and non-monetized forms of exchange exist in 
the information that flows through social networks of transactors. These social networks may 
themselves be altered by a shift to monetized transactions because of the new informational 
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requirements (some higher and others lower) of monetized exchange. On the contrary, it may 
also be the case that the form of exchange is a response to the specific type of social network 
relation that exists between exchange partners. For example, an improvement in the ability of 
transactors to store value by using money as opposed to a particular bartered item may decrease 
the need for a transactor to depend upon personal assessments of the exchange partner’s 
reputation and trustworthiness, expanding the realm of possible trade partners. Such an idea has 
been famously captured in John Steinbeck’s oft-shortened statement that “Money not only has no 
heart but no honor nor any memory.” (Steinbeck 2008: 57). But it is equally possible that the 
existence or lack of trust between partners may determine the form of the transaction, in whole 
or in part. In either case, a bartered item may depreciate in value quickly for a variety of reasons, 
but money is depended upon to retain its value under normal circumstances.  
The circumstances under which money retains or loses value, unlike those under which it 
is adopted in the first place, are heavily studied in economics. While money is in one sense the 
enabler, what has really changed with monetization is the decision-making framework of the 
transactors. It is this fundamental observation that is often overlooked when one focuses on 
money as the key aspect of change. When money is used as a unit of account, its redemption is 
tacitly or explicitly guaranteed by a third party – a debtor, a community of traders, a bank, a 
state. In this sense, money is indeed an invention that exists to reduce the myriad transaction 
costs associated with economic exchange (North 1981; North 1992). But it is not so much a 
technological invention as it is a social invention in the same way that a mutual insurance group 
is a social invention designed to help its members spread the costs of unexpected loss over the 
entire group. In the latter case, one would not likely focus on the paperwork that accompanies the 
formation of such an organization but the social arrangements of the organization itself, and yet, 
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in most economic studies of monetization, this seems to be precisely what is done. In truth then, 
it is not money that is memory-less, it is the transactors themselves, who are freed by virtue of 
money’s third-party backing from many of the burdens of memory associated with barter. 
Within this general theoretical understanding of money and monetization, a study must 
be situated with respect to its specific context. Past studies discussing monetization have treated 
it as a very general aspect of context, against which other phenomena of interest occur. The 
present study seeks to bring monetization to the foreground as a subject of interest in its own 
right. This does not mean that other aspects of context can be ignored, however. On the contrary, 
it becomes crucial in studying monetization to specify whether one is describing an entire 
economy, a sector of an economy, a single class of social or economic behavior, or even a single 
transaction. In addition to carefully specifying the level of analysis, it is important to take 
account of other concomitant processes of social change that are occurring. Lastly, the social 
networks linking actors within a given place must be considered as an important element of 
context that is frequently missing from discussions of many economic phenomena. As noted in 
the introduction, it is my intent to explore the behavior of households in a specific context with 
regards to two interrelated behaviors: growing rice, and paying laborers. In order to understand 
why these specific instances make for a satisfying test case I now examine both the specific data 
sources and specific elements of the context that are especially important to the present study.  
 THE CASE 
Why Nang Rong? 
A number of features of Nang Rong District, Thailand make it a highly appropriate test 
case to use in understanding monetization. First, on a purely practical level, survey and interview 
measures of monetization are virtually non-existent, while those that do exist are frequently 
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premised on an under-theorized, concept of monetization as dichotomous at large scales. 
Treating monetization as an “either-or” proposition at the scale of a village or nation severely 
limits understanding of this theoretical construct at these scales. Thus, it is important that the test 
case selected provide the measures necessary to begin studying monetization at the level of the 
transaction and the network. The Nang Rong Project, a series of data collections that includes 
three waves of large, multi-scale surveys conducted in Northeast Thailand in 1984, 1994, and 
2000 provides just such micro-level data, along with a rich collection of observations on 
demographic, economic, and agricultural characteristics of households and villages.  
Second, the period in which observations were collected on Nang Rong was one of 
widespread and rapid social, cultural, and economic change – general conditions under which 
monetized transactions appear, anecdotally, to also increase. This may be true both because of 
the greater security and reduced information costs that monetary exchanges offers as opposed 
barter, or because monetization itself is likely to be an important agent or concomitant of change. 
The prospective nature of the Nang Rong data allows changes in a wide range of social and 
economic behaviors to be recorded with a degree of accuracy and reliability not permitted using 
retrospective measures. The long observational window, on the other hand, permits the 
exploration of trends over time. Both of these aspects of the data are important to the study of 
monetization, which may have wide-ranging and long-term effects but may not be accurately 
recalled in retrospective interviews due to the commonplace character and large number of the 
economic exchanges involved (Conway 1990; Henry et al. 1994; Schwarz and Sudman 1994).  
The Nang Rong Project gathered data on individuals, households, and communities, and 
did so for a large sample. The large number of individuals (ranging from 34,035 in 1984 to 
33,193 in 2000) and households (ranging from 5,860 households in 1984 to 8,638 in 2000), and 
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the comparatively large sample of villages (51 villages in 1984 that were followed as they grew) 
provide sufficient statistical power to examine a large number of potential covariates and to 
provide stable estimates of less common behaviors. The feature of the Nang Rong data that 
enables the direct investigation of monetized labor is a series of unique and detailed questions 
asked in 1994 and 2000 about labor used in harvesting rice. Harvesting rice is a labor-intensive 
task that is largely not amenable to mechanization and other labor-saving technologies, and thus 
requires many households with even modest landholdings or many members to seek assistance 
outside their own members (Hull 2007). Information was collected about the nature of each 
discrete transaction between any two households. That is, a household utilizing workers from 
several other households could (and sometimes does) pay one, exchange labor with another, and 
receive help for free from a third. The intense, short-term nature of the rice harvest permits the 
collection of fairly complete information about all rice harvest labor transactions at a level of 
detail not usually available and not previously exploited in empirical research. In order to better 
understand and interpret the significance of the example, I now present a deeper look at rice 
agriculture in Northeast Thailand. 
The Rice Harvest and Rice Labor 
Rice agriculture has been central to the economic wellbeing and cultural identity of 
villages and households in Thailand for centuries (Keyes 1976; Phongphit and Hewison 2001). 
Northeastern Thailand, where this study is based, is a culturally, socially, and economically 
distinct region that locals call Isan. Cultivation practices in Isan differ from rice-growing in other 
parts of Thailand and beyond in notable ways. In particular, rice-growing in the Northeast has 
traditionally been smaller-scale, less market-oriented, and less intensive than cultivation in the 
Central and Northern regions of Thailand. The Nang Rong Projects data suggest that greater than 
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80 percent of households in the District were engaged in rice agriculture during the decade prior 
to the period examined here. This high percentage reflects the smallholder tradition and 
subsistence nature of much agriculture that has been the hallmark of rice agriculture in this 
region for decades.  
In the Northeast, water for irrigating rice is often limited to what can be had through 
rainfall. Estimates of the proportion of households in the Northeast relying on any form of 
irrigation other than rainfall vary considerably from year to year during the years examined here, 
but never range above a third and are often quite lower (Grachangnetara and Bumruntham 2003).  
Estimates for Nang Rong District drawn from the 1994 and 2000 data are within the same range. 
Reliance on rainfall alone is often more than sufficient, thanks to large volumes of seasonal 
rainfall brought by the annual monsoon, but the high variability of both the timing and quantity 
of rainfall negatively influences overall yield.  
During the season reported on in 2000 for example, the weather station in Nang Rong 
recorded above average rainfall starting in March and continuing through the months of May and 
June, the months that typically coincide with heavier rains and the start of planting. Overall, 
rainfall during this season was substantially higher than the 30-year average and this 
precipitation was well spaced (Thailand Meteorological Department Climatology Division 
2002). As a result, average yield in metric tons per rai for all rice-growing households in the 
sample was approximately 2.7 t/ha, slightly above the national average of 2.51 t/ha (United 
States Department of Agriculture 2009).2  This contrasts sharply with the season reported on in 
                                                 
2
 Sample tabulations of yields based on 1994 and 2000 Nang Rong Data are only approximations due to the 
possibility of measurement error and conversion. Households reported rice yield in tang in 1994, a unit of volume 
roughly equivalent to 10kg of dry jasmine rice. Households reported rice yield in grasops in 2000, a unit of volume 
whose weight varies according to the type of rice and other factors. Each household provided estimates of the 
number of kilograms of rice per grasop in 2000 for each of three major varieties. These relationships were used to 
compute the total kg of rice per household.  
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1994, which was a year of poor rainfall that also came later than expected (Thailand 
Meteorological Department Climatology Division 2002). As would be expected in a rainfall-
dependent rice economy, yield in that year was around 0.85 t/ha, far below the national average 
of 2.21 t/ha, and below the average for the Northeast of 1.45 t/ha (Food and Agricultural 
Organization of the United Nations 2009; United States Department of Agriculture 2009). These 
figures clearly demonstrate the reduction that can occur in rough rice yields during drought years 
below what would be possible with adequate and well-timed rainfall. 
While some innovations and green technologies have been successfully implemented, 
most notably the adoption of large tractors and walking tractors for tilling rice paddies prior to 
planting, the larger suite of available technologies implemented elsewhere has not been widely 
adopted due to cost and limited gains. In particular, while machines have reduced labor demands 
during the plowing phase of the rice cycle, the harvest was still carried out almost exclusively by 
hand during the period examined due to the delicate handling needed to avoid wastage, among 
other factors (Fukui 1993; see Hull 2007 for a more thorough review of these factors). 
Herbicides and pesticides are used sparingly and in most cases provide only marginally 
improved yields in this agricultural context. Chemical fertilizers, by contrast, had become nearly 
universal by the most recent wave of data collection. In sum, while households in Nang Rong 
District, like their neighbors throughout the Isan region, show a readiness to adopt innovations 
offering real or perceived gains in agricultural yields, a number of these innovations have proven 
too costly or of limited effectiveness. As a result, many aspects of rice agriculture across the 
study area do not look remarkably different today than they might have appeared in decades past. 
To return to the central idea, two important questions facing many households in Nang 
Rong are whether to grow rice and if rice is grown, who will provide labor for the intensive 
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harvest. Even households that own no land are not barred from growing rice in principle, as an 
active market for land rental exists. Regarding the first question, Chayonov (1926) argues that in 
the absence of well-developed markets for labor, household production decisions depend upon 
household demographic composition, as the household is the sole source of labor, and some 
empirical work supports this claim (Jacoby 1988, cited in Benjamin 1992). This formulation is 
likely to be an oversimplification when applied to the Isan context, however, because it fails to 
take into account the precise nature and timing of labor demands associated with differing types 
of agriculture. In the case of wetland rice in Isan, many conditions, including a large number of 
varieties grown, elevation differences, and intentional variations in planting time, all serve to 
generate a situation in which rice matures at different times for different households. Treated as 
individual units, a household’s only alternative in the absence of a labor market would be its own 
members, which could indeed tie production decisions to household demography. But what if 
one’s neighbors have comparatively less work at the time when one’s own labor demands are 
greatest? Labor could potentially be obtained through a promise of providing labor in the future 
when the roles are reversed. Such a situation is, in fact, exactly the logic that underlies the long 
khaek system of rice labor exchange that was a central feature of agricultural life in Nang Rong 
for decades.  
Thus, households in Nang Rong typically have not one, but two potential sources of labor 
in the absence of a labor market: household members and exchange labor. The introduction of 
wage labor, then, is not an entirely new, qualitatively different phenomenon, but rather an 
alternative to the long khaek labor exchange system. Either might function to supplement 
household labor. The availability of labor for pay is an established feature of the Nang Rong 
economy, one that has been present for at least two decades prior to the present study (Phongphit 
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and Hewison 2001). When markets for labor are present, if imperfect, three sources of labor 
presumably exist: household members, long khaek, and wage labor.  
In a given year a household determines whether to grow rice (and how much to plant) 
based upon a number of factors. The most likely factors will be described below in the section on 
measurement, but labor may be particularly important. Considerable labor is needed to plant rice 
(and also to transplant, depending on the method of cultivation). Then, the rice requires less labor 
and attention for several months, mostly in the form of weeding, until it is time to harvest. The 
factors that could potentially influence how much rice is ultimately produced based upon this 
initial investment in planting are many, but few outside of the labor invested are under the 
control of the farmer. As already noted, rainfall exerts a strong force on yields, but rainfall 
cannot be predicted at the time of planting, nor can such occurrences as loss due to winds or 
flooding, or a bad year for pests. Likewise, the basic quality of the growing conditions cannot be 
altered to a great extent once rice has been planted. Well-timed applications of fertilizer may 
improve yield, but only so much. 
Thus, it may be reasonable to assume that the amount of labor that will be required for 
the harvest at the end of a growing season is a quantity that is only partly knowable by farmers at 
the outset, and further that beyond ensuring that what rice has been planted survives and thrives 
there are very few actions a farmer can take to dramatically increase or decrease the final yield. 
Put simply, by planting x amount of land in rice, a farmer is committing to a fixed but 
unpredictable labor requirement at harvest time. What matters is not so much the raw quantity of 
rice planted, but the ratio between this quantity and the predicted resources of the household at 
harvest time. Both of these quantities will continually fluctuate up until harvest time, but at that 
point, the relationship between labor requirements and available labor at last becomes apparent 
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to the household. It is at this point that a household estimates how much labor will be needed to 
harvest all of the rice, how much of that rice will actually be harvested, and who will provide the 
labor: household members, labor exchange partners, wage laborers, or some combination of all 
sources.  
In sum, households have multiple sources of rice labor. The ability of households to 
mobilize any one of these sources is likely to be a function of household characteristics, to be 
explored in the next section. Further, a wide variety of factors may influence both the amount of 
rice planted initially and the amount of labor required at harvest time. More will be said about 
the interrelated nature of these household decisions and the implications for modeling in Section 
V, but first, I present a thorough description of the measurement of the many factors included in 
the analysis.  
METHODS 
Dependent Variable Measurement 
The rice-growing behavior of the household is operationalized as a dichotomous indicator 
of whether a household harvested any rice during the previous season. The paid-labor outcome is 
a dichotomous indicator measuring whether the household used monetized labor. The latter 
indicator is coded so that a household that paid all of its workers is coded as using “monetized” 
labor, while one that paid no workers, or mixed strategies, are coded as “non-monetized” with 
respect to the rice harvest. It appears to be the case in Nang Rong, especially in the year 2000, 
that monetized labor is no longer the innovation, but the dominant mode of exchange when extra 
labor is required. For the small number of households that did mix and match bases of exchange, 
descriptive analysis suggests that they are far more similar to households that pay no workers 
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than to those that pay all (Hull 2009b). 3 Some detail is sacrificed by treating the dependent 
variables as dichotomies, but this simplification permits the estimation of the same model at 
different points in time using the Nang Rong data and other analyses which are an important goal 
of the present research. It is important to recall that much previous research implicitly treats 
monetization as a force that is dichotomous at the level of a village or even a national economy – 
and often as a phenomenon that occurs en masse, instantaneously, and without friction. Thus, the 
present operationalization, while itself a dichotomy, is still a significant improvement for the 
measurement of monetization at the micro level.4  
Independent Variable Measurement 
Independent variables reflect four major factors a.) household demographic composition, 
b.) relevant agricultural characteristics, c.) other economic assets and activities, and d.) general 
characteristics of the village economic and agricultural context. These four groups of factors are 
all expected to be related to both the decision to grow rice and to pay laborers. In addition, a fifth 
potential group of variables – explicit measures of the social network position of households, are 
argued to be a constant factor of the social context based upon prior work, and so are not 
                                                 
3
 Due to the obvious significance of the operationalization of the primary dependent variable, a subsequent 
sensitivity analysis was conducted in which the monetization variable was re-coded using the rule, “if any paid 
labor, then code as monetized.” A small number of households were affected by this change. The results reported 
here were robust to this alternate specification.  
 
4
 In constructing this latter measure, the categories of “free labor” and “exchanged labor” were also collapsed. This 
reflects both doubts on the part of the author about the lack of a meaningful distinction between these two concepts 
and uncertainty about the possible alteration of meaning in the course of translation. One does not need to posit a 
fully rational actor model to question whether any labor is ever given freely. Such “gifts,” to use Sahlin’s 
terminology, likely represent one step in a complex ongoing series of exchanges of many different valuables over an 
extended period of time (Sahlins 1972). The respondents may rightly claim that they neither paid the laborer nor 
exchanged any labor, and yet this is not the same as saying that the labor was actually free. At the time the 
interviews were fielded, the study of monetization was not the central purpose. Therefore, it is uncertain whether the 
interviewers provided enough explanation of the distinction between these concepts for them to be reliably 
distinguished in this particular analysis. Further, both “free labor” and labor exchange are distinctly different from 
the major concept of interest: monetized labor. Collapsing these categories reduces the complexity of the modeling 
task and reduces concerns about measurement error while sacrificing little in the way of substantive interest.  
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included. A discussion of the reasons for this decision is included in the section on measurement. 
I explain the theoretical rationale for including each variable as each is operationalized below.  
HOUSEHOLD DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION. Eight measures constitute the 
demographic composition of households in both models. Rather than include a single measure of 
all household labor, I use separate measures of the number of working age males and females to 
allow for the possibility of differential effects by gender, age, and membership status. Measures 
of the number of children and older household members are included separately as these 
individuals also provide labor, but potentially not to the same extent. In addition, the number of 
former household members now living in other households nearby is included separately, as 
these individuals may not be considered laborers by the household in the same way as non-
household members. On the other hand, migrants from the household may represent a direct loss 
of labor to the household (Hugo 1982). But any potential loss of labor generated by migration 
might be offset by a flow of wealth from the migrant back to the family in the form of 
remittances which could be used to purchase labor. Thus, separate measures of the number of 
remitting and non-remitting migrants are included in the model. Lastly, the mean age of the 
household is included as a simple measure of life-course effects. Controlling for the other 
household demographic features, one might expect older households to be less engaged in rice-
growing, having turned over control of family land resources to children and younger family 
members.   
HOUSEHOLD AGRICULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS. The inclusion of the amount of 
land owned or used by a household is an important variable in both models. Excluding such 
measures could potentially lead to model misspecification because the amount of land available 
to potentially grow rice should be strongly related to a household’s likelihood of engaging in rice 
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agriculture as well as their overall labor needs and probability of using paid labor. But, due to 
changes in the survey, different measures of agricultural land were obtained in 1994 and 2000. In 
1994, households were asked to report on the amount of land that they owned. In 2000, an 
attempt was made to additionally account for each individual parcel a household owned, but this 
was found to be problematic, so the question was re-written to ask households about the parcels 
of land that they used. Despite the theoretical difference, empirically, the distributions of the two 
variables display quite similar shapes, ranges, and central tendencies, though differences do 
exist. Most notably, the 2000 land-used variable displays more instances of households using 
very small amounts of land, possibly renters of a few rai that were not observed with the 1994 
measure. It appears to be primarily at the margins of the distribution – among those households 
using small amounts of land and those households owning large amounts of land – where wider 
discrepancies between these measurements exist. Given that these variables are measured six 
years apart, the similarity between them suggests a reasonable degree of stability. This comports 
with qualitative research in Nang Rong which suggests that land changes hands slowly, and most 
transactions take place among family members in conjunction with inheritance {{348 Nang 
Rong Projects Focus Group Interviews 2004}}. In order to further reduce the uncertainty 
surrounding the measurement of the “used” variable in 2000 and at the same time increase the 
comparability across years, the two variables, land owned and land used, are recoded as ordinal 
variables. Specifically, I create three categories: Households with small (0-15 rai), medium (15-
45 rai), and large (45 or more rai) landholdings, based upon an assessment of the distribution of 
the two variables.5 This specification has the added benefit of removing concerns about undue 
influence by the handful of households with very large landholdings.  
                                                 
5
 The rai is a Thai unit of land measurement. There are 6.25 rai in one hectare, and approximately 2.53 rai in one 
acre. 
133 
 
The model of agricultural participation also includes a dichotomous indicator of whether 
a household owned any large agricultural equipment. In 1994, household were asked about 
ownership of large tractors, walking tractors, water pumps, electric generators, and threshers, 
while in 2000 they were asked about only tractors, small tractors, and threshers. The indicator 
measure includes all the large agricultural equipment was asked about in each year. Despite these 
differences, the measure in both years should be a strong predictor of participation in rice 
agriculture, since such large investments signal a long-term commitment to agriculture.  
The model of paid labor use additionally includes a count of the number of non-
household members who came to help a household plant its rice. This variable is included as a 
proxy for the total amount of rice planted, which was not directly measured. This variable should 
be strongly related to the amount of labor needed to harvest rice, and thus the probability of 
using paid labor. 
HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS. The economic resources a household 
commands are thought to play a role in making paid labor more attainable. Households without 
any access to cash cannot then pay others to provide them with labor. Income may also influence 
agricultural decisions by providing alternative livelihoods or, on the contrary, giving the 
household additional resources to invest in agriculture. An attempt was made to accurately 
measure the full range of possible income sources and economic opportunities that each 
household engaged in. As a result, a large number of variables characterizing a household’s 
economic activities can be included in the model. Households in Nang Rong traditionally utilized 
a diversified economic strategy to minimize overall risk in the event that any one investment 
should fail. In addition to growing rice, a household might raise livestock such as cattle, pigs, or 
buffalo, grow a cash crop like cassava, produce charcoal, or participate in such cottage industries 
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as the production of silk or cloth. While many of these activities are carried out for household 
use, they all represent possible sources of additional income for the household as well, to varying 
degrees. For this reason, indicators of a household’s engagement in each activity are included in 
both models.  
Further, the overall level of wealth that a household possesses should be included in both 
models. Unfortunately, no direct measure of the total assets of households was obtained. But 
measures of household wealth by proxy in the form of material investments may predict 
participation and labor monetization due to the convertibility of some or all of these assets into 
cash or their usefulness in agriculture. In 1994 households were asked about consumptive assets 
which included large televisions, small televisions, VCRs, and refrigerators, while in 2000 they 
were asked whether they owned large TVs, small TVs, VCRs, telephones, computers, 
microwaves, washers, one-door refrigerators, and two-door refrigerators. Some assets were 
considered both productive and consumptive. In 1994 these included cars and motorcycles, while 
by 2000 the list had been refined to include large motorcycles, small motorcycles, cars, pickups, 
and large trucks. In both 1994 and 2000, those assets that were considered purely productive 
were Itans (multi-purpose farm engines), large tractors, small tractors, and sewing machines. In 
each year, the total value of each of these three categories of assets was converted into their 
value in Thai baht according to the average prices of these goods in Nang Rong District or the 
nearest locale where they are readily sold.  
In addition to these specific calculations of the rough value of the material assets owned 
by each household, I include two dichotomous indicators as proxies of housing quality and value. 
First is a measure of whether the household had glass windows at the time of the interview. 
Second is a measure of whether the household used “old” or “new” fuel sources for cooking. 
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Sources of fuel classified as old include wood and charcoal, and no fuel at all. Sources of fuel 
classified as new include propane, electric, and other modern sources.  
VILLAGE-LEVEL CHARACTERISTICS. More general macro-level processes and 
characteristics measured at the village-level, while less proximate, are predicted to relate to 
household-level decisions. The size of the village population is included in the paid-labor 
equation for the straightforward reason that this population provides a readily accessible source 
of additional labor to households. The total amount of rice land in the village is included in the 
rice-growing equation on the expectation that this measure may capture some variation in 
growing conditions, and because villages with more rice land may provide other additional 
agricultural support. This same variable is included in the paid-labor equation with the 
expectation that villages with more total rice land under cultivation will experience greater 
competition for labor, and may be more likely to have a strong paid labor market. A measure 
obtained from group interviews with village elders and headmen that asks whether villagers 
hired labor from other villages is included in the paid-labor equation. Both equations contain a 
variable gauging the extent of localized water shortages as assessed by this same group of 
informants.  In 1994, the question about whether households had sufficient water for growing 
specified only rice cultivation, while in 2000 the question referred to all agriculture generally. A 
dichotomous measure of whether households in a village had access to piped water to dwellings 
is included as an indicator of general village development and because such water might be used 
during periods of extreme drought to keep crops alive (Rindfuss et al. 2007). Lastly, a 
dichotomous measure of whether the village had a telephone, and thus enhanced contact with 
broader markets, is included in both models.  
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HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL SOCIAL NETWORK POSITION. In previous work I provide 
strong evidence that the household decision to use monetized labor during the rice harvest is 
consistently associated with that household’s position in multiple social networks, especially the 
rice harvest network itself. Further, these relationships display the sort of multi-scale properties 
predicted by the theory and several other empirical predictions of the theory (Hull 2009b). It 
would seem, therefore, that omitting measures of these network properties from the present 
analysis might naturally lead to misspecification of the model, particularly if these same 
variables are also related to the other independent variables in the model. But, one of the most 
important conclusions of that prior work was that these social network associations were 
extremely consistent over time, despite any number of observed and unobserved shifts in related 
phenomena. The implication is that these social networks constitute a part of the invariable social 
context of monetized and non-monetized labor exchange transactions in Nang Rong.  
From a more methodological standpoint, there is also a considerable danger that 
including these variables without a good theory about the directionality of the relationship could 
introduce endogeneity into the model and possibly bias the resulting coefficient estimates. The 
question becomes, is it better to include or exclude such measures. I come down firmly on the 
side of excluding them for the time being because there are strong theoretical grounds for 
predicting that most social network variables and monetization variables are simultaneous, and 
therefore require a more complex modeling procedure than can be employed here using these 
data (Hull 2009b).6 Further, if the impact of these variables is as constant as suggested by this 
                                                 
6
 Sensitivity tests were conducted in which the models presented here were re-run with the social network measures 
presented in Hull (2009b) included. The results were not substantively different, with one exception. The three 
household-level demographic characteristics that are significant in the models presented here in 1994 (counts of the 
number of adults females and males and the number of dependent children) are not significant when the social 
network measures are included. This may suggest a greater reliance on network ties over household labor in 1994, 
but such interpretations should be tempered by the methodological concerns raised in this section. In 1994, all other 
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prior work, and they share no causal relationship with other predictors, then their omission will 
not necessarily result in endogeneity bias. It may be helpful to point out again, that the question 
this research aims to answer is, within a particular context, what factors are related to the 
differentiation of households according to these two important measures? While it is possible 
that certain elements of the context may not be universally related in the same way to the 
processes being examined, within Nang Rong, they are presumed to be constants. The broader 
exploration of the generality of these contextual elements must await cross-national and other 
context-varying data collections.  
Model and Sample 
For each year that data were available (1994 and 2000) two separate binary probit models 
are estimated. The dependent variable for the first model is the dichotomous indicator of whether 
a household harvested any rice during the previous season. The second dependent variable, also 
dichotomous, measures whether a household used paid labor to accomplish its harvest. Because 
the data are multi-level, the observations within each village may not be entirely independent of 
each other. In order to account for the inflation of standard errors that may result from clustering 
at the village level, Huber-White robust standard errors are estimated in all models. 
The sample used in this analysis differs from that used in previous analyses of 
monetization due to the inclusion of many more covariates into the model of both outcomes. This 
introduces a number of purely methodological obstacles to including all available households. 
Chief among these is that the method of collecting data on the migration behavior of household 
members requires that at least one member of a household was present during a previous wave of 
data collection (1984 for 1994, 1994 or 1984 for 2000). Absent from the samples used, therefore, 
                                                                                                                                                             
relationships remained fundamentally unchanged; in 2000 all relationships remained unchanged. For this reason, the 
original models, which do not risk the endogeneity problems discussed in this section, are presented. 
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are those households that were “new” to the villages in a given wave, as the result of in-
migration (divided households are kept in the sample). Limiting the sample to this group of 
households reduces the total sample size from 7331 households in 1994 to 5190 (71 percent of 
total), and from 8638 in 2000 down to 6920 (80 percent of total). These numbers indicate, among 
other things, that Nang Rong was still functioning as a frontier region during the period under 
examination, receiving an ongoing flow of new migrants. When labor monetization is modeled, 
the households included in the sample are further restricted to only those that grew rice, which 
results in samples of size 4165 in 1994 (82 percent of rice-growing households) and 5279 in 
2000 (76 percent of rice-growing households). The implications of these decisions for the 
internal and external validity of the analysis will be discussed in Section VI. First, I turn to the 
presentation of the main results. 
RESULTS 
The results of the analysis are presented in four stages. First, descriptive statistics for all 
measures included in the modeling are presented. Second, the model predicting labor 
monetization is discussed. Third, the results of the model predicting agricultural participation are 
described. Lastly, an additional analysis is carried out that takes advantage of the two separate 
observation windows to perform a standard demographic decomposition on the two models.  
Descriptive Results 
Table 1 provides means and standard deviations for all variables used in this analysis for 
1994 and 2000. The column on the left of the table indicates whether a variable was present only 
in the selection equation (1 variable), the substantive equation (3 variables), or both equations 
(24 variables). The sample for the second model excludes households that did not grow rice, and 
therefore descriptive statistics are provided for both samples – the full sample of households and 
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the rice-growing sample. Basic levels for both dependent variables are also shown in Table 1. As 
noted earlier, there has been a sizeable expansion in the use of paid labor. In addition to a general 
increase in the average number of paid laborers used by each household, the percentage of rice-
growing households paying all of their laborers rose from 28 to 55 percent over the six year 
period. The share growing rice was about 82 percent in 1994 and fell to 76 percent in 2000, 
despite the much better growing conditions in that year.  
Overall, differences between the sample of all households and that of rice-growing 
households are modest, a point that will be emphasized in the discussion. Most notably, when 
non-rice growing households are removed from the sample a small increase in the mean number 
of working-age males and females is observed, and a 10 to 20 percent reduction in the average 
non-agricultural wages earned by a household is seen. This sensibly suggests greater reliance by 
non-rice growing households on non-agricultural pursuits for a share of their income. All of the 
variables directly associated with rice agriculture increase when the non-rice growing households 
are removed, as would be expected, although the extent of this increase is quite modest, 
reinforcing the picture of smallholder agriculture that characterizes the region. Additional 
reference to Table 1 will be made below when coefficients are interpreted. 
The results of the two independent probit models, one of rice-growing and the other of 
paid labor use, are presented for both years in Table 2. The similarity of the 1994 and 2000 
models allows a simplified interpretation of the results. I first discuss those factors that show 
similar results in both years together and then the smaller number of variables that yielded 
different outcomes across years.  
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The Paid Labor Equation 
In the model of labor compensation strategy, a greater number of working age males and 
females in the households is associated with a reduced tendency to hire laborers and to rely 
instead on household labor only or labor exchange. The simplest interpretation of this finding is 
that each working-age member of a household provides labor that would otherwise need to be 
hired, and likewise makes labor-exchange more feasible. Turning it around, it is the smaller 
households, with respect to their potential household labor force, that are most likely to pay for 
labor. The strength of this relationship approximately doubles from 1994 to 2000, perhaps as a 
result of the presumed greater competition for labor in the latter, wetter year. The number of 
over-55 household members has the same relationship as working-age members, with 
households containing more members over 55 showing a reduced tendency to pay all of their 
extra laborers. This relationship could result from either the substitution effect described above 
or a preference on the part of influential older household members for the more traditional modes 
of obtaining labor that affects household decisions, or both.    
Turning to agricultural variables, households owning more land and those using more 
laborers to plant rice are more likely to engage in monetized labor transactions at harvest time. 
This is exactly what would be expected. These coefficients are consistent and of similar 
magnitude across years.  
Of the economic measures included, only three were significant in both years. The first 
was the dichotomous measure of whether a household had glass windows or not. Households 
that cannot afford glass windows, approximately 2 in 5 in 1994, and 1 in 3 in 2000, likely have 
little disposable cash. Evidence on the uses to which cash remittances are put suggests that rural 
Thai households are far more likely to spend them on consumption (including household 
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improvements) rather than productive investments (Fuller et al. 1983: 16-17). This may suggest 
that households who are unable to obtain money through cash cropping, cottage industries, 
remittances,  local wage labor, or some other activity may face a bind if they produce more rice 
than can be harvested by their own members and labor exchange partners. However, when one 
further considers that none of the potential income sources included in the model was significant 
by itself, it suggests that no one source of income impacts the decision making process for all 
households. Alternatively, it may suggest that the extensive measures included in this model still 
fail to provide a complete picture of the sources of cash income utilized by households. Having 
no direct measure of the total cash resources commanded by each household, proxy measures 
such as this must suffice for now. 
Along the same lines, the total value in baht of productive and consumptive assets owned 
by households in each year is associated with paid labor use. Productive assets, recall, are things 
like tractors and sewing machines while consumptive assets include televisions, telephones and 
the like. Notably, while productive assets matter, it appears that the value of consumptive assets 
is more closely related to the tendency to pay laborers. This is entirely consistent with the 
interpretation that cash-strapped households are unable to afford either consumptive assets like 
televisions, basic home improvements like glass windows, or paid labor. Virtually no change in 
the magnitude of any of the economic variable coefficients is observed from 1994 to 2000. It is 
appropriate here to note that the coefficient for the total value of assets that are both productive 
and consumptive is significant in 2000 but not 1994. Given that the mean value of these assets 
owned by households, which includes cars and trucks, doubled from 1994 to 2000, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that these assets are related to paid labor in the same way as other types 
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in 2000, but that in 1994 automobiles and trucks may well have been viewed as luxury items by 
paid-labor and non-paid labor households alike, and were simply too uncommon. 
It is just as important to also consider what is not associated with monetized labor. As 
noted, the number of remitting migrants is not significant, and neither is the number of non-
remitting migrant household members. The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that the average 
household has about 1 remitting migrant for every 4 working-age members in 1994, which fell to 
1 migrant for every 6 working-age members by 2000. The same ratio for non-remitting migrants 
was about 1 for every six in both years. Migration is an important facet of life all across Isan, 
with villages experiencing the absence of large numbers of working-age individuals, especially 
during the off-season (Limanonda and Tirasawat 1987: 59-66). But despite this, population 
mobility appears to exert little direct influence on household-level rice harvest labor behavior. 
Likewise, the fact that most of the other economic endeavors that a household could be involved 
in are unrelated is consistent with the interpretation that it is not so much how a household 
obtains cash that matters, but rather how much cash is obtained, here proxied by the measures of 
assets included in the model.  
Among those factors that were different across years, the village-level factors are 
especially noteworthy. In 1994, none of these factors was related to paid labor use. In 2000, the 
number of working-age adults in the village was negatively related to it. This difference may 
well capture the influence of labor availability. I noted this same general finding in 2000 but not 
1994 in previous work, where it was used to argue that the relationship of social network 
measures to monetization was not explainable by village-level labor demand alone (Hull 2009b).  
Here, I would add that wage rates for rice labor in Nang Rong are quite rigid and show 
fairly modest responsiveness to demand, as well as very little variation across villages. In 1994, 
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for example, reported wages during periods of high labor for both men and women averaged 
roughly 58 baht/day with standard deviations of less than 10. Corresponding mean wages during 
periods of low labor demand were 49 baht/day for both sexes. In 2000, the means and standard 
deviations for both sexes in 2000 were 105 baht/day and 7.6 during periods of typical demand, 
which rose to 126 baht/day and 12.8 during periods of peak labor demand.7 The higher wage 
rates in 2000 may partially index inflation, but more likely represent the greater demand for rice 
harvest labor in this year driven by better rains and better yields. Similar to the effect observed at 
the household level, the greater the number of (presumably better-known) individuals in the 
village who might provide labor, the less is the chance that a household will need to pay for 
labor.  
Also in 2000, reports of insufficient water for agriculture positively predicted paid labor 
use. It is likely that this latter difference, in both this and in the rice-growing model interpreted 
below where the significance also differs, may be attributable to the difference in the measure 
across years noted above. In 1994, group interviews asked villagers about the water available for 
rice agriculture, while in 2000, this question referred to all agriculture. While this provides a 
convenient explanation for the difference in significance across years, the positive coefficient of 
the measure in 2000 is contrary to expectations and is something of a puzzle. Most likely, this 
variable is capturing variations in the overall suitability of a villages location for agriculture in 
                                                 
7
 The availability of these statistics raises the obvious question of why the average wage rate in each village is not 
included in the model. The reason is that these measures were not created by aggregating household-level 
information, but from focus-groups of village headman and others who were first asked whether villagers paid 
others for labor, and then what the rates were during different periods. Thus, if a focus group responded that wage 
labor was not used in the village, the wage rate is not observed. It is demonstrable that households in these villages 
did pay for labor using the household-level data, but unfortunately, I do not know how much they paid their laborers 
for both years. As further evidence of the poor predictive ability of the focus-groups, the village-level measure of 
paid labor use shows no relationship to the household-level measure in the paid-labor model. Thus, while desirable, 
inclusion of such a measure is not possible with the data used. 
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2000, which may in turn be related to both the economic welfare of households and the types of 
economic strategies they use. This finding warrants further attention in future work. 
The Rice-Growing Equation 
By interpreting what is going on with rice agriculture simultaneously with what is going 
on with paid-labor behavior, a much richer picture of what is occurring at the ground level in 
Nang Rong emerges. For the decision to grow rice, having more available household workers, 
more land and equipment, and greater involvement in “traditional” home industries all exert a 
positive force on the decision to grow rice in both years. Older households and those with greater 
household assets were less likely to grow rice in both years, generally. Looking more closely at 
these variables, the effect of additional household labor is opposite to what was found for the 
paid labor decision, and consistent with theory. Households with more labor are more likely to 
grow rice. This finding also implies non-separability of production decisions from household 
demographics. Larger households in Nang Rong are consistently more likely to engage in 
agriculture and in 1994 the negative effect of the number of children on growing implies that the 
competing labor demands of child care are important. Both observations serve as evidence of the 
imperfection of labor markets in the region. This observation is reinforced by the evidence on 
wage labor rates cited above. 
Having more land and possessing equipment for rice agriculture both function exactly as 
predicted by theory in the model. Both are stronger predictors of agricultural participation in 
2000, suggesting, among other things, that specialization in rice agriculture may be occurring 
more in 2000. Raising livestock and making charcoal were both associated with a greater 
probability of growing rice in both years. These subsistence-oriented economic activities are 
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highly compatible with rice agriculture and are a part of the traditional portfolio of multiple 
economic activities that has often been commented on by observers in the region.  
Among the factors influencing household agricultural participation negatively, there are 
few surprises. The average age of the household functions as anticipated, as a rough proxy for 
household life-course effects. Older households participate in rice agriculture less often, all other 
things considered. This may reflect both the difficult, labor-intensive nature of rice agriculture 
and the tendency for older individuals to turn over cultivation of family lands to their children. 
The three measures of the value of household assets also function as expected, with those 
households possessing more wealth in these assets showing a reduced probability of growing 
rice, on average. Rice, as the traditional primary subsistence crop of Isan and of Nang Rong, 
continues to be planted and harvested more often by households with few cash resources 
available for other investments, all things equal. The one exception to this observation is that 
consumptive assets showed no relationship with the rice-growing decision in 2000.  
The few coefficients that lose or gain significance across years for this equation are also 
telling. The contradictory effects of young and old dependents in a household only influence the 
decision to grow rice in 1994, suggesting a reduction in the influence of these household 
members in the calculus of agricultural decision-makers. Likewise, household involvement in 
cottage industries, besides diminishing from 1994 to 2000 also ceases to impact the rice decision, 
perhaps reflecting the fact that those households still engaging in cottage industries in 2000 do so 
for reasons having little to do with household decisions about agriculture. Cassava acts in the 
same way as household involvement in a cottage industry across models.   
Lastly, lack of sufficient water did appear to negatively impact some households’ 
decisions to grow rice in 1994, but not in 2000. For the reasons explained above, the difference 
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between years may be explained by the slightly different measures used in the two years. In this 
case, the importance of insufficient local water resources in 1994 for the decision to grow rice 
makes sense – areas with water shortages saw less rice cultivation on average. The fact that the 
dependent variable is, more precisely, a measure of whether the household harvested any rice 
may also be relevant, as regions experience severe water shortages may have seen larger 
proportions of households plant rice but harvest nothing, a behavior that would otherwise be 
quite out-of-character with Nang Rong agriculture, where crops are not lightly abandoned in the 
fields once planted.  
Decomposition Analysis 
In this section, I apply common decomposition techniques to the 1994 and 2000 models 
and data to examine the relative contributions of year-specific factors versus sample-specific 
factors to the overall proportions of rice-growing and monetized households. The decomposition 
technique estimates the value of each outcome that would have been observed if the population 
in 2000 had been identical to that in 1994, and vice versa. This is accomplished by taking the 
coefficients from each model – labeled the 1994 model and 2000 model respectively – and re-
estimating the probability of each outcome using the data from the opposite year – labeled the 
1994 data and 2000 data. Four scenarios result from each pairing: 1994 coefficients and 1994 
data (reality), 1994 coefficients and 2000 data (hypothetical), 2000 coefficients and 2000 data 
(reality), and 2000 coefficients and 1994 data (hypothetical). A comparison of the real outcomes 
with the hypothetical outcomes provides additional insight into whether the observed change in 
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each outcome from 1994 to 2000 may be attributable to changes in the data, changes in the 
structural parameters, or both. 8 
Table 3 shows the results of this decomposition, comparing these hypothetical predictions 
with the observed outcomes. The results show a consistent pattern. To best interpret the table, 
begin with the “like-with-like” entries in the cross-classifications (e.g. 94 Model with 94 Data). 
For both the upper and lower panels, these entries are equal to the observed frequencies in the 
populations. These numbers represent a benchmark against which the effects of changing either 
the model or the data are to be judged. Looking first at the upper panel, the predicted percentage 
of rice-growing households (the selection equation) is not especially sensitive to reversing the 
parameters of the 1994 and 2000 models, but declines a few points when the data are reversed. In 
fact, due to the predicted increase in the proportion growing rice that is found when the 1994 
data are used to estimate the 2000 model, a difference of nearly 10 percent (86 percent versus 76 
percent) can be produced by substituting one data set for the other with the 2000 model 
parameters. And because changing the data while holding the parameters constant is equivalent 
to varying the composition of the population, this can be interpreted to mean that the proportion 
of households who grow rice in Nang Rong District is more responsive to compositional shifts in 
the types of households than it is to structural shifts in the parameters.  
Just the opposite obtains for monetization. Here a small shift is observed in response to 
data compositional changes, and a larger shift in response to changing structural parameters. In 
fact, roughly a 20 percent change in the proportion of households monetized occurs when 
holding the 1994 data constant and varying the set of coefficients used. That is, nearly all of the 
                                                 
8
 In order to generate these estimates, I use microsimulation, in which the actual values for each observation on each 
variable are retained and fed into the model for each year, as opposed to using means or theoretically interesting 
values.  
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observed change from 1994 to 2000 can be reproduced by holding the 1994 data constant and 
using the 2000 coefficients. However, in this case, some sensitivity to shifting the data is also 
observed using the 1994 model, though not to the same extent. In plain-English, changes in the 
predicted level of labor monetization are more sensitive to structural shifts, and to a lesser extent 
shifts in population composition.  
 DISCUSSION 
The analysis presented here represents the first attempt to empirically model the factors 
that are related to the monetization of agricultural labor in a specific context using a large, 
representative data set. Thus, it should not come as a complete surprise that difficulties were 
encountered in modeling these two phenomena, though fortunately these were mostly of a 
technical nature. Chief among the acknowledged problems for the present analysis is the 
difficulty in identifying a viable instrument to use in assessing the potential impact of sample 
selection bias. As a result, the possibility that sample selection is biasing coefficient estimates in 
unpredictable ways cannot be ruled out definitively. A second concern is the inclusion of several 
variables in either model that might be suspected of being simultaneously determined. Although 
care was taken to select variables for inclusion in the model that were unlikely to be endogenous 
in this way, some variables such as the amount of rice harvested, were deemed far too important 
for the overall validity of the model to be otherwise excluded on these grounds alone. Thus, 
endogeneity might be a concern for the analysis as well.  
Both of these potentially threaten the internal and external validity of the conclusions 
reached in this analysis. In order to better assess the magnitude of each threat, I now discuss 
these concerns more thoroughly, each in turn.   
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Potential Threats to Internal and External Validity 
 SAMPLE SELECTION BIAS. Two decisions were about households to include in this 
analysis, each of which may have implications for the results. The first was made on strictly 
technical grounds and can be demonstrated to have no effect on the results. Recall that in order to 
include variables measuring a household’s migrants and former members living nearby, the 
sample had to be reduced to so-called “old” households – those that had at least one member 
present during a previous wave of the study – because only these households were asked about 
migrants. All three migration-related variables proved to have no association with either outcome 
in the modeling, but this was not known a priori, and so the original models are presented, rather 
than stripped-down models reflecting knowledge gained in the modeling process itself. But as a 
check against selection bias arising from this particular decision models were re-run without the 
migration variables on the entire sample of “old” and “new” households with not one coefficient 
losing or gaining significance and only very minor alterations in the magnitude of coefficients. 
Sensitivity tests were also run with all “new” households simply coded as having zero migrants 
and leaving these three variables in the model with the same result.9 Thus, I am confident that no 
significant threat to the internal or external validity of the results arises from presenting the 
original models based only on the sample of “old” households as initially specified. 
The second selection concern is that a household’s paying laborers is conditioned on the 
household’s participation in rice agriculture. That is, the second variable is only observed for a 
portion of the sample: those households that grow rice. The value of this measure for the non-
rice growing households, had they grown rice, is unknown. If rice-growing households are a 
representative sample of all households, no problem exists. But it is reasonable to suspect that 
these households differ from the non-rice growing households on both observed and unobserved 
                                                 
9
 The results of any sensitivity tests not specifically reported in this paper are available from the author on request. 
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characteristics, and further, that these differences may also influence whether a household uses 
monetized labor or not. Such sample selection bias and can present a threat to both the external 
and internal validity of the results (Berk 1983).  
To address concern about the possible influence of this sample selection on the results, a 
Heckman two-step selection model is estimated using the same variables employed in the models 
described above (Heckman 1976; Heckman 1979).10 A comparison of the results of the Heckman 
probit model (available in Appendix B) to the results of two independent probit models 
(presented below) shows virtually no effect on the estimates of either the coefficients or the 
standard errors for either model or year. It is tempting to conclude from this analysis that no 
selection bias is present, but this assertion is somewhat tempered by an assessment of the degree 
to which the assumptions of the Heckman model can be met using the Nang Rong data. The 
Heckman model is widely acknowledged to be susceptible to underidentification (Berk 1983; 
Moffitt 2005; Winship and Mare 1992; Woolridge 2003). Identification often, but not always, 
requires the inclusion of a strong instrumental variable or set of variables, called an exclusion 
restriction, which is both a good predictor of selection and uncorrelated with the substantive 
equation (Leung and Yu 2000).  
The justification for the exclusion restriction must be made almost exclusively on 
theoretical grounds when data are observational in nature (Bushway, Johnson, and Slocum 
2007). Accordingly, the best (a posteriori) instrument available in the present analysis was 
judged to be the ownership of costly rice-growing equipment by the household, which is highly 
                                                 
10
 This model is estimated in two stages. First, in the “selection equation,” the Inverse Mills’ Ratio is estimated 
based upon those factors thought to influence selection, which is essentially a measure the probability of selection 
based upon a bivariate probit model. Second, in the “substantive equation,” this quantity is included as a regressor in 
an OLS model of the desired outcome. The Heckman selection model can alternatively be estimated using 
Maximum Likelihood methods. This method must be used when the second variable is dichotomous, as it is in the 
present analysis. 
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predictive of participation in rice agriculture. At the same time, the observation that 
mechanization has had little impact on the rice harvest means that ownership of such equipment 
will have little direct impact on the method of obtaining labor that a household used. However, 
this best-choice instrument is not ideal. First, if the economic variables included in the model do 
not completely measure the economic resources of the household, then there is a possibility that 
the instrument will be indirectly related to the second outcome, paying labor. Wealthier 
households should be more likely to own agricultural equipment and also to have the cash 
resources needed to pay workers, ceteris paribus. Second, a multicollinearity test between the 
predicted Inverse Mills’ Ratio and the other variables in the substantive equation suggests a 
moderate degree of multicollinearity exists in the resulting selection model (Norton, Dow, and 
Do 2008).11 This multicollinearity results from the underperformance of the exclusion restriction 
which fails to produce an Inverse Mills Ratio that is not entirely determined by the variables 
common to both models.  
Both of these observations call into question the effectiveness of the Heckman model for 
addressing any potential selection bias in the present instance. If so, using a Heckman model in 
this way is not evidence that a sample selection correction is unnecessary, as is often mistakenly 
presumed. Rather, it is evidence that the best available sample selection correction is not 
effective in removing this particular bias, if it is present. Unfortunately, given the existing data, 
the extent of this particular form of bias on the estimates cannot be precisely determined as there 
                                                 
11
 The condition numbers for the multicollinearity test on the second model including the Inverse Mills Ratio were 
34.7 in 1994 and 36.5 in 2000. Although there is not precise rule of thumb, this indicates that multicollinearity may 
be a concern. Further, following Jones (2007), an OLS regression of the Inverse Mills’ Ratio on the variables in the 
substantive equation shows that between 79 and 80 percent of the total variance is explained in either year, as 
measured by the R-squared. Jones provides no formal standards for rejecting the validity of the instrument, but an R-
square of this magnitude, by most social science standards, supports the conclusion that the instrument may not be 
performing optimally (Jones 2007). 
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is no direct test for the presence of selection bias. In sum, the selection model, as specified, 
provides no improvement over the simpler, independent models approach.   
However, the threat of selection can still be addressed in another, less direct way. It is 
straightforward to show that the restricted samples used in this analysis do not differ in 
meaningful ways from the full possible sample of households on observed characteristics. This 
can be ascertained through a comparison of the basic descriptive statistics reported in Table 1, 
already accomplished in Section V. A more formal way to assess this is to use the parameter 
estimates generated by the 1994 and 2000 model to generate another set of predicted 
probabilities of using monetized labor. This time, I use the mean values of all variables in the 
model derived from the select sample and compare the resulting predictions of the model to the 
predictions made when the means for all possible households are used. To be sure, this only 
partially answers the question of what might have happened if all households had been included. 
Because the dependent variable is not observed for non-rice growing households, they are unable 
to contribute to the estimation of the model, but once the model is estimated, it shows very little 
responsiveness to including these households (see Table 4).  The largest difference in predictions 
is a drop of 4 percent, from 56 percent for the select sample to 52 percent for the full sample, in 
the probability of paying laborers in the year 2000. Both sets of predictions are also consistent 
with the actual observed values for the monetization measure. All of this indicates that unless the 
1000 or so households in 1994 and the 1600 households in 2000 that did not grew rice would 
have substantially altered the parameters of the models themselves by their inclusion, the internal 
validity of the results will remain unaffected. The author readily admits of no way of testing for 
this final possibility in the specific case of monetization at present. The Nang Rong dataset 
already represents a rare case, and as such, an alternative test case that simultaneously measures 
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comparable dependent variables and permits the identification of a strong instrumental variable 
for selection modeling does not exist at present. This points to the importance of designing future 
data collection efforts with a specific eye toward identifying such instruments a priori if 
possible, and if this is not possible, of at least measuring more potential instruments including 
environmental, ecological and geographic variables (Moffitt 2005). 
ENDOGENEITY AND SIMULTANEITY. The analysis performed here is presented 
intentionally as exploratory and descriptive in its orientation, and not as a fully confirmatory or 
explanatory piece of research. This befits the study’s status as a novel empirical exploration of a 
topic previously relegated only to the social and economic context of research. With any such 
study, much further work is required to firmly establish that the causal linkages implied are in 
fact valid, and in particular that they are non-spurious and that the direction of influence has been 
properly identified (Bollen 1989).  In interpreting the various relationships identified here, a 
simple one-way causal interpretation may not be fully warranted at present. Thus caution, as well 
as further replication of the analysis, is especially warranted.  
While the suggestion that it is household demography and wealth that influence a 
household’s ability or willingness to grow rice or hire labor in a given year has considerable 
prima facie validity, it cannot be ruled out at present that these latter behaviors might have some 
influence on the former as well. If a household is particularly successful in its rice-growing 
efforts, this may lead to greater wealth and possibly even household size over the long term, 
creating a mutually reinforcing relationship. This reverse causal path is almost certainly weaker 
and less direct than the path from wealth and household size to the key outcomes. However, the 
specific approach employed in the present work precludes strong explanatory causal statements.  
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Readers are advised to treat the associations found here as just that – correlations. As 
such, they are still of considerable value in constructing a theory of which households within this 
context are most likely to engage in agriculture and to use monetized labor. For one thing, the 
absence of statistical relationships anticipated based on theory would generally falsify that 
theory. That relationships of the sort predicted by the general theory of monetization presented 
here were found is encouraging. But, these relationships are also consistent with an underlying 
casual model in which the independent variables in the model are, in actuality, causes of the 
outcomes in question. Better confirmation of this causal model must await additional data.  
Conclusions 
This analysis has demonstrated that a number of key demographic, economic, and 
agricultural characteristics of households and villages are correlated with the household 
decisions to grow rice and to pay laborers. Taking a synoptic view of the many independent 
findings, three major factors consistently matter for both the decision to pay laborers and to grow 
rice. First is the labor available to the household from existing members. Second is the 
endowment of land and equipment that a household is able to exploit. Third is the total value of 
material assets that a household possesses. While the measures of land and equipment display a 
reliable and fairly unremarkable positive relationship with both outcomes across years, the 
household demographic and wealth measures are related to the two outcomes in opposite ways. 
Larger, wealthier households are generally more likely to grow rice and less likely to pay 
laborers if they do. Smaller, less wealthy households are correspondingly less likely to grow rice 
and more likely to pay laborers if they do so. 
Considering general trends in just these three major factors over the past two decades 
provides some interesting observations about the possible nature of change in the region. 
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Available evidence suggests that the average size of rice land holdings of households was not 
changing markedly in the region during the period under consideration and for some time before, 
leading this factor to contribute little to any potential change if it continues unaltered.  In 
contrast, the trend in Nang Rong District, and much of Thailand, has been toward decreasing 
household size over the past two decades. Likewise, a steady trend toward greater household 
material wealth across the District in recent decades has been observed in Nang Rong and 
elsewhere. Taken together, these trends would argue in favor of reduced participation and greater 
monetization of labor in the future if they continue unabated. If the average size of households 
continues to decline as average wealth increases, the resulting smaller (and likely more 
numerous) wealthier households would be predicted by both the 1994 and 2000 models to be less 
involved in agriculture and to rely more on paid labor during the harvest.  
Moreover, the decomposition analysis suggests that the observed changes in the 
proportion of households growing rice may be less amenable to reversal than changes in the 
proportion of households using fully monetized labor. The reason, recall, is that changes in the 
former were better explained by the changing characteristics of the population itself, while 
changes in the latter could be explained almost entirely by different values of the parameter 
estimates. The characteristics of the population that mattered for the rice-growing decision – size 
of household, mean age, land holdings, and even value of most large consumptive assets owned, 
such as refrigerators and television sets – while no doubt part of the constantly shifting context in 
which these decisions take place, are not likely to display wild shifts from year to year. It is the 
values of these measures that most influences the rice-growing decision, while the proportion of 
paid labor is more responsive to the way in which these factors matter in a given year which can 
change even as the values of these variables remain fairly constant. Taken together, the findings 
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presented here provide evidence that a real, secular decline in the proportion of households 
participating in rice agriculture is likely to be taking place.  
This evidence for a decline in the proportion of households growing rice comports well 
with qualitative evidence from the field, the reality of multiple new forms of livelihood that are 
increasingly viable in Nang Rong, and the simple fact that 2000 was a better year for growing 
rice. According to both intuition and the decomposition analysis, proportionally more households 
would have been expected to grow and harvest rice in 2000, exactly the opposite of what was 
observed. That the predictions of a fairly abstract demographic test of the model closely parallel 
simple intuition and experience about what types of behaviors ought to be observed in a year of 
good rainfall provides a nice result, one that gives additional validity to the model and supports 
the theory presented here.  
But if the proportional reduction in households growing rice is indeed a more permanent 
feature of the shifting agricultural landscape in Nang Rong, the same cannot be said conclusively 
for the proportion of households engaging in various methods of obtaining labor. This feature of 
agricultural and economic behavior may be highly responsive to yield, labor availability, and 
other structural conditions present at the time of the harvest. This too, conforms quite well to 
qualitative evidence that suggests Nang Rong farmers to be highly adaptive, responsive decision-
making agents. Throughout decades of contending with unpredictable volume and timing of rain, 
crop pests, political, economic, and cultural isolation from the rest of Thailand, poverty, and 
unreliable labor supplies due to out-migration, among other challenges, the households of 
Northeast Thailand have become highly adept at using whatever resources are most abundant at a 
given time and place. If household labor is abundant one year and rice yields are low, then 
household labor may be used exclusively in that year. If during the next year, yields far outpace 
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household labor supplies, the household may turn to exchange with the neighbors, paid labor, or 
both. It is precisely this flexibility that makes the same type of concrete prediction based on 
observations from two points in time unsupportable in the same way as inferences about rice 
cultivation.  
Fortunately, the weaknesses of the present analysis that have been  identified here, are 
readily remedied through the collection of new data intended for the primary purposes of 
exploring monetization, rather than the use of available secondary data. While secondary data are 
an excellent starting point, and often provide the justification for such intensive, expensive new 
data initiatives, as this research does, one must constantly confront the challenge of working with 
measures that were never intended to capture the types of novel distinctions and relationships 
that are often required by new theory. It is my hope that by exploring the empirical findings, 
theoretical and practical significance, and methodological challenges of a formal study of 
monetization as I have done here, that I can stimulate these types of new research endeavors, 
particularly those that bridge social network, economic, and environmental or biophysical 
domains. These types of integrated interdisciplinary data sources will be indispensible to the 
replication and verification of the models presented here, as well as a fuller understanding of the 
process of institutional change that is monetization and its precise theoretical linkages. 
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 TABLE 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Full and Rice-Growing Samples, All Variables 
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TABLE 4.1 (Cont’d): Descriptive Statistics for Full and Rice-Growing Samples, All 
Variables  
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TABLE 4.2: Independent Probit Models of Paid Labor Use and Rice Growing (With 
Huber-White Robust Standard Errors at Village Level) 
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TABLE 4.2 (Cont’d): Independent Probit Models of Paid Labor Use and Rice Growing 
(With Huber-White Robust Standard Errors at Village Level) 
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TABLE 4.3: Decomposition Using Probit Predicted Probabilities 
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TABLE 4.4: Predicted Probabilities of Monetized Labor Using Means of Full and Select 
Samples 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION TO THE DISSERTATION 
 
 REVIEW OF MAJOR FINDINGS AND SIGNIFICANCE 
In Chapter 2, I presented revised conceptual definitions of money and monetization 
which synthesized the strongest elements from Marxist and Simmelian analyses of money with 
contemporary scholarship. This new theoretical framework incorporates institutional and social 
network views of the role of money in society and the process of social change that is 
monetization. The theory was shown to have improved utility to theorists over more 
conventional understandings of money and monetization, and has the additional benefits of 
suggesting new research problems and supporting new collaborations between researchers who 
are studying different aspects of the same core process. This chapter was also aimed at reminding 
social scientists that the sociological perspective can make a considerable contribution to the 
study of money. Radford’s classic account of monetization in a German P.O.W. camp was 
shown to support this revised interpretation and, in fact, the revised theory explained several 
otherwise puzzling aspects of the account, including the rapidity with which the institution of 
money emerged in the camps, and the sensitivity of monetary exchange to the social conditions 
of the camp.  
Chapter 3, informed by the theory from Chapter 2, continued to develop an empirically 
grounded theory of monetization. In it, an attempt was made to better distinguish between 
traditional in-kind forms of exchange and monetized exchange, both traditionally identified in an 
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“I know it when I see it” fashion that is inadequate from a scientific perspective. I utilized the 
insights of sociological exchange theory and social network analysis and theory to derive five 
specific hypotheses specific to the context of rice harvest labor in Northeastern Thailand. Based 
upon the exploratory results presented, the caveat mutator burden does appear to influence the 
pattern of exchange in systematic ways.  The empirical analysis provided strong support for all 
five specific predictions about network properties associated with monetized exchange at two 
very different points in time. The analysis therefore supports the assertion that the theory 
describes a stable, underlying condition in labor exchange networks, and exchange networks 
more generally. 
In Chapter 4, I set out to identify the general sociological, demographic, and economic 
factors that are associated with a particular form of monetized exchange. In this chapter, I 
presented a pair of probit models that were related by the nature of the selection into the specific 
exchange behaviors. The first descriptive model predicts that agricultural participation is 
associated with the demographic, agricultural, and economic characteristics of households. The 
second model predicts that use of monetized labor in agriculture is related to household and 
agricultural factors alone. Further, these results were stable across very different periods of time 
in which a wide array of measured and unmeasured factors differed. A decomposition comparing 
the impact of data composition with that of the structural parameters suggested that shifts in the 
proportion of households growing rice between years are attributable chiefly to shifts in the 
characteristics of households and villages in the study area, while shifts in the proportion using 
paid labor are better explained by changes in the values of parameters.  
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 GENERAL IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES OF MONETIZATION 
At the outset of this work, I expressed a hope that, by its end, readers might be satisfied 
by the theoretical and empirical progress made toward a better understanding the role and 
significance of monetization in many aspects of social life. But such a hope ignores a common 
outcome of scientific inquiry: more numerous and better refined questions. The future research 
directions warranted by each chapter have been traced individually, but it is worth taking the 
time to present a more unified set of general suggestions.  
First, the theory presented in Chapter 2, and elaborated in Chapter 3, requires more 
attention. A fully developed theory of monetization is too large a task for a single researcher or a 
single set of articles. Many implications remain to be drawn from the basic elements of the 
theory and subsequently tested. So too, the implications derived and tested in these chapters 
require extensive replication and testing in other contexts before they can potentially take a place 
among other established elements of sociological understanding. The question of why some types 
of exchange continue to be monetized while others are not has been answered in the particular 
(monetized exchanges enable some of the trust requirements of an exchange to be shifted to an 
institutional agent) but the underlying motivations remain unexplored. If monetary exchange is 
so much more efficient, why does non-monetized exchange continue to exist at all? More work 
along the lines of Zelizer’s (1989) analysis of the multiple layers of meaning embedded in 
different types of economic transaction can serve as a model for these types of investigations. 
Second, and more fundamental, questions linger about what precisely occurs when 
exchange becomes monetized, that is, when money, whatever it is, becomes an acceptable means 
of payment. Money is a powerful innovation, with demonstrated and widely recognized capacity 
to drastically restructure human social relations. This was a major message of Marx’s Capital 
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and Simmel’s Philosophy of Money and these observations hold no less relevance for 
contemporary society. Which specific social phenomena are influenced by the way social 
exchange is conducted, and how? It has been suggested by authors cited in these papers that the 
introduction or proliferation of monetary exchange into an economy may promote such varied 
outcomes as the rapid transmission of AIDS through emerging transactional sex (Caldwell and 
Caldwell 1993) and the artificial inflation of measures of national economic growth like the 
Gross Domestic Product through the incorporation of formerly non-monetized transactions such 
as child care and domestic work (Benavot 1989; Bornschier, Chase-Dunn, and Rubinson 1978; 
Chase-Dunn, Kawano, and Brewer 2000; Lloyd 1991; London and Williams 1988; Schnaiberg 
and Reed 1974). These questions can only be addressed through careful empirical studies that are 
better able to measure the extent of monetization and model these potential causal relationships 
with other factors. 
Third, it has been suggested several times throughout these chapters that a major obstacle 
to the study of monetization in the past has been the predominant disciplinary division of 
research labors. Thus, I have attempted to demonstrate the benefits of a more interdisciplinary 
approach to the topic, at least where theory is concerned. The recognition that a variety of social 
phenomena are best studied using the combined expertise of multiple disciplines is not 
necessarily new, but does appear to be gaining institutional support from funding agencies, 
outlets for research publication, and academic departments responsible for educating new 
scholars and grating recognition. These are all the essential elements identified as necessary to 
the emergence of a new movement in academia by Frickel and Gross (2005) in their general 
theory of scientific and intellectual movements. Thus it may portend greater acceptance for 
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interdisciplinary research going forward. This is good news for the development of an 
interdisciplinary science of money and such important social phenomena as monetization.  
Fourth, and not to be lightly dismissed, is the observation that considerable political 
persuasion may be required to convince researchers in many disciplines who have been long 
accustomed to viewing monetization as a limited, well-understood concept to reexamine this 
position. This effort would be greatly aided by the additional empirical demonstrations of the 
significance of monetization called for above. To this end, the annotated bibliographies and 
categorized literature reviews found throughout this dissertation should provide an excellent 
starting point for other researchers interested in incorporating monetization into their work more 
directly.  
 SPECIFIC IMPLICATIONS FOR DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
Lastly, existing sources of data have been generated according to existing 
conceptualizations of money and monetization, a principal limitation of every set of observations 
about the world. One cannot measure what one cannot imagine or conceptualize. Kuhn made this 
point prominently in the Structure of Scientific Revolutions though he was certainly not the first 
to remark on the intimate relationship between the conceptual model of a thing and our abilities 
to observe its properties. Kuhn’s suggestion that a key function of paradigms is to direct 
researchers where to look for answers has the inseparable corollary that well-accepted theories 
may also limit us from seeing or making sense of things not illuminated by such understandings. 
Thus, what types of novel observations and data are required and implied by the revised theory 
and the conclusions reached thus far in the three chapters here? I wish to suggest two major 
approaches to collecting new and better data on the social phenomenon of monetization.  
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First, there is an important role for additional qualitative research that is exploratory in 
nature. Such research is important both for identifying additional elements that may help to 
better distinguish monetized exchange from non-monetized exchange and for shaping the 
research tools used to formally evaluate theoretical propositions. Of particular interest would be 
explorations into the attitudes of actors towards different types of exchange. Which types of 
information do they privilege in evaluating the riskiness of a given transaction? Where do they 
acquire this information? Both the original anthropological studies that informed these aspects of 
the theory in Chapter 2, and studies like that of DiMaggio and Louch (1998) which investigate 
the relationship between social networks and economic exchange can serve as useful models for 
further research.  
Second, many existing data sets, large and small may yet hold untapped potential to 
provide insights into monetization. But, what this also suggests is that incorporation of small 
modules into well-established data collection efforts might be easily carried out. Researchers 
already investigate many aspects of exchange behavior, institutions, and social networks. What 
could help the study of monetization immensely would be the addition of questions probing the 
specific requirements and context of a given set of regular economic transactions.  
The specific question, of course, will require extensive validity testing and revision. 
When fielded, the analyses presented here suggest that they should initially be targeted at a type 
of economic transaction closely bounded in time in space and at a community of actors that can 
be readily identified and bounded. This latter requirement is often challenging due to the 
overlapping nature of many networks (Wasserman and Faust 1994). A useful context to continue 
the investigation would be the study of seasonal economic activities in semi-autonomous (or 
highly exclusive) communities like the villages of Nang Rong. As an alternative the electronic 
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marketplaces that have emerged in recent years might provide a powerful illustration of the 
universality of the basic propositions of the theory.  
Thus, surprisingly, examples of basic questions investigating monetization in populations 
suggested throughout these chapters are as appropriate for villagers living in comparatively 
remote locations who might be experiencing monetization for the first time as they are for 
electronic consumers in the United States, already intimately acquainted with money in all its 
forms, who may shop the internet from the comfort of their own homes. It is this consistent 
universality of human exchange – noted by Simmel and Marx, emphasized by Radford, and 
illustrated throughout this dissertation – that should compel sociologists to pursue the types of 
analysis suggested here with the goal of better understanding yet another fundamental human 
institution. 
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Appendix 1A 
Full Matrix of Pearson Correlations among Village Characteristics  
and Rice Harvest Labor Measures, 1994 (r and p-values) 
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Appendix 1B 
Full Matrix of Pearson Correlations among Village Characteristics 
and Rice Harvest Labor Measures, 2000 (r and p-values) 
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Appendix 2A 
Full Matrix of Pearson Correlations among Household-Level Network 
and Rice Harvest Labor Measures, 1994 (r and p-values) 
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Appendix 2B 
Full Matrix of Pearson Correlations among Household-Level Network  
and Rice Harvest Labor Measures, 2000 (r and p-values) 
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Appendix 3 
Demography Articles Drawing Theoretical Connections between  
Monetization and Other Subjects, Organized by Thematic Area 
 
I. Fertility, Marriage, and the Family 
A. Demographic Transition Theory, Fertility Decline  
Caldwell, John C., P. H. Reddy and Pat Caldwell. 1982. "The Causes of Demographic Change in 
Rural South India: A Micro Approach." Population and Development Review 8(4):689-727. 
 
Caldwell, John C. and Pat Caldwell. 1978. "The Achieved Small Family: Early Fertility Transition 
in an African City." Studies in Family Planning 9(1):2-18. 
 
Caldwell, John C. 1978. "A Theory of Fertility: From High Plateau to Destabilization." Population 
and Development Review 4(4):553577. 
 
Cleland, John. 2001. "The Effects of Improved Survival on Fertility: A Reassessment." Population 
and Development Review 27 (Supplement):60-92.  
 
Cleland, John and Christopher Wilson. 1987. "Demand Theories of the Fertility Transition: an 
Iconoclastic View." Population Studies 41(1):5-30.  
 
Greenhalgh, Susan. 1988. "Fertility as Mobility: Sinic Transitions." Population and Development 
Review 14(4):629-674.  
 
Jones, Gavin. 1990. “Fertility Transitions Among Malay Populations of Southeast Asia: Puzzles of 
Interpretation.” Population and Development Review 16(3):507-537.  
 
Mason, Karen O., Maxine Weinstein and Barbara Laslett. 1987. "The Decline of Fertility in Los 
Angeles, California, 1880-1900." Population Studies 41(3):483-499.  
 
B. Caldwell’s Wealth Flow Theory, Cost of Children  
Birdsall, Nancy. 1983. "Fertility and Economic Change in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century 
Europe: A Comment." Population and Development Review 9(1):111-123. 
 
Caldwell, John C., Barkat-e-Khuda, Bruce Caldwell, Indrani Pieris and Pat Caldwell. 1999. "The 
Bangladesh Fertility Decline: An Interpretation." Population and Development Review 25(1):67-
84. 
 
Caldwell, John C. 1981. "The Mechanisms of Demographic Change in Historical Perspective." 
Population Studies 35(1):5-27. 
 
Caldwell, John C. 1976. "Toward a Restatement of Demographic Transition Theory." Population 
and Development Review 2(3/4):321-366. 
 
Fargues, Phillipe. 1997. "State Policies and the Birth Rate in Egypt: From Socialism to 
Liberalism." Population and Development Review 23(1):115-138. 
 
Freedman, Ronald. 1979. "Theories of Fertility Decline: A Reappraisal." Social Forces 58(1):1-
17. 
 
Khawaja, Marwan. 2000. "The Recent Rise in Palestinian Fertility: Permanent or Transient?" 
Population Studies 54(3):331-346. 
 
Knodel, John, Napaporn Harranon and Anthony Pamualratana. 1984. "Fertility Transition in 
Thailand: A Qualitative Analysis." Population and Development Review 10(2):297-328.  
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Simmons, Ruth. 1996. "Women's Lives in Transition: A Qualitative Analysis of the Fertility 
Decline in Bangladesh." Studies in Family Planning 27(5):251-268.  
 
Stark, Oded. 1981. "The Asset Demand for Children During Agricultural Modernization." 
Population and Development Review 7(4):671-675. 
 
C. Population Growth 
 McNicoll, Geoffrey. 1984. "Consequences of Rapid Population Growth: An Overview and 
Assessment." Population and Development Review 10(2):177-240. 
 
D. Family Planning  
Berelson, Bernard and Jonathan Lieberson. 1979. "Government Efforts to Influence Fertility: The 
Ethical Issues." Population and Development Review 5(4):581-613. 
 
Frank, Odile and Geoffrey McNicoll. 1987. "An Interpretation of Fertility and Population Policy 
in Kenya." Population and Development Review 13(2):209-243. 
 
Freedman, Ronald. 1987. "The Contribution of Social Science Research to Population Policy and 
Family Planning Program." Studies in Family Planning 18(2):57-82. 
 
Lewis, Maureen A. 1986. "Do Contraceptive Prices Affect Demand." Studies in Family 
Planning(17):3-126. 
 
Mita, Rezina and Ruth Simmons. 1995. "Diffusion of the Culture of Contraception: Program 
Effects on Young Women in Rural Bangladesh." Studies in Family Planning 26(1):1-13. 
 
Schellstede, William P. and Robert L. Ciszewski. "Social Marketing of Contraceptives in 
Bangladesh." Studies in Family Planning 15(1):30-39. 
 
Sirageldin, Ismail and Samuel Hopkins. 1972. "Family Planning Programs: An Economic 
Approach." Studies in Family Planning 3(2):17-24. 
 
Weinreb, Alexander. 2001. "First Politics, Then Culture: Accounting for Ethnic Differences in 
Demographic Behavior in Kenya." Population and Development Review 27(3):437-467. 
 
E. Marriage Patterns, Bridewealth, Dowries 
Boomgaard, Peter. 2003. "Bridewealth and Birth Control: Low Fertility in the Indonesian 
Archipelago, 1500-1900." Population and Development Review 29(2):197-214. 
 
Caldwell, John C., P. H. Reddy and Pat Caldwell. 1983. "The Social Component of Mortality 
Decline: An Investigation in South India Employing Alternatives." Population Studies 37(2):185-
205. 
 
Caldwell, John C., I. O. Orubuloye and Pat Caldwell. 1991. "The Destabilization of the Traditional 
Yoruba Sexual System." Population and Development Review 17(2):229-262. 
 
Fricke, Thomas and Jay D. Teachman. 1993. "Writing the Names: Marriage Style, Living 
Arrangements, and First Birth Interval in a Nepali Society." Demography 39(2):175-188. 
 
Mensch, Barbara S., Monica J. Grant and Ann K. Blanc. 2006. "The Changing Context of Sexual 
Initiation in sub-Saharan Africa." Population and Development Review 32(4):699-728. 
 
F. Children as Insurance, Fertility Preferences 
Axinn, William G. and Scott T. Yabiku. 2001. "Social Change, the Social Organization of 
Families, and Fertility Limitation." American Journal of Sociology 106(5):1219-1261. 
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Boserup, Ester. 1989. "Population, the Status of Women, and Rural Development." Population 
and Development Review 15 (Supplement)(4):45-60. 
 
Mason, Karen O. and Anju M. Taj. 1987. "Differences between Women's and Men's Reproductive 
Goals in Developing Countries." Population and Development Review 13(4):611-638. 
 
Montgomery, Mark R. 2000. "Perceiving Mortality Decline." Population and Development 
Review 26(4):795-819. 
 
G. Child Care in Industrial Nations 
 Angrist, Shirley S. and Judith R. Lave. 1973. "Issues Surrounding Day Care." Family Coordinator 
22(4):457-464. 
 
H. Care for Elderly 
Axinn, June and Herman Levin. 1972. "Optimizing Social Policy for Families." Family 
Coordinator 21(2):163-169. 
 
Freedman, Ronald. 1986. "Policy Options after the Demographic Transition: The Case of 
Taiwan." Population and Development Review 12(1):77-100. 
 
II. Mortality 
 A. Mortality differentials by region 
Meegama, S. A. 1969. "The Decline in Maternal and Infant Mortality and its Relation to Malaria 
Eradication." Population Studies 23(2):289-302. 
 
 B. Spread of AIDS 
Caldwell, John C. and Pat Caldwell. 1993. "The Nature and Limits of the sub-Saharan African 
AIDS Epidemic: Evidence from Geographic and Other Patterns." Population and Development 
Review 19(4):817-848. 
 
 C. Nutrition and Disease 
Caldwell, John C., P. H. Reddy and Pat Caldwell. 1983. "The Social Component of Mortality 
Decline: An Investigation in South India Employing Alternatives." Population Studies 37(2):185-
205. 
 
III. Migration 
 A. Determinants of Migration 
Arizpe, Lourdes. 1981. "The Rural Exodus in Mexico and Mexican Migration to the United 
States." International Migration Review 15(4):626-649. 
 
Roberts, Kenneth D. 1982. "Agrarian Structure and Labor Mobility in Rural Mexico." Population 
and Development Review 8(2):299-322. 
 
B. Consequences of Migration 
Guilmoto, Christophe Z. 1998. "Institutions and Migrations: Short-Term Versus Long-Term 
Moves in Rural West Africa." Population Studies 52(1):85-103. 
 
Haberkorn, Gerald. 1992. "Temporary versus Permanent Population Mobility in Melanesia: A 
Case." International Migration Review 26(3):806-842. 
 
C. Remittances 
Kirwan, F. X. 1981. "The Impact of Labor Migration on the Jordanian Economy." International 
Migration Review 15(4):671-695. 
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D. Immigrant enterprise 
Waldinger, Roger. 1986. "Immigrant Enterprise: A Critique and Reformulation." Theory and 
Society 15(1/2):249-285.   
 
 E. Migrant Labor 
Roberts, Kenneth D. 1997. "China's "Tidal Wave" of Migrant Labor: What Can We Learn from 
Mexican Undocumented Migration to the United States?" International Migration Review 
31(2):249-293.   
 
IV. Other Topics 
 A. Shifting locus of production, household production 
Arthur, W. B. and Geoffrey McNicoll. 1978. "An Analytical Survey of Population and 
Development in Bangladesh." Population and Development Review 4(1):23-80. 
 
Gartrell, John W. 1981. “Inequality Within Rural Communities of India.” American Sociological 
Review 46(6):768-782. 
 
Horan, Patrick M. and Peggy G. Hargis. 1991. "Children's Work and Schooling in the Late 
Nineteenth-Century Family Economy." American Sociological Review 56(5):583-596. 
 
McNicoll, Geoffrey. 1989. "Social Organization and Ecological Stability Under Demographic 
Stress." Population and Development Review 15 (Supplement):147. 
 
Stecklov, Guy. 1997. "Intergenerational Resource Flows in Cote d'Ivoire: Empirical Analysis of 
Aggregate Flows." Population and Development Review 23(3):525-553. 
 
Thornton, Arland and Thomas Fricke. 1987. "Social Change and the Family: Comparative 
Perspectives from the West, China, and South Asia." Sociological Forum 2(4):746-779. 
 
B. Household consumption 
Schnaiberg, Allan. 1970. "Rural-Urban Residence and Modernism: A Study of Ankara Province, 
Turkey." Demography 7(1):71-85. 
 
 C. Development Theory 
Boserup, Ester. 1996. "Development Theory: An Analytical Framework and Selected 
Application." Population and Development Review (22):3-505. 
 
 D. Changes in Adolescence 
Caldwell, John C., Pat Caldwell, Bruce Caldwell and Indrani Pieris. 1998. "The Construction of 
Adolescence in a Changing World: Implications for Sexuality, Reproduction, and Marriage." 
Studies in Family Planning 29(2):137-153. 
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Appendix 4  
Maximum Likelihood Heckman Selection Model of Paid Labor Use  
(With Huber-White Robust Standard Errors at Village Level) 
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